

**United States' Track II Diplomacy During the
Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis (2002-2008)**

by

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Abstract

In the realm of academia and US government, scholars and policymakers argue that diplomacy is no longer a viable option towards dismantling North Korea's nuclear program. I, however, argue that it is too early to declare diplomacy as a failed solution, due to the lack of research on Track II diplomacy between the US and North Korea. While there is a large amount of literature on US foreign policy towards North Korea, there is little literature that seeks to explain United States Track II diplomacy towards North Korea. My research, therefore, makes an original contribution to the study of US foreign policy towards North Korea. My dissertation questions why influential United States non-governmental organizations (NGOs) initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy with the North Korean government during the United States administrations of George W. Bush (2001-2009). It argues that non-governmental organizations pursued Track II diplomacy because they believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate for the shortcomings of US Track I, or official, diplomacy that took place between the Bush administration and North Korean government. To demonstrate my argument, I examine three cases of US Track II diplomacy to North Korea: Track II diplomatic conferences of the National Committee of American Foreign Policy; the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea; and US science diplomatic activities to North Korea, which include the Stanford delegation's visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and the Nautilus Institute's DPRK Energy Experts' Working Group. The analysis demonstrates that each case of US Track II diplomacy partially compensated for the US delegation to the Six Party Talks' inability to fulfil a normal function of diplomacy. This study concludes that the Bush administration limited its practice of official diplomacy concerning the North Korean nuclear issue, hence the vacancy for Track II diplomacy.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction.....	1
Introduction.....	1
Demonstrating the Research Gap.....	1
Disconnect between International Relations theory and study of diplomacy	2
Literature on US diplomacy is atheoretical.....	6
Dominant themes of literature on US foreign policy towards East Asia	10
Lack of literature on Track II diplomacy between US and DPRK	14
Research question	26
Thesis.....	28
Methodology	29
Chapter outline.....	31
Chapter 2 Analytical Framework.....	34
Introduction.....	34
Analytical framework	35
Core elements of classical literature on diplomacy	37
Diplomacy is conducted by the state.....	38
Negotiation is a core element of diplomacy.....	42
Limitations of the classical literature on diplomacy	50
Non-state actors play a role in diplomacy.....	51
Track II diplomacy.....	58
Conclusion.....	69
Chapter 3 American Moral Exceptionalism as a Constraint on US diplomacy	70
Introduction.....	70
The Debates: Exceptional or Not?	72
American exceptionalism: historical phenomena versus normative prospectus	79
American exceptionalism as a historical phenomena	80
American exceptionalism as moral superiority.....	85
The diplomatic isolation of non-democratic states.....	91
American moral exceptionalism and Track II diplomacy	97
Chapter 4 Bush administration diplomacy towards the DPRK: Constraints and limitations	99
Introduction.....	99
The underlying philosophy	100
The self-understanding of Bush administration foreign policy	102
The embeddedness of moral exceptionalism in policies towards North Korea	105
North Korea must be free.....	107
The 2003 North Korea Democracy Act	109
The 2006 North Korea Nonproliferation Act.....	111
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007	112
Bush administration foreign policy towards the DPRK.....	113
Diplomacy with the DPRK.....	116
The 2002 Pyongyang meeting.....	118
The process	121
Inadequate gathering of information about the nuclear issue	126
Lack of effective communication between the United States and the DPRK	128
Complicating factors.....	131

Lack of a consistent and coherent US foreign policy towards the DPRK	132
The lack of trust between the US and the DPRK.....	134
The Bush administration's overreliance on the Chinese government.....	135
The role of the DPRK	137
Opening the space for Track II diplomacy to the DPRK.....	138
Chapter 5 Explaining the NCAFP Track II Diplomacy on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis.....	141
Introduction	141
Data	143
Problem-solving workshop: An approach to conflict resolution	146
Assumptions that inform Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop	147
Central purpose and series of objectives of problem-solving workshop	148
Methodology	148
Ideal participant of the problem-solving workshop	151
Critiques of the Kelman and Cohen's model	152
The National Committee on American Foreign Policy.....	153
NCAFP Track II approach: Supplement to, and preparation for Six Party Talks.....	156
Assumptions that inform the NCAFP Track II approach	156
Purpose of NCAFP Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue	157
Objectives of NCAFP Conference on Northeast Asian Security	161
Methodology	164
NCAFP Track II meeting participants	169
Achievements of the NCAFP Track II diplomacy on the DPRK nuclear issue	175
Open a channel of communication between US delegation and DPRK delegation ..	176
Change participants' perspectives of each other and the North Korean nuclear issue	181
Transfer of results from NCAFP Track II meeting back into official policy process ..	186
Conclusion.....	190
Chapter 6 US Science Diplomacy to the DPRK: Track II diplomacy in action.....	191
Introduction	191
Data	192
Scholar and policy literature on science diplomacy.....	194
Scholarly literature on science diplomacy	195
Policy literature on science diplomacy	204
US science diplomacy: manifestation of Track II diplomacy	212
Theoretical Framework: Non-state actors play a role in diplomacy	212
Explaining the activities of Stanford University academics and the Nautilus Institute in the DPRK	216
Stanford University academics' visits to Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center	217
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability DPRK Energy Experts Working Group	229
Conclusion.....	237
Chapter 7 Americans in Pyongyang: Explaining the New York Philharmonic's Visit to the DPRK.....	238
Introduction.....	238

Data	240
US delegation unable to minimize effects of friction within US-DPRK relations..	242
Motivation, aim, and outcome of the New York Philharmonic’s visit to Pyongyang	247
Disconnect between study of US musical diplomacy and diplomatic theory	256
New York Philharmonic’s visit conceptualized within Track II diplomacy	262
Theoretical framework: Non-state actors play a role in diplomacy.....	263
New York Philharmonic compensates for a limitation of US diplomacy.....	266
Conclusion.....	271
Chapter 8 Conclusion	272
Introduction	272
Research question and thesis	272
Analytical Framework.....	273
Chapter conclusions.....	273
Further research	277
Research findings and implications.....	278
Conclusion.....	279
Bibliography	281

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Introduction

Within the realm of academia and United States government, scholars and policymakers argue that diplomacy is no longer a viable option towards dismantling North Korea's nuclear program. Due to the lack of research on Track II diplomacy between the United States and North Korea, it is, however, too early to declare diplomacy as a failed solution. While there is a large amount of literature on United States foreign policy towards North Korea, there is little literature that seeks to explain United States Track II diplomacy towards North Korea. This dissertation makes an original contribution to the study of United States foreign policy towards North Korea, as it aims to help fulfil this research gap.

In this chapter, I first demonstrate that there is a lack of research on Track II diplomacy between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).¹ I next introduce my research question and hypothesis. I next discuss my methodology and, lastly, the chapter structure of my dissertation.

Demonstrating the Research Gap

There is a very long-established literature on the field of US foreign policy, but there is little written about Track II diplomacy, or unofficial diplomacy, specifically Track II diplomacy between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Through the analysis of literature pertaining to United States foreign policy, United States foreign policy towards East Asia, and United States foreign policy towards North Korea, I will demonstrate four research gaps. The first research gap is the lack of attention

¹ The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea. I will be referring to this region as either DPRK or North Korea.

to diplomacy in International Relations theory. The second gap is that the literature on US diplomacy is predominantly atheoretical. The works concerning American diplomacy make little reference to International Relations theory or diplomatic theory. The next research gap is that the literature concerning US foreign policy towards East Asia gives little attention to diplomacy between the US and East Asian region. Lastly, there is a lack of scholarly literature concerning US diplomacy towards the DPRK, particularly in terms of Track II diplomacy. Instead, the literature is heavily policy driven and focused on security. I will, therefore, demonstrate that there is a gap in the English-language literature concerning Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK.

Disconnect between International Relations theory and study of diplomacy

In this section, I demonstrate that the subject of diplomacy has received little attention from International Relations theories through the analysis of different International Relations theories, represented by Hans Morgenthau, John Mearsheimer, and Robert Keohane.² Morgenthau is the most famous classical realist and his work dominated the field of International Relations for at least the next two decades after it was first published in the early days of the Cold War (1948).³ Mearsheimer and Keohane are also leaders in their respected International Relations theory as their works have been cited in numerous scholarly articles and books, including textbooks, such as Bruce Jentleson's *American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century*.⁴

² Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1993).

³ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 14.

⁴ Bruce Jentleson, *American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2014), 216-233.

In his work, *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Peace and Power*, Hans Morgenthau explains the role of diplomacy in his theory of International Relations, which is known as classical realism.⁵ Although Political Realism began with an understanding of the significance of diplomacy, as shown by Morgenthau, the current theories of Political Realism understand diplomacy as unimportant in international politics, as can be seen in the work of Mearsheimer. In his theory, Morgenthau explains why states want power and how much power states deem satisfactory. Morgenthau argues that states strive for power because states are governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.⁶ States, therefore, strive for power because they are led by human beings who have a will for power. In his explanation of power, Morgenthau introduces the different factors that make up the power of a nation, one being the quality of diplomacy.⁷ He, therefore, regards diplomacy as an asset of the state, as he explains that the quality of a nation's diplomacy combines the other elements of national power into an integrated whole, turning potential power into actual power.⁸ Diplomacy in Morgenthau's perspective is a component, or reflection, of state power and, therefore, an instrument of the state that is dependent on more material capabilities.⁹

In *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Mearsheimer explains why states compete for power.¹⁰ Mearsheimer first provides his understanding of power, which is comprised of a state's population, wealth and military power. He then explains that states measure power through the size of the states' military power, which is divided into latent (economy and population) and actual power (military).¹¹ Mearsheimer argues that the aim of a state is to

⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 529-532.

⁶ Ibid., 4.

⁷ Ibid. 146.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Christer Jonsson, "Theorising Diplomacy" in *Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft*, ed. B.J.C. McKercher. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 18.

¹⁰ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 29-54.

¹¹ Ibid., 55-137.

become the hegemon—the only great power in the international system.¹² States aim to be the hegemon, and are predominantly concerned with survival due to three features of the international system: the lack of an agency that will protect the states from each other; the fact that states always have some offensive military capability; and the fact that states can never be certain about other states' intentions.¹³ Due to these fears, states recognize that the more powerful they are compared to their rivals, the better their chance of survival. The national interest of the state is, therefore, defined in terms of power since states realize that power is the key to their survival.

Mearsheimer argues that because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power, there are rarely states that wish to preserve the existing balance of power. States are, therefore, locked in a perpetual great-power competition, since the best guarantee of survival is to gain power and become the hegemon. If the state was to become the hegemon, it could not be seriously threatened by other states due to its mighty power and its survival would, therefore, be ensured.¹⁴ While Mearsheimer's work explains why states seek power, his political theory does not mention diplomacy. Given his lack of attention to the theory and practice of diplomacy, Mearsheimer's work implies that diplomacy has little connection to a state's power, nor does it aid in increasing a state's power; diplomacy is, therefore, inconsequential in international politics.

In *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Robert Keohane introduces his theory of International Relations. Keohane argues that in order to understand international politics, it is necessary to take “the existence of mutual interests as given and examines the conditions under which they will lead to cooperation.”¹⁵

¹² Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 55-137.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid., 169.

¹⁵ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 6.

Keohane explains that cooperation has been, and can be, organized in the international world economy when common interests exist.¹⁶ Keohane's *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* defines two key terms—cooperation and international regimes. Keohane builds a theoretical framework on the basis of the concepts of cooperation and international regimes to show that cooperation between states is possible, even in an anarchical international society.¹⁷ He argues that under some conditions, cooperation can develop on the basis of complementary interests, and that international regimes, or international institutions, affect the patterns of cooperation that emerge.¹⁸ The extent of cooperation, therefore, depends on the existence of international institutions with particular characteristics, such as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”¹⁹ Keohane’s theory focuses on cooperation that is centred on complementary interests, but his theory does not mention the practice of diplomacy. Keohane places great importance to international institutions in terms of their role in international cooperation, which is somewhat similar to the theories of diplomacy that emphasize the necessity of negotiations to reduce or manage conflict resolution. Keohane, however, does not incorporate diplomacy as a core component of his theoretical framework, de-emphasizing the importance of diplomacy in international politics and underestimating the role and function of diplomacy in the international system.

International Relations theorists have written little about diplomacy. Mearsheimer and Morgenthau’s theory of realism argues that states compete for power in an anarchical

¹⁶ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 6.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., 13.

For more information concerning international regimes, see Robert Keohane, “Cooperation and International Regimes” in *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

international society. While they may disagree on why states compete for power, their scholarship provides an understanding of what power is and how states measure the level of power. The works of Morgenthau and Mearsheimer demonstrate that international relation theorists of Political Realism have given less attention to diplomacy. Although Morgenthau frames diplomacy as a reflection of the national power, Mearsheimer does not mention the role of diplomacy in his theoretical framework. Liberalism also does not give much attention to diplomacy. While Keohane argues that cooperation between states can be achieved through international institutions with certain characteristics, he does not mention how the practice of diplomacy can support international cooperation. Diplomacy is a valuable instrument of foreign policy, yet International Relations scholars rarely discuss the role of diplomacy in their theories, and give even less attention to the role of Track II diplomacy in their scholarship. There is, therefore, a disconnection between the study of International Relations theory and the study of diplomacy.

Literature on US diplomacy is atheoretical

The dominant approach to the study of American diplomacy is empirical and not shaped by a clear theoretical framework. I do this by comparing the works of George Kennan and William Appleman Williams, and the scholarship that they have developed.²⁰ Kennan and Williams' respective scholarship on American diplomacy is a critique of US foreign policy that had taken place before and was taking place during the Cold War.²¹ Kennan argues that the legalistic-moralistic principles that defined US foreign policy from 1900s to

²⁰ George Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951); William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972).

²¹ Both Kennan and Williams' works were published and taught during the Cold War. Kennan's *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* was first published in 1950. Williams' *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* was first published in 1959.

1950s are at odds with the assumptions and practices of traditional power politics, where the nation's concept of interests is defined by power.²² His work, therefore, includes concepts that are identified to Political Realism. Williams' *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* argues that US foreign policy was interconnected with imperialism, and is, therefore, also considered as an important piece of scholarship within the study of American imperial history.²³ Michael Hunt considers Kennan and Williams' work on US foreign policy as the two dominate interpretations concerning America's relationship with the rest of the world.²⁴

Kennan's *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* analyzes past events of American diplomacy to make the case that because the national interest is defined in terms of power, great states care about power. He argues that moralism and legalism, which he argues defined America's approach to international affairs, obstructed a clear definition and effective pursuit of the national interest.²⁵ Kennan defines the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems as the "belief that it would be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of government in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints."²⁶ The main principle of the legalistic-moralistic approach is that it is in the international community's best interest if formal criteria of a juridical nature, by which acceptable behaviour of states could be defined, were developed.²⁷

Kennan finds faults in the legalistic-moralistic approach and argues that this approach contains several weaknesses. The first is that the legalistic-moralistic approach ignores the international significance of political problems and the deeper sources of international stability.²⁸ The legalistic-moralistic approach also does not take into consideration the

²² Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, 107.

²³ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 24.

²⁴ Michael Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009), 5.

²⁵ Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, 107.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 102.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 102.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

conflicts of national interest. Kennan critiques the moralistic-legalistic aspect of US foreign policy arguing that this framework had led to a decline of US security.²⁹ Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Powers* argues that while Kennan presents the argument that power is the basic concept that explains the conduct of a state's external relations, he does not explain why states pursue or compete for power, or what level of power states deem satisfactory.³⁰ Kennan's approach makes use of conceptual insights of what is now understood as the international theory of realism. He, however, does not use these to build a comprehensive and persuasive theoretical framework for understanding international diplomacy.

Also relying on past events in the field of American diplomacy, Williams' *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* describes US' overseas commercial expansion, and explains the expansionist ambitions of US diplomacy. Williams, therefore, connects US economic activities to the study of US foreign policy, to emphasize that American foreign policy can be identified as an interest-oriented approach, and that it was centred on expansionism. Another theme that Williams introduces in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* is that almost all Americans held the belief that domestic well-being depends upon sustained, increasing overseas economic expansion.³¹ Williams argues that Americans believed that expansion was essential to American prosperity and security not only because it was economically necessary, but also because of their belief that it would bring peace and wealth to the rest of the world.³² Williams explains why America saw expansionism as essential, but he does not explain why expansionism increases the effects of American power. Moreover, while Williams explains the relationship between United States expansionism and the pursuit of power by US policymakers, his work remains focused on empirical

²⁹ Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, vii.

³⁰ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 18.

³¹ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 24.

³² *Ibid.*, 30.

investigation. His work, therefore, also does not provide a developed theory of American diplomacy.

As demonstrated, the works that discuss diplomacy between the US and other states are more empirical than theoretical.³³ Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman's edited volume, *American Diplomacy*, recognizes the issue of scholars and policymakers giving more attention to American grand strategy and foreign policy than to American diplomacy.³⁴ While the essays in the volume contribute to the general study of American diplomacy, this section specifically analyzes the first chapter, written by Wiseman, as he underlines that International Relations theorists underestimate diplomacy. In his chapter, "Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy," Wiseman argues that the US has a distinctive form of "anti-diplomacy," accepting in practice many diplomatic norms and practices while remaining reluctant to acknowledge the fact.³⁵ To demonstrate this claim, Wiseman argues that the US practices diplomacy in a distinctive manner, and that the distinctiveness stems from seven characteristics of American diplomacy.³⁶

Through his analysis of the characteristics of American diplomacy, Wiseman examines the relationship between international relation theorists and the study of diplomacy. Wiseman argues that realism "overlook a great deal that distinguishes national diplomatic culture and styles that affect international affairs."³⁷ Realists perceive diplomacy as static and universal rather than evolving and particular.³⁸ Moreover, realists believe that diplomacy

³³ Thomas Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1969); John Greenville and George Young, *Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy 1873-1917* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); George Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951); Robert Schulzinger, *US Diplomacy since 1900* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

³⁴ Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, eds., *American Diplomacy* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012).

³⁵ Geoffrey Wiseman, "Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy," in *American Diplomacy*, ed. by Paul Sharp et al. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 4.

³⁶ Wiseman, "Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy," 4.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., 22.

fails to achieve the objective of advancing the country's national interests, which is why they do not give much importance to diplomacy within their theory of International Relations.³⁹ Similarly, liberals doubt that diplomacy promotes international cooperation as much as they think it should, and, therefore, the practice of diplomacy is also overlooked.⁴⁰ Wiseman's work, therefore, further supports the argument that the literature on US diplomacy lacks an appropriate framework that is drawn from the concepts of International Relations theory.

Dominant themes of literature on US foreign policy towards East Asia

In this section, I analyse the literature on US foreign policy towards East Asia to demonstrate that the dominant themes of the literature are the question of stability in the East Asian region and security. Little attention is given to the subject of diplomatic interaction between the United States and East Asia. The literature on US foreign policy towards East Asia refers to numerous theories of International Relations, as scholars explain their perspectives concerning stability and security in East Asia. There is, however, a lack of literature on the subject of diplomacy between the two regions, specifically Track II diplomacy between the US and DPRK. Scholars have, therefore, given little attention to diplomacy, focusing predominantly on the theme of security and the question of stability.

The main understanding concerning the situation of post-Cold War East Asia has conventionally been underpinned by Realist assumptions, and focuses on prospects for regional tension and heightened great power conflict.⁴¹ Richard Betts' "Wealth, Power and

³⁹ Wiseman, "Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy," 22.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States After the Cold War," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (1994): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (1994): 5-33; Michael Mastanduno, "Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia," in *Asian Security Order*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa, (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2003), 141-170; Robert Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (1999): 81-118.

Instability: East Asia and the United States After the Cold War,” and Aaron Freidberg’s “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” argue that Asia could see a return of power politics, return of arms racing, and possibility of major conflict among Asian countries.⁴² Robert Ross writes in his article, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century,” that liberalist scholars argue that the tension in post-Cold War East Asia will “increase because of the relative absence of the three liberal/Kantian sources of peace: liberal democracies, economic interdependence, and multilateral institutions.”⁴³

Other perspectives concerning security and stability of East Asia that are not underpinned by Realist or Liberal assumptions are, however, appearing in the academic literature. David Kang points out that the pessimistic predictions from realists that “Asia would experience a period of increased arms racing and power politics has largely failed to materialize” and argues that East Asia should be examined through the theory of constructivism—the perspective of East Asia’s own history and culture.⁴⁴ Kang critiques widely-used Realist approaches by arguing that it is problematic for scholars to project concepts, theories and experiences derived from the European experience onto East Asia.⁴⁵ On a similar note, Peter Katzenstein argues that regional commonalities differentiate Asian from European politics in terms of institutional form, type of identity, internal structure, and characteristic political practice.⁴⁶ John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno also voice their concern that European-centred theories may not apply or be useful towards the East Asian region.⁴⁷ These scholars, therefore, question whether the International Relations theories that are deeply rooted in Western philosophical traditions and debates are applicable to US

⁴² Betts, “Wealth, Power and Instability,” 36-37; Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,” 7.

⁴³ Ross, “The Geography of the Peace,” 81.

⁴⁴ David Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” *International Security* 27, no. 4 (2003): 58.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁴⁶ Peter Katzenstein, “Regionalism Reconsidered,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 7, no. 3 (2007): 395.

⁴⁷ Ikenberry and Mastanduno, *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, 2.

relations with East Asia. Amita Acharya notes that the theory of constructivism is becoming central to literature on East Asian international relations because “its focus on issues of culture and identity, resonate well” with Asian scholars.⁴⁸

Muthiah Alagappa’s *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features* also questions the claim made by Friedberg and other Realist scholars of how East Asia would become a dangerous region where rivalry, power balancing and conflict would prevail.⁴⁹ He instead argues that the international political, economic and social interaction of most East Asian states, “occurs in the context of a stable and predictable environment and generally is in accord with internationally accepted principles and norms.”⁵⁰ Alagappa’s *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features* examines the security order of East Asia.⁵¹ Alagappa argues that six pathways sustain the security order; these are hegemony, balance of power, regional multilateral institutions, United Nation system, nongovernmental institutions, and economic cooperation and interdependence.⁵² This edited volume is structured around the study of security order in Asia, and includes a chapter that investigates the impact of Track II process, or nongovernmental institutions, on the form and function of the Asian security order.

Brian Job’s “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asia Security Order,” questions to what extent Track II processes have had an impact on determining the characteristics of the post-Cold War security structure in the Asian region and whether past Track II processes are capable of sustaining forward momentum on

⁴⁸ Amita Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives on International relations in Asia” (paper presented at the Conference on International Relations in Asia: The New Regional System, Washington D.C., September 2007), 18.

⁴⁹ Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 8.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

enhancing norms and modalities of sub-regional and regional security cooperation.⁵³ Job adopts the analytical eclectic mode of inquiry that includes multiple theoretical perspectives—realism, liberalism and constructivism—to analyse the influence of nongovernmental institutions and unofficial processes on Asian security.⁵⁴ His analysis of the Track II diplomacy is, however, based on the broader spectrum of Track II processes, such as unofficial public diplomacy, informal diplomatic process, and regional and sub-regional multilateral security dialogues throughout Asia.⁵⁵ The focus is, therefore, on multilateral institutions, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its corresponding nongovernmental (Track II) multilateral institutions, and the effect that these multilateral institutions have on cooperative security. His analysis consequently does not include the narrower Track II processes that include a particular form of dialogue activity which involves the meeting of academics, journalist, and government officials attending in their unofficial or private capacities.

Another approach that challenges the dominant Realist perspective concerning security in East Asia is the “critical theoretical approach” and the “human-centered policy approach” introduced by Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald.⁵⁶ In their edited volume, *Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific*, Burke and McDonald question the understanding of traditional or Realist security studies. They and other contributors address some of the problems, people, and vulnerabilities of the East Asian region that they believe have been

⁵³ Brian Job, “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asia Security Order,” in *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 241-279.

⁵⁴ For works concerning analytical eclecticism, see Peter Katzenstein, “Re-thinking Asian Security,” in *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency*, edited by J.J Suh, Peter Katzenstein and Allen Carlson, 1-33. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004; Peter Katzenstein, and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytic Eclecticism.” *International Security* 26, no. 3 (2002).

⁵⁵ Job, “Track 2 Diplomacy,” 241-279.

⁵⁶ Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald, eds., *Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 2.

neglected in the dominant literature. The critical theoretical approach “interrogates the deeper assumptions underpinning security discourses and policies.”⁵⁷ The human-centred policy approach “avoids the state and elite bias of traditional security analysis and instead focuses on the security, welfare and emancipation of human beings and communities.”⁵⁸ The edited volume, therefore, approaches East Asia not through theories concerning deterrence, alliance systems strategy and counter-insurgency, but through emancipation, human security, security politics, language and threat-constructions. While the focus of the articles written about the Korean peninsula or China is on traditional conflicts and security concerns, issues are perceived through the critical theoretical approach.⁵⁹ The main purpose of this book is to underline forms of insecurity and suffering that have been misunderstood or neglected by traditional security studies.⁶⁰ It, therefore, aims to re-define security in the Asia-Pacific region. The edited volume, however, pays little attention to diplomacy, both official and unofficial, nor does it mention whether diplomacy plays or does not play a role in the re-defined security order of this region. The theme of the literature concerning US foreign policy towards East Asia is about the question of security and stability within the East Asian region, and pays little attention to the diplomatic relation between the US and East Asia.

Lack of literature on Track II diplomacy between US and DPRK

There is little research on Track II diplomacy between US and the DPRK. Instead the English-language literature on North Korea is predominantly policy driven. Furthermore, as

⁵⁷ Burke and McDonald, eds., *Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific*, 2.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁵⁹ Ronald Bleiker, “Dealing with a nuclear North Korea: conventional and alternative security scenarios,” in *Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 215-230; Yongjin Zhang, “Discourses of security in China: towards a critical turn?” in *Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 167-182.

⁶⁰ Burke and McDonald, eds., *Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific*, 2.

argued by Charles Armstrong, most of the literature is written by security experts who are more concerned with influencing US policy than understanding North Korea itself.⁶¹ I first analyse the authoritative literature that has influenced US policymakers' and media's perspective of North Korea, and the US foreign policies towards the DPRK to demonstrate that the primary focus of US policy is the nuclear issue more than any other issue concerning North Korea. I then analyse the authoritative literature concerning nuclear negotiations between the US and the DPRK to demonstrate that the literature focuses on Track I diplomatic procedures, and is primarily descriptive. I lastly analyse the literature concerning Track II diplomacy with US and DPRK to show that the literature is also descriptive, and does not provide an analytical framework that can be used as a theoretical framework for this dissertation.

Dominant focus of US foreign policy towards North Korea

The authoritative literature pertaining to US foreign policy towards North Korea focuses on North Korea's nuclear program and analyzes this issue predominantly through a security perspective where the significant factor of analysis is military power and military instruments.⁶² As will be later demonstrated, these scholars' interpretation of the North Korean government's behaviour and their perception of North Korea's strategic intentions about its nuclear program are reflected in US government policies. United States foreign policy towards North Korea is, therefore, predominantly focused on the nuclear issue more than any other issue. Nicholas Eberstadt's "Hastening Korean Reunification" (1997) and Marcus Noland's "Why North Korea Will Muddle Through" (1997) are two such articles

⁶¹ Charles Armstrong, "Trends in the Study of North Korea," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 70, no. 2 (2011): 358.

⁶² Hazel Smith, "Bad, mad sad or rational actor? Why the 'securitization' paradigm makes for poor policy analysis of north Korea," *International Affairs* 76, no.3 (2000): 593.

that have led the scholarship that has shaped US foreign policy towards North Korea.⁶³ Other influential scholarship includes Victor Cha's "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula" and David Kang's "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War."⁶⁴ Cha's and Kang's arguments can also be found in their jointly-authored book *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies*.⁶⁵

Eberstadt argues that the "North Korean regime is the North Korean nuclear program" and because the North Korean program is what supports the existence of the North Korea regime, the only strategy that will bring peace to the Korean peninsula and resolve the North Korean issue is unification under South Korean rule.⁶⁶ Eberstadt, therefore, argues that US policy towards North Korea should focus on Korean unification. Eberstadt argues that gradual unification is not possible since the North Korean government will not accept a program of economic liberalization. Instead, "the weight of evidence indicates that the leadership believes that economic liberalization would be lethal for the regime."⁶⁷ Eberstadt also argues against diplomacy by underlining that any diplomatic act with the North Korean government will turn into "tribute-seeking diplomacy."⁶⁸ In other words, if the US- DPRK relation was normalized and the two nations were to enter into an economic relationship, the North Korean government would only extort foreign aid from the US, using its nuclear program as leverage. Under these conditions, the acceptable policy is one that prepares for and attempts to expedite unification.⁶⁹

⁶³ Nicholas Eberstadt. "Hastening Korean Reunification." *Foreign Affairs* 76, no.2 (1997): 72-92; Marcus Noland, "Why North Korea will Muddle Through," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 4 (1997): 105-118.

⁶⁴ Victor Cha, "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," *International Security* 27, no. 1 (2002): 40-78; David Kang. "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 3 (September 2003): 301-324.

⁶⁵ Victor Cha and David Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

⁶⁶ Eberstadt, "Hastening Korean Reunification," 88.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 80

⁶⁸ Nicholas Eberstadt, "The Most Dangerous Country," *National Interest* 57 (1999): 51.

⁶⁹ Eberstadt, "Hastening Korean Reunification," 78.

Noland's article examines the economic status of North Korea, and offers three options that the North Korean leadership faces, which are: economic reform, collapse of the North Korean regime and unification with South Korea, or muddling through, making adjustments when circumstances dictate.⁷⁰ Noland also briefly discusses which option China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States would prefer.⁷¹ Noland proposes that "long-run US interests" are better served by the option of unification by South Korea, compared to the other two options.⁷² He argues that the US would not only bear little of the direct costs of unification, but also unification has the prospect of ending North Korean proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁷³ Noland, therefore, supports Eberstadt's argument that unification by South Korea is a promising solution for the US concerning North Korea and its nuclear program.

While Eberstadt and Noland argue that the policy of unification, even if it is coerced, best serves the interests of the US, Cha and Kang argue that engagement with the DPRK must be part of the US policy.⁷⁴ Cha and Kang argue that North Korea is neither irrational nor undeterrable; they, however, adopt different assessments concerning North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Relying on the theories of preventive war and power transitions, as well as the desperation theory, which argues that a country might rationally decide on war if alternatives are even worse, Cha envisages that North Korea will instigate another conflict and is, therefore, a threat to the United States.⁷⁵ Kang, however, disputes Cha's argument. Relying on the theory of deterrence, Kang argues that North Korea will not instigate another conflict because deterrence works—the US has made it clear that a North Korean attack

⁷⁰ Noland, "Why North Korea will Muddle Through," 110-111.

⁷¹ Ibid., 117.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Victor Cha and David Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 4-5.

⁷⁵ Cha, "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," 44.

would fail.⁷⁶ Kang also argues that North Korea's "nuclear weapons, missile programs, and massive conventional military deployments are aimed at deference and defense."⁷⁷ North Korea's nuclear program is, therefore, a product of DPRK's legitimate security concerns, and the purpose of the program is to protect the DPRK from existential threats. Although both Cha and Kang argue that the most desirable option concerning North Korea's nuclear program is engagement, they differ in their assessment of North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Cha argues that the program is for offensive capabilities, while Kang argues that it is for defensive purposes.

There is a number of English language scholarly books on North Korea that aim to explain various aspects of the state, such as the everyday life of North Korea citizens, human rights, and its economy.⁷⁸ A large bulk of the literature concerning North Korea, however, is focused and written in the context of what the US' response to North Korea's nuclear program should be. The authors' arguments can be seen in US government policies concerning North Korea, as their scholarship has influenced one of the primary issues that have stood out in the policy debate: containment and/or regime change vs. engagement.⁷⁹ Policymakers in the US government have been divided between the two contrasting policies concerning the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program. One group of policymakers, known as hardliners, believes that the North Korean government is increasing its nuclear capacity to deter attacks, intimidate its neighbours and/or sell its products to other

⁷⁶ Kang, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War," 301.

⁷⁷ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies*, 43.

⁷⁸ Armstrong, "Trends in the Study of North Korea"; Barbara Demick, *Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea* (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2010); Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Chol-hwan Kang, *The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag* (New York: Basic Books, 2001); Hazel Smith, *Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005).

⁷⁹ Lindsey Ford, Zachary Hosford, and Michael Zubrow. "US-DPRK Nuclear Negotiations: A Survey of the Policy Literature." *Center for a New American Security*, April 2009.

nations.⁸⁰ They proclaim that the North Korean government's violation of a series of non-proliferation agreements result from the government's intention of regime survival.⁸¹ Hardliners, therefore, believe North Korea is a threat to the interests of the United States and believe that the only strategy worth pursuing is isolation and containment to ensure the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program.⁸²

A component of the hardliner's preferred policy is complete verifiable irreversible dismantlement (CVID) and the use of economic sanctions. The literature concerning CVID states that the primary goal of the US government must be complete dismantlement of all North Korean nuclear weapons in a complete verifiable manner.⁸³ The literature argues that any policy that does not strive for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization, demilitarization, and termination of hostilities and illicit activities is rewarding North Korea for "escalating belligerent provocations."⁸⁴ The literature on financial and economic sanctions argues that sanctions force the North Korean regime to make better decisions concerning its wealth and present the leadership with a choice between reform and collapse.⁸⁵ Financial sanctions are, therefore, perceived by hardliners as being successful in restraining the North Korean government and pressuring it to modify its behaviour. Some hardliners, however, take a step further, seeking regime change, which would lead to the collapse of the

⁸⁰ Marion V. Creekmore, *A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, the Power of a Peacemaker, and North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2006).

⁸¹ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 15.

⁸² Ibid., 16.

⁸³ Kim R. Holmes, "North Korea Nuclear and Missile Issues: What's the Solution?" *The Heritage Foundation*, February 2007, <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/north-korea-nuclear-and-missile-issues-whats-the-solution>; Klinger, Bruce Klinger, "A Six-Party Strategy: How the US Can Press North Korea to Give Up Its Nuclear Weapons," *The Heritage Foundation*, February 2007.

⁸⁴ Holmes, "North Korea Nuclear and Missile Issues."

⁸⁵ "Answer North Korea with Financial Sanctions." *Washington Post*, April 2, 2013; Joshua Stanton and Sung-Yoon Lee, "Financial sanctions could force reforms in North Korea," *The Washington Post*, February 20, 2014; Juan C. Zarate, *Treasury's War: the Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013).

current North Korean government and unification under South Korean rule.⁸⁶ Like Eberstadt, they believe that the eradication of North Korea is the solution for a denuclearized and peaceful Korean peninsula. Hardliners favour isolation, containment, and transformation of North Korea rather than attempting engagement and diplomacy.

The other group of policy-makers is known as soft-liners, or moderates. Contrast to hardliners, they believe that the North Korean government's fear of United States pre-emptions led it to develop a nuclear program.⁸⁷ The United States government should, therefore, resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiations.⁸⁸ This policy is against economic sanctions and acts of military deterrence, arguing that they have not worked to end the North Korean crisis, but instead have led to more tension on the Korean Peninsula.⁸⁹ The body of literature produced by moderates reasons that the US government should take steps to persuade rather than force North Korea to cooperate.⁹⁰ Moderates argue that the primary purpose of the North Korean nuclear program is to leverage the US and other countries into providing North Korea with political, economic and security benefits.⁹¹ The components of US policy towards North Korea should, therefore, entail economic and political incentives.⁹² Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon's *Crisis on the Korean*

⁸⁶ Mike Chinoy, *Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008); Charles Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got The Bomb* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

⁸⁷ Tim Beal, *North Korea: The Struggle Against American Power* (London: Pluto Press, 2005).

⁸⁸ Cha and Kang, *Nuclear North Korea*, 4-5; Abraham M. Denmark, Zachary M. Hosford, and Michael J. Zubrow. "Hard Lessons: Navigating Negotiations with the DPRK." *Center for a New American Security*, November 2009,

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/DenmarkHosfordZubrow_DPRKLessonsLearned_Nov09.pdf

⁸⁹ Charles Armstrong, "Negotiation, Not Deterrence, the Way Forward with North Korea," interview with Marie O'Reilly, *IPI Global Observatory*, April 17, 2013.

⁹⁰ Armstrong, "Negotiation, Not Deterrence, the Way Forward with North Korea"; Sung Chull Kim and David Kang, eds. *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2009).

⁹¹ Creekmore, *A Moment of Crisis*.

⁹² Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang, eds. *Economic Sanctions against a Nuclear North Korea: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions since 1950* (Jefferson: McFarland, 2007) Kim and David Kang, *Engagement with North Korea*; Mike M. Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2003).

Peninsula introduce such a policy, which they label as a “grand bargain.”⁹³ The authors argue that in return for the North Korean government limiting its conventional forces and completely dismantling its nuclear capability, the United States should provide economic aid and guarantees of military security.⁹⁴ The policy literature from moderates focuses on components and points that US diplomats should bring to the negotiating table, but it does not adequately explain why these components will lead to a successful negotiation, nor does it take role of Track II diplomacy into consideration.

The literature concerning United States foreign policy towards North Korea focuses predominantly on the denuclearization of North Korea. Scholars and government officials introduce and argue for what they believe is the most efficient route to dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program, with the debate being framed within the security perspective.

Nuclear negotiations literature

There is a body of literature that discusses United States diplomatic negotiations with the DPRK.⁹⁵ The literature, however, focuses primarily on Track I diplomatic processes, and is more empirical than theoretical. I demonstrate this argument through the analysis of the authoritative English-language literature concerning the nuclear negotiations that occurred during the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis.

In *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis*, Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman and Robert Gallucci present an inside account of the first North Korea nuclear crisis and trace the efforts of the Clinton administration that led North Korea to freeze its nuclear program

⁹³ Mochizuki and O'Hanlon, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula*, 3.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci. *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2004); Leon Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

starting from March 1993 to July 1995. Using international government documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the three authors discuss the concerns that the Clinton administration had towards North Korea's nuclear program and the diplomatic efforts that lead to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.⁹⁶ The authors establish the obstacles that negotiators faced as the negotiators sought to intertwine military, economic, and diplomatic instruments to create a multi-part strategy that would persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response.⁹⁷ While the authors discuss President Carter's visit to North Korea, they do not provide an in-depth analysis of the Track II diplomatic efforts, as the book's main focus is to provide the US government's perspective of the first North Korean nuclear crisis.

Leon Sigal also provides a comprehensive account of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea*. Using extensive interviews and daily newspaper coverage, Sigal presents the details to how the Korean nuclear crisis originated, how it escalated to point that the United States almost went to war, and how the crisis was defused and resolved. Referring to game theory and strategy of reciprocity, Sigal argues that the North Korean government was willing to negotiate its nuclear program in exchange for light-water reactors and a normalized relationship with United States. He establishes that the United States government at first refused to engage in negotiations, and was only able to recognize the option of a peaceful conflict resolution after the failure of coercive diplomacy, and after the personal intervention by former president Jimmy Carter. Sigal, therefore, argues that the US government carries a preference towards

⁹⁶ Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, *Going Critical*, xii.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

coercion than cooperation when dealing with aggressive nations.⁹⁸ Sigal's work is important as it presents a different account of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, as he incorporates the argument that the US prefers coercion than cooperation when interacting with aggressive nations. He also argues that North Korea was willing to cooperate and negotiate, disputing prior beliefs and scholarship about North Korea. He, however, does not focus on the Track II diplomatic efforts that occurred during this time period and its role within the Track I diplomatic efforts, as he gives more attention to the actions and decisions of the US government.

While Wit, Poneman, Gallucci and Sigal focus on the first North Korean nuclear crisis, Funabashi provides a comprehensive and multiple-perspective account of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*. Drawing upon interviews with key government officials, Funabashi goes beyond the bilateral context of the United States and North Korea, and depicts how the efforts of China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States attempted to lay the framework for multilateral negotiations, first as trilateral meetings that included the US, China and North Korea, and then as the Six Party Talks. Funabashi discusses the historical, geopolitical and security concerns of the participating states, and also illustrates the failures of these states that led to the deepening of the second nuclear crisis. Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made efforts to create a normalized relationship with North Korea only for the attempts to become hampered by the abduction issue.⁹⁹ The US government attempted to search for a quick and permanent solution to the nuclear issue, but the "two governments in one" and the inner-struggle within the Bush administration concerning the nuclear solution

⁹⁸ Sigal, *Disarming Strangers*, 3.

⁹⁹ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 13.

resulted in the prolongation of the negotiations.¹⁰⁰ Russia offered to play the role of “honest broker” and proposed of a “package solutions” that the Russian government believed would be accepted by other nations.¹⁰¹ The North Korean government, however, did not trust Russia and the weakest point of the proposed solution was that it failed to lure China into the arrangement. The role of the Chinese government shuffled between its traditional relationship with North Korea, and leading the multilateral diplomacy to defuse the nuclear crisis.¹⁰² Despite China’s efforts, North Korea carried out a nuclear test in October 2005. The South Korean government played a self-appointed role as “balancer” in the East Asian region, but it started to lose trust and support from other countries for South Korea to play a central role in a post-unification Korean peninsula.¹⁰³ Funabashi examines the actions of the states that participated in the Six Party Talks, and concludes that these actions may have deepened the crisis than resolve it. He, however, does not provide an analysis of the nuclear negotiations, but rather provides a detailed account of the security interests and perspective of the participating nations.

United States Track II Diplomacy with North Korea

Few have analysed or sought to explain United States Track II diplomacy to North Korea.¹⁰⁴ The available literature on US-DPRK Track II diplomacy is primarily descriptive. Marion Creekmore’s *A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, the Power of a Peacemaker, and North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions* describes former President Jimmy Carter’s visit to North

¹⁰⁰ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 13.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 191.

¹⁰² Ibid., 293.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 257.

¹⁰⁴ "A Case for Track II Diplomacy: The North Korean Nuclear Issue." *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* 27, no. 5 (2005): 450-453; M. J. Zuckerman, "Track II Diplomacy: Can "Unofficial" Talks Avert Disaster?" *Carnegie Reporter* 3, no. 3 (2005): 2-11.

Korea and his Track II diplomatic efforts to mediate the first nuclear crisis that occurred between the United States and North Korea. Unlike Wit, Poneman, and Galluci's book that uses governmental documents, Creekmore's book relies on the personal papers and notes of President Carter. Creekmore accompanied President Carter on his trip to North Korea, which gave him access to primary sources that were not available to other analysts. The book describes the process of how President Carter, as a private citizen, was able to travel to North Korea, meet with North Korea's President Kim Il-Sung, and leave with an understanding that contributed to a peaceful suspension of the nuclear crisis.¹⁰⁵ Creekmore's book aims to establish that the former president was concerned that the US government was misjudging the actions of North Korea, and that President Carter's initiative to go and visit North Korea was because he believed that Kim Il-Sung wished to resolve the nuclear issue through a peaceful resolution.¹⁰⁶ The book, however, does not attempt to provide analysis of this Track II diplomatic effort, but instead provides a detailed empirical account of President Carter's visit to North Korea.

Accounts of United States initiated Track II diplomacy to the DPRK are mainly available in reporting from non-governmental agencies and media reporting, and are mainly descriptive than scholarly. The well-connected National Committee of American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) hosted Track II conferences in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2009 that complemented the official, or Track I, Six Party Talks, and allowed the participating six states to explain their perspective of the North Korean nuclear crisis in an unofficial setting.¹⁰⁷ Several DPRK participants and US officials said that they found the meetings

¹⁰⁵ Creekmore, *A Moment of Crisis*.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Zuckerman, "Track II Diplomacy" 2-11; Donald Zagoria, "Multilateral Dialogue to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue," NAPSNet Special Reports, August 09, 2005, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/multilateral-dialogue-to-resolve-the-north-korean-nuclear-issue/>; Donald Zagoria, "The Next Phase of US-DPRK Relations," *National Committee on American Foreign Policy*, 2008; "The National

helpful.¹⁰⁸ The NCAFP published information about the Track II diplomatic efforts that the NCAFP hosted in its journal, *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee of American Foreign Policy* and in the related NCAFP yearly reports.¹⁰⁹ The reports and articles include observations of the conferences, perspectives of the different participating nations, and the goals of the NCAFP. The publications, however, cannot be considered as scholarly since the literature is primarily descriptive. In June 2017, the National Committee on North Korea (NCNK) released a report about Track II diplomacy with North Korea.¹¹⁰ Similar to the publications of the NCAFP, the NCNK report is more descriptive than analytical, in that it offers no analytical framework which explains why the organizations initiated US Track II diplomatic activities with the DPRK. There is, therefore, an absence of research on United States diplomacy towards North Korea, particularly in terms of Track II diplomacy.

Research question

During the administrations of George W. Bush, the dominant view, as expressed by the National Security Council, the president's office, and the vice president's office, was that

Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) in Pictures," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 32, no. 44 (2010).

¹⁰⁸ Zagoria, "The Next Phase of US-DPRK Relations."

¹⁰⁹ "For the Record," *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* 26, no. 1 (2004): 73-76; "News and Views," *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* 27, no. 5 (2005): 459-61; "News and Views," *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* 28, no. 3 (2006): 276-79; "News and Views," *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* 30, no. 1 (2008): 51-56; "Kissinger, Perry Likely to Visit NK to End Nuclear Stalemate," *Korea Times*, November 11, 2008; "The North Korean Nuclear Issue," *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* 28, no. 3 (2006): 269-70; Donald Zagoria, "East Asian Security Challenges," *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* 29, no. 1 (2007): 11-22.

¹¹⁰ Daniel Wertz, *Track II Diplomacy with Iran and North Korea: Lessons Learned from Unofficial Talks with Nuclear Outliers*, Washington D.C.: The National Committee on North Korea, 2017, accessed July 27, 2017, http://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/NCNK_Track_II_Conference_Report_0.pdf.

the United States should not engage in Track I diplomacy with North Korea.¹¹¹ Even when both states were engaged with each other through the multilateral diplomacy of the Six Party Talks between 2002 and 2008, the Bush administration continued to express a reluctance to engage in Track I diplomacy with North Korea. The Bush administration, for example, instructed the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly not to engage in bilateral talks with the North Korean government delegation.¹¹² Nevertheless, unofficial or Track II diplomacy, initiated by representatives of United States non-governmental organizations closely connected to Track I officials, took place throughout the period of the Bush administrations. The well-connected National Committee of American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) hosted Track II conferences on Northeast Asian security; the New York Philharmonic Orchestra visited Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea to play a public concert; and academics from Stanford University visited the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, North Korea's main nuclear facility. Track II diplomacy, therefore, had the consequence of managing diplomatic channels between the United States and the DPRK when official channels were closed.¹¹³

As demonstrated in the first section of this chapter, there is a lack of research on Track II diplomacy between the US and the DPRK, and so the question that arises from the research gap is why did influential United States non-governmental organizations (NGOs) initiate and pursue Track II diplomacy with the government of the DPRK during the United States administrations of George W. Bush that began on January 20, 2001 and ended on January 20, 2009?

¹¹¹ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 421.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 338.

¹¹³ Kruth, Erin. "US Alternative Diplomacy towards North Korea: Food Aid, Musical Diplomacy, and Track II Exchanges," in *SAIS US-Korea Yearbook 2008* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 2008).

Thesis

Even though the United States and the DPRK were diplomatically engaged with each other, the Bush administration continued to express a reluctance to engage in Track I diplomacy with North Korea. This placed constraints on Track I diplomats. The argument that I aim to demonstrate is that non-state actors pursued Track II diplomacy because they believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate for the shortcomings of US Track I diplomacy that took place between the Bush administration and the North Korean government. My dissertation's understanding of Track II diplomacy is a type of diplomatic practice where non-state actors help compensate for the limitations that state actors face during Track I diplomacy through processes, such as problem-solving workshops, influencing public opinion, and cooperative economic development.¹¹⁴ This understanding of Track II diplomacy is significant as it emphasizes an important function of Track II diplomacy, which is its ability to become an effective support to the official negotiation process. Track II diplomacy can play an important complementary role at all stages of the negotiation process.

Although United States non-state actors recognized the divergent national interests of the United States and the DPRK, they hoped that the Bush administration would continue to resolve the North Korean nuclear conflict through diplomacy. They perceived United States policy as being over-reliant on military solutions while ignoring and underestimating the value of diplomacy in conflict resolution. Track II diplomacy was, therefore, designed to assist official Track I diplomats and the diplomatic process by compensating for the constraints that were imposed upon these state actors by the Bush administration.

¹¹⁴ Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 161.

Methodology

This dissertation evaluates secondary material that includes books and scholarly articles about Track I and Track II diplomacy between United States and the DPRK, and books and articles about US foreign policy goals towards North Korea and the instruments the US government used to achieve those goals. This dissertation also uses primary data that includes government and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports, reports from the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) and the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, and interviews.

Secondary data is obtained from libraries and electronic sources. Primary data is obtained through news services, such as *The New York Times*, and *The Los Angeles Times*. Primary data is also obtained through databases, such as LexisNexis, which is used to gain a broader access to relevant articles. Material on Track II diplomacy is obtained from the *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee of American Foreign Policy*, which is the journal that is published by the NCAFP and the NCAFP yearly reports.¹¹⁵ The journal of the NCAP and the yearly reports include information about the Track II diplomatic efforts that the NCAFP hosted with DPRK and other participating Six Party Talk states. The journal can be found using the database, Taylor & Francis.¹¹⁶ The yearly reports are published on the NCAFP website.¹¹⁷ My thesis is from the perspective of

¹¹⁵ "For the Record," (2004): 73-76; "News and Views," (2005): 459-61; "News and Views," (2006): 276-79; "New and Views," (2008): 51-56; "Kissinger, Perry Likely to Visit NK to End Nuclear Stalemate." *Korea Times*, November 11, 2008; "The North Korean Nuclear Issue." *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* 28, no. 3 (2006): 269-270; Donald Zagoria, "East Asian Security Challenges," *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy* 29, no. 1 (2007): 11-22.

¹¹⁶ *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Taylor & Francis, <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uafp20#.VXbiu1xViko>.

¹¹⁷ Ronda Hauben, "Track 2 Talks for North Koreans and US Held by NCAFP in New York." *Netizen Journalism and the New News*, April 28, 2011; Zagoria, Donald, "Conference on Northeast Asian Security," *NCAFP*, August 9-11, 2004, accessed October 3, 2015, <https://www.ncafp.org/articles/04%20second%20conference%20on%20northeast%20Asian%20security.pdf>; Zagoria, Donald, "The Next Phase of US-DPRK Relations." Summary Report for a Conference Organized by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), November 10, 2008.

US non-governmental organizations and the Bush administration, which have produced material written in English. I will, therefore, be mainly using English-language material.

This dissertation also makes use of interviews with organizers of Track II diplomacy between the US and the DPRK in order to supplement the gaps that appeared after the secondary and primary literature was reviewed and analysed. I specifically interviewed those who played a key role within the Track II diplomatic endeavours, as a main unit of analysis of this dissertation are those who have initiated and/or pursued Track II diplomacy with the DPRK. I have gone through the appropriate ethical procedures, as established by the University of Central Lancashire, and have obtained ethical approval to address the issue of gaining informed consent. In order to obtain consent from participants, I created a consent form which the participant signed before the interview began. Interviews raise some understandable methodological and theoretical concerns, such as the problems of distinguishing truth from authenticity, potential bias, and the informant's memory.¹¹⁸ For a variety of reasons, the informant may omit important details, or they may view the situation through "distorted lenses" and provide an account that is misleading and unable to be checked or verified.¹¹⁹ Original interviews are, however, necessary in order to gain a better understanding of why non-governmental organizations pursued Track II diplomacy. This study is moreover based on the perceptions and beliefs of the organizers of Track II diplomacy. Interviews were, therefore, chosen as the primary method because they allow me to examine the subject's attitudes and beliefs in depth, and because interviews provide insight into "experiences, processes, and behaviors."¹²⁰ Semi-structured interviews is the most

¹¹⁸ George Gaskell, "Individual and Group Interviewing," in *Qualitative Researching: With Text, Image and Sound. A practical handbook*, ed. Martin W. Bauer and G. Gaskell (London: SAGE Publications, 2000), 38-56; Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Karl Nunkoosing, "Problems with Interviews," *Qualitative Health Research* 15, no. 5 (2005): 698-706.

¹¹⁹ Gaskell, "Individual and Group Interviewing," 44.

¹²⁰ J. Rowley, "Conducting research interviews," *Management Research Review* 35, no. 3 (2012): 261.

appropriate form of interviewing since it not only provides some organization and structure, but also allows for flexibility and subject feedback.¹²¹ The organization and structure allows for specific topics to be addressed, while the flexibility and subject feedback gives rise to unconsidered questions or topics.

Chapter outline

My dissertation consists of a total of eight chapters, including introductory Chapter 1. The analytical framework of my research, including its understanding of Track II diplomacy, is established in Chapter 2. The analytical framework draws from the following concepts of diplomacy. The first is that diplomacy is conducted by the state and state-sanctioned actors through the process of negotiation. The second is that diplomacy is also conducted by non-state actors. The third is that the relationship between the state and the non-state actor within the realm of diplomacy can be demonstrated in a specific form of diplomacy, known as Track II diplomacy.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 specifies the constrictions of US Track I diplomacy during the Bush administration, which Track II diplomacy aimed to compensated for. The aim of Chapter 3 is to demonstrate that although articulated and manifested in different forms by different presidencies, American exceptionalism in the theory and practice of United States diplomacy, is very profoundly embedded in the historical and conceptual framing of United States foreign policy. The idea of American exceptionalism as moral superiority is helpful in the effort to understand United States reluctance to engage diplomatically with non-democratic states. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the United States delegation to the Six Party Talks was unable to fulfil the normal functions of diplomacy because of the underlying

¹²¹ Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, 284.

philosophy of the ideology of American moral exceptionalism that impeded active diplomatic engagement with the North Korean government.

Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7 discuss three cases of US Track II diplomacy towards North Korea that occurred during the Bush administration. Chapter 5 analyses the Track II diplomatic efforts initiated by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP). I argue that the National Committee on American Foreign Policy pursued and initiated a series of Track II meetings from 2003 to 2005 to compensate for the US delegation to the Six Party Talks' inability to facilitate the communication of US policy objectives to the DPRK. To explain the NCAFP's Track II diplomatic approach, I make use of Herbert Kelman and Stephen Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop. Their model reflects my analytical framework, as I establish in my analytical framework that problem-solving workshops have the potential to compensate for limitations of official diplomacy.

Chapter 6 examines the US scientific activities pursued by the academics of Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute of Security and Sustainability in the DPRK. In lieu of the unsuccessful efforts by the Bush administration to obtain information about the DPRK's nuclear program, these activities can be explained by diplomatic theories that have been established in my analytical framework, specifically the concept that non-state actors are partaking in functions of diplomacy. Chapter 6 argues that the scientific activities can be understood as fulfilling the Track I diplomatic function of gathering information about another state. By gathering information and transferring their findings back into the United States Track I policymaking processes, the Stanford University academics and the Nautilus Institute compensated for the Bush administration Track I diplomatic limitations.

Chapter 7 shows that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a partial compensation for the US delegation's inability to fulfil the normal diplomatic function of minimizing diplomatic friction between the United States and the

DPRK. While it can be debated whether this visit can be categorised as a form of Track II diplomacy, the New York Philharmonic's visit to the DPRK played a complementary role to the Six Party Talks, as the visit helped the United States delegation to the Six Party Talks fulfil certain functions of diplomacy. By doing such, the visit can be considered a form of Track II diplomacy. The analytical framework of this dissertation argues that Track II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors compensate for the constraints that state actors face in official diplomacy. The orchestra aimed to present a positive image of the United States to the North Korean government and the North Korean public. In so doing, the activities of the New York Philharmonic can be understood as a partial compensation for the United States delegation's inability to ease the diplomatic friction between the US and the DPRK.

Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of and summarizes the research. There are numerous other forms of nongovernmental activity that have been carried out by United States intermediaries in regards to North Korea, such as the global, nongovernmental, humanitarian aid organization Mercy Corps program to alleviate hunger in North Korea by expanding agricultural production, or Syracuse University educational initiatives.¹²² The three case studies that my dissertation analyses, however, best demonstrate my dissertation's understanding of Track II diplomacy. These cases partially compensated for the United States delegation to the Six Party Talks' inability to fulfil a normal function of diplomacy.

¹²² George S. Bain, "One Korea," *Maxwell Perspective*, Fall 2009, accessed on July 23, 2018, <https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/news.aspx?id=36507226699>; Fred Carriere, interview with author, Oct. 16, 2016; Lila Wade, "Demystifying our work in North Korea," *Mercy Corps*, August 20, 2010, accessed on July 23, 2018, <https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/north-korea/demystifying-our-work-north-korea>.

Introduction

In this chapter, I develop the analytical framework to explain why influential United States non-state actors initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy with the government of the DPRK during the George W. Bush administration. I argue that Track II diplomacy was pursued by non-state actors because they believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate for the shortcomings of US official diplomacy that took place between the Bush administration and the North Korean government. I develop an analytical framework that takes into account the role of the state and non-state actors in the domain of diplomacy through the analysis of the literature on diplomacy, since Track II diplomatic activities involves state and non-state actors.

I first introduce my analytical framework, which draws on concepts of diplomacy. In the following section, I further analyse these concepts within the context of the International Relations theories of political realism and neoliberal institutionalism. I then analyse the classical literature on diplomacy to argue that two conceptual underpinnings of diplomacy are that diplomacy is conducted by the state and that negotiation is central to diplomacy.¹ The classical literature on diplomacy does not take into consideration the role of the non-state actor in diplomacy or the nature of Track II diplomacy. In the third section, I address these limitations. Through the analysis of literature on post-Cold War diplomacy, I argue that diplomacy is also conducted by non-state actors, since non-state actors are engaging in practices that have been conventionally known as core diplomatic tasks.² The emergence of

¹ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1977); Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1993); Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).

² John Robert Kelley, "The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 21, no. 2 (2010): 286-305; Richard Langhorne, "Current developments in diplomacy: Who are the diplomats now?" *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 8, no. 2 (1997): 1-15; Richard Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,"

non-state actors in the domain of diplomacy does not mean that non-state actors are replacing the state-sanctioned actors as the diplomatic representative, as argued by Langhorne.³ In the last section, I argue that the relationship between the state and non-state actor can be demonstrated in a specific practice of diplomacy known as Track II diplomacy, through the analysis of the literature on Track II diplomacy.⁴

Analytical framework

In order to explain why non-governmental organizations pursued Track II diplomacy with the government of the DPRK during the Bush administration, the analytical framework draws from the following concepts of diplomacy. The first assumption is that diplomacy is conducted by the state and state-sanctioned actors through the process of negotiation, as argued by the classical literature on diplomacy.⁵ The second assumption is that diplomacy is also conducted by non-state actors, as the literature on post-Cold War diplomacy such as Richard Langhorne's "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors" and John Robert Kelley's "The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution" argue that non-state actors are engaging in core diplomatic tasks.⁶ Diplomacy, therefore, involves a wide range of actors that go beyond the

Diplomacy & Statecraft 16, no. 2 (2005): 331-339; Michael Lisowski, "How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 2 (2005): 361-383; Geoffrey Allen Pigman, "Making Room at the Negotiating Table: The Growth of Diplomacy between Nation-State Governments and Non-State Economic Entities," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no.2 (2005): 385-401; Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, "Introduction," in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, ed. Ole Jacob Sending et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 5.

³ Langhorne, "Current developments in diplomacy," 3, 4; Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 332.

⁴ Ronald J. Fisher, "Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation," *International Negotiation* 11 (2006): 65-89; Ronald J. Fisher, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful Negotiation," *International Journal* 44, no. 2 (1989): 442-474; Joseph Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," in *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships Vol II* ed. V.D. Volkan, J. Montville & D.A. Julius (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991), 161-175.

⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 170; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 108, 530-531; Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 3, 39, 52.

⁶ Kelley, "The New Diplomacy," 286; Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 334; Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, "Introduction," 5.

state, which include intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. The emergence of non-state actors in the domain of diplomacy, however, does not indicate that the role of the state and state-sanctioned actors is irrelevant or has become obsolete.⁷ The third assumption is, therefore, that the relationship between the state and non-state actors in diplomacy can be demonstrated in a specific form of diplomacy, known as Track II diplomacy.⁸ Track II diplomacy is a practice of diplomacy where non-state actors help compensate for limitations that state actors face during official diplomacy.

The analytical framework of this dissertation makes use of the concepts of the International Relations theories of realism and neoliberalism. It, however, makes less use of constructivist theory. According to the constructivist framework, identities and interests of actors of the international system are endogenous and socially constructed, rather than exogenous and fixed, making identities and interests significant features of international relations.⁹ Constructivists are, therefore, interested in how constituent actors are able to acquire their current identity and the interests that are assumed to go along with it, and how specific identities of specific states shape their interests, and thereby, patterns of international outcomes.¹⁰ Wendt and Ruggie, who are considered core constructivist scholars within the

⁷ Juergen Kleiner, "The Inertia of Diplomacy," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 19, no. 2 (2008): 321-349; Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, "Introduction," 5.

⁸ Tobias Böhmelt, "The effectiveness of tracks of diplomacy strategies in third-party interventions," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (2010): 167-178. Fisher, "Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation," 65-89; Fisher, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions," 442-474; Jeffrey Mapendere, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks," *Culture of Peace Online Journal* 2, no. 1 (2005): 66-81; John W. McDonald, "Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy," in *Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts* ed. Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J Thorson (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 201-220; Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 162; James Notter and John McDonald. "Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies for Peace," *Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy*, accessed on April 19, 2016, [http://www.davidmlast.org/POE410-2016W/7_Management_files/Notter%26McDonald\(1996\)Track2diplomacy.pdf](http://www.davidmlast.org/POE410-2016W/7_Management_files/Notter%26McDonald(1996)Track2diplomacy.pdf).

⁹ John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization*, vol 52 no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 856; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, vol. 46 no. 2 (Spring 1992) 397, 403.

¹⁰ Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?," 863.

field of International Relations as determined by the February 2007 TRIP survey of International Relations faculty in the United States and Canada, argue that the identities and interests of actors are generated by international interactions—by what other actors do.¹¹ The identities and interests of actors, such as foreign policy identities and national interests, are, thereby, constructed socially. The aim of my dissertation, however, is not to explain the Bush administration's foreign policy or American diplomacy, *per se*. Rather, it is more interested in showing how the United States government regards diplomacy, particularly within the context of its foreign policy towards the DPRK, in order to better demonstrate that Track II diplomacy is a complement to official Track I diplomacy. It is, therefore, not necessary to use the fundamental principles of constructivism as a framing device.

Core elements of classical literature on diplomacy

In this section, I demonstrate two core components in terms of understanding diplomacy as established by the classical literature on diplomacy. The first component is that the classical literature on diplomacy understands diplomacy as being conducted by the state. The conceptualization of the state that informs this perspective can be understood through the paradigm of Political Realism theories, which assumes the state as sovereign, independent, and equal to other states in the international system.¹² The second component that I demonstrate is that the classical literature on diplomacy understands negotiation as the core component of diplomacy. Diplomacy, therefore, does not involve the usage of force, as the negotiation process is conducted through peaceful means. The classical literature on

¹¹ Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael Tierney, "The View From the Ivory Tower: TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in the United States and Canada," *College of William & Mary*, February 2007, https://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/_documents/trip/ivory_tower_view_2007.pdf; Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?," 879; Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it," 403.

¹² Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 318-319.

diplomacy does not conceptualize negotiation, but the concepts of the negotiation process can be understood through I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman's framework on negotiation, as set out in *The Practical Negotiator*.¹³ This framework argues that the negotiation process can be analysed through specific stages, sequences, behaviours, and tactics. These two core elements of diplomacy are in works that have become authoritative and influential in understanding the nature and function of diplomacy, including Harold Nicolson's *Diplomacy*, Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, and Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*.

Diplomacy is conducted by the state

In this section, I argue that diplomacy is conducted by the state, and those who represent and are, thereby, authorized to act in the name of the state, as argued by the classical literature on diplomacy.¹⁴ The conceptualization of the state that informs this perspective can be understood through the paradigm of Political Realism theories.¹⁵ Given the paradigm of Political Realism thought, which gives states more importance than non-state actors, the classical literature on diplomacy understands the state, rather than non-state actors, as the key actor in diplomatic interaction.

In his work *Diplomacy* (1939), Nicolson argues that diplomacy is conducted by the professional diplomat, who is the representative of the state.¹⁶ Nicolson was part of the diplomatic service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for twenty years, from 1909 to 1929.¹⁷ *Diplomacy* was written due to Nicolson's concern that the public

¹³ I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

¹⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 163; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 531; Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 4.

¹⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 13.

¹⁶ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 39, 52.

¹⁷ T.G. Otte, "Nicolson," in *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, ed. G.R. Berridge et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 152-153.

was misunderstanding and misusing the term diplomacy, and so his purpose for this work was to explain what he believed diplomacy is and what it is not.¹⁸ Although Nicolson's *Diplomacy* does not provide a theoretical framework for understanding diplomacy, his work makes use of conceptual insights of what is now known as the International Relations theory of Political Realism, represented by Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (1948).¹⁹

To represent and specify his understanding of diplomacy, Nicolson uses the definition of diplomacy as given by the Oxford English Dictionary, namely, "diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiations; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist."²⁰ This definition of diplomacy provides various understandings of diplomacy, but it implies that diplomacy is conducted by specific official agents who are authorized to act in the name of the state. Nicolson argues that diplomacy is a definite profession, which is why he dedicates an entire chapter of his scholarship to what he believes to be the qualities of an ideal diplomatist.²¹ Nicolson also specifies which official agents should conduct diplomacy, as he states that he believes that diplomacy should be practiced specifically by professionals who have been trained in the art of negotiation and have discretion and experience in negotiation.²² Nicolson then argues that this "professional diplomat is the servant of the sovereign authority," and that in democratic countries, the sovereign authority is represented by the government.²³ The professional diplomat is, therefore, the servant of the state, as Nicolson assumes the sovereign authority as the state.

¹⁸ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 4.

¹⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 13.

²⁰ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 4-5.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 14, 55-67.

²² *Ibid.*, 39, 52.

²³ *Ibid.*, 41.

Nicolson describes the state as being independent, which indicates that Nicolson assumes the state as having no authority above it, or as sovereign.²⁴ Nicolson's scholarship can be understood through the paradigm of Political Realism thought, represented by Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Morgenthau argues that the independence of a state signifies that there is no authority above the state, which he then argues is a particular aspect of the supreme authority of the state, or a state's sovereignty.²⁵ The state is, therefore, free to manage its internal and external affairs according to its discretion and without the interference of another state, as long as the decisions of the state do not violate existing treaty or international law. Nicolson understands the state as the sovereign authority, and so the sovereign authority that the professional diplomat serves is the state. Nicolson's work demonstrates that diplomacy is state-directed as he argues that diplomacy is conducted through the professional diplomat who represents the state.

Similar to Nicolson, Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* argues that diplomacy is conducted by the state through the agents that speak for and represent the state.²⁶ Morgenthau's scholarship is one of the few theories of International Relations that gives attention to the subject of diplomacy. Morgenthau argues that international peace can be achieved through diplomatic processes, because diplomacy can be used by the state to minimize and mitigate international conflicts.²⁷ Morgenthau understands diplomacy as the formulation and execution of foreign policy.²⁸ In order to successfully formulate and execute a state's foreign policy, and thereby resolve international conflicts,

²⁴ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 41.

²⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 318.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 108.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 529.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 146.

Morgenthau argues that there are four tasks that diplomacy must manage.²⁹ Diplomacy must first determine its objectives taking into account the power that is actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives.³⁰ Diplomacy must then assess the objectives of other states and determine whether the other states have the power to pursue their objectives.³¹ The third task is to determine the compatibility of these different objectives.³² If the objectives are not compatible, then through diplomatic bargaining, the give and take of compromise, a way must be found to which the interests of the different nations can be reconciled.³³ Diplomacy must lastly establish the correct means for achieving its policy objectives.³⁴

Morgenthau argues that the instruments of diplomacy, or those who are responsible for performing these tasks of diplomacy, are two. The first instrument is the foreign offices in the capitals of the respective state, which is the agency where foreign policy is formulated.³⁵ These foreign offices are better known as the ministries of foreign affairs, which are responsible for the formulation and execution of foreign policy; although in most states, the foreign ministry formally shares control over the making of foreign policy with other ministries and executive activities.³⁶ The second is the diplomatic representative sent by the foreign offices to the capitals of foreign nations, or the diplomat.³⁷ According to Morgenthau, the ones who conduct diplomacy are, therefore, the ministry of foreign affairs and the diplomat. He, moreover, argues that these instruments of diplomacy act as the

²⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 531.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., 532.

³⁶ G.R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, 5th Edition (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 10, 19.

³⁷ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 532.

representative of the state, which indicates that Morgenthau believes that diplomacy is conducted by the state, or those sanctioned by the state.³⁸

The main unit of Morgenthau's scholarship is the statesmen.³⁹ When Morgenthau inquiries into why states seek power, he does so from the perspective of the statesman; he assumes that the statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power.⁴⁰ Morgenthau argues that statesmen are those who speak for and represent the state in international affairs.⁴¹ These agents speak for the state, negotiate treaties in the name of the state, define the objectives of the state, choose the means for achieving these objectives, and try to maintain, increase and demonstrate the power of the state.⁴² As demonstrated earlier, according to Morgenthau, the ones who are responsible the actions of defining the objectives of the state, and choosing the means for achieving these objectives are the foreign offices and the diplomat. The diplomat is, therefore, a statesman, and consequently, an agent of the state who represents the state and acts on behalf of the state.

The classical literature on diplomacy understands diplomacy as being conducted by the state through official agents who are authorized to act in the name of the state.

Negotiation is a core element of diplomacy

While the study of diplomacy consists of a varied set of conceptual frameworks, making diplomacy a rich theoretical field of research, a common theme of the literature on diplomacy is the centrality of the negotiation process to diplomacy.⁴³ In this section, I first demonstrate that negotiation is a core concept of diplomacy, as argued by the classical

³⁸ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, 5th edition, 108.

³⁹ Ibid., 5.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., 108.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Christer Jönsson, "Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes et. al (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2010), 213.

literature. The classical literature on diplomacy does not discuss in detail the concepts of the negotiation process, nor does it fully elaborate the procedures of the negotiation process. The classical literature, however, does argue that processes of diplomacy do not involve the usage of force, which I demonstrate in the second section. In the following section, I demonstrate the concepts of the negotiation process as understood through I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman's framework on negotiation, as set out in *The Practical Negotiator*. Zartman and Berman's framework of negotiation incorporates the understanding of negotiation that has been established by the classical literature on diplomacy.

The significance of negotiation to diplomacy

Negotiation is a central component of diplomacy, as understood by the classical literature on diplomacy. In *Diplomacy*, Nicolson's understanding of diplomacy is intertwined with negotiation, making negotiation a core component of diplomacy. Nicolson understands diplomacy as being the execution of foreign policy, which he also describes as negotiation.⁴⁴ In his scholarship, Nicolson attempts to correct the public's misunderstanding of diplomacy, which was that diplomacy implied both the formation of foreign policy and the execution of that policy.⁴⁵ Nicolson argues that diplomacy involves only the execution of foreign policy and that it does not imply the formation of foreign policy.⁴⁶ According to Nicolson, diplomacy is carried out by negotiation, as he argues that foreign policy is executed through negotiation.⁴⁷ Negotiation is, therefore, a central component of diplomacy.

Nicolson's understanding of the relationship between diplomacy and negotiation can again be seen when he discusses diplomatic theory. Nicolson argues that diplomatic theory

⁴⁴ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 3.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

is the principles and methods of negotiation and international conduct that are common to all international intercourse and have been generally accepted by the international community.⁴⁸ The main unit of Nicolson's diplomatic theory is the negotiation process, which implies that Nicolson perceives negotiation as a core element of diplomacy. Nicolson elaborates and discusses what he calls "two main currents of diplomatic theory," which are two different methods of negotiation.⁴⁹ The first theory, or method of negotiation, is what Nicolson calls "the warrior or heroic" theory, and regards diplomacy as war by other means.⁵⁰ The methods are similar to military tactics rather than the intercourse of give and take, and are managed by the military.⁵¹ The purpose of negotiation according to the warrior theory of diplomacy is total victory, and, therefore, any concession made or treaty concluded is regarded as a weakness.⁵² The second theory, or negotiation method, is called the "mercantile or shop-keeper theory" and regards diplomacy as an aid to peaceful commerce.⁵³ The mercantile theory is based on the assumption that a compromise between rivalries is generally more profitable than the complete destruction of the rival.⁵⁴ Negotiation is, therefore, an attempt by mutual concession to reach some understanding, thereby reconciling their conflicting interests.⁵⁵ Nicolson discusses these methods of negotiation to demonstrate that negotiations is a core concept of diplomatic theory, implying that negotiation is the core of diplomacy.

Morgenthau understands negotiation as a core component of diplomacy, as he argues in *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* that it is through negotiation that the third task of diplomacy can be fulfilled.⁵⁶ The third task that diplomacy must

⁴⁸ Nicolson, *Diplomacy* 5.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, 26.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 530-531.

accomplish is determining the compatibility of the different objectives of each state.⁵⁷ Morgenthau elaborates that if the objectives are not compatible, then through diplomatic bargaining, the give and take of compromise, the states must find a way to reconcile the different interests.⁵⁸ Morgenthau describes the give and take process as follows. State A must first determine whether its objectives are so important that they must be pursued despite the incompatibility with the objectives of state B. If state A finds that its objectives are essential towards its national interests, then state A must determine whether state B's objectives are essential for state B's national interests. If state A concludes that state B's objectives are not essential for state B's national interest, then state A must persuade state B to abandon its objectives by offering state B equivalents that are not important to state A.⁵⁹ Morgenthau argues that the incompatible objectives and interests of each state can be reconciled through compromise. Morgenthau does not use the term negotiation in his scholarship. The process that he demonstrates, however, reflects Nicolson's second negotiation method, the mercantile or shop-keeper theory, where conflicting interests are reconciled through compromise and the discovery of a middle point.⁶⁰ Morgenthau understands negotiation, or what he calls diplomatic bargaining, as a core component of diplomacy.

In *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Bull also demonstrates the centrality of negotiation to diplomacy through his argument that diplomacy can only fulfil one of its function if negotiation is possible.⁶¹ Bull's scholarship inquires into the nature of order in international politics, and questions how order is maintained within the present system of sovereign states, despite the anarchical characteristics of the international arena.⁶²

⁵⁷ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 530-531.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 531.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 26.

⁶¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 171.

⁶² Ibid., xi.

Bull argues that diplomacy is one of the five institutions of international relations that contribute to international order, which he defines as “the pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society.”⁶³ The other institutions are: balance of power, international law, managerial system of great powers, and war.⁶⁴ Through the five institutions of international relations, states collaborate with one another to carry out the political functions of the international society, such as the function of making the rules or legislation, and thereby maintain order.⁶⁵

In his section on diplomacy, Bull argues that an important function of diplomacy is the negotiation of agreements to ensure that relations between states do not consist of only brief, hostile encounters.⁶⁶ Bull demonstrates the centrality of negotiation to diplomacy when he argues that the extent to whether diplomacy can occur is connected to whether negotiations can be carried out. Bull understands negotiation as the process of determining the areas of common interests between states, and bringing the states to an awareness of the overlapping interests.⁶⁷ According to Bull, if the state views its foreign policy as the rational pursuit of common interests, diplomacy is able to serve its function in the international system.⁶⁸ Bull elaborates and emphasizes that diplomacy “can play no role where foreign policy is conceived as the enforcement of a claim to universal authority, the promotion of the true faith against heretics, or as the pursuit of self-regarding interests that take no account of the interests of others.”⁶⁹ In these situations, states are unable to find or determine areas of common interests since states refuse to take into consideration any other objectives or interests other than their own. Diplomacy is, therefore, not possible because negotiation

⁶³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 8.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 170.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 171.

cannot take place. According to Bull, diplomacy is linked to whether negotiation, or the pursuit of common interests, is plausible, making negotiation a core part of diplomacy.

The classical literature on diplomacy understands negotiation as a central aspect of diplomacy, as the literature argues that diplomacy is implemented by the process of negotiation.

Diplomacy does not involve the use of force

While diplomacy may involve the threat of force, diplomacy does not involve the use of force. Once diplomacy involves the usage of force, it ceases to be diplomacy and becomes its opposite, namely war.⁷⁰ This concept of diplomacy can be seen in the classical literature's understanding of war and diplomacy. The classical literature argues that war and diplomacy are both instruments of the state through which a state's objectives can be attained.⁷¹ The two differ in the means that they employ. Unlike war, which is conducted through violent means, diplomacy is conducted through peaceful means.⁷²

In *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Morgenthau is more explicit in his understanding concerning the different methods and means of war and diplomacy. Morgenthau argues that the objective of war is to break the will of the other state by bringing the greatest amount of violence upon the other state's most vulnerable areas.⁷³ The objective of diplomacy is, however, not to break the will of the other state, but to bend the other state's will through compromise.⁷⁴ Diplomacy does not involve hurting the interests of the other state, and, therefore, does not involve the use of force. Morgenthau mentions in

⁷⁰ Harold Nicolson, "Marginal Comments," *The Spectator* (1951): 11.

⁷¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 180; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 556.

⁷² Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 163, 178.

⁷³ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 557.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

his scholarship that military force is a necessary means of diplomacy, but he is discussing the threat of force not the actual use of force.⁷⁵ Morgenthau argues that the threat of force, along with persuasion and compromise, are the three means which diplomacy employs to pursue its objectives.⁷⁶ Military strength can, therefore, be used by the state to impress the other state, and to convey the message that disaster will be inescapable if negotiations are not conducted.⁷⁷ While diplomacy may involve the threat of force, it does not involve the usage of force. Once diplomacy does so, it can no longer be called diplomacy, but war.

The characteristics of the negotiation process

In this section, I demonstrate the concepts of the negotiation process as understood by I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman's *The Practical Negotiator*. Zartman and Berman incorporates the classical literature on diplomacy's understanding of negotiation, as both understand negotiation as a process where the differing interests of the states are reconciled.⁷⁸ The classical literature on diplomacy, however, does not discuss the traits or procedures of the negotiation process. Although Zartman and Berman's *The Practical Negotiator* may not relay new information concerning negotiation, as argued by Robert Purnell, this scholarship is considered innovative by James R. Silkenat and Roger Fisher due to its usage of data gathered from extensive interviews and questionnaires addressed to senior diplomats, United Nations ambassadors, and other high-ranking negotiators from a number of different nations.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 531.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, 5th edition, 29; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 531.

⁷⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 180; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 531; Zartman and Berman, *The Practical Negotiator*, 1.

⁷⁹ James R. Silkenat, review of *The Practical Negotiator* by I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 464 (Nov. 1982): 193-194; Roger Fisher, review of *The Practical Negotiator* by I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, *The American Journal of International Law* 77, no. 3 (July 1983): 670-671; Robert Purnell, review of *The Practical Negotiator* by I.

Zartman and Berman's *The Practical Negotiator* discusses the concepts of the negotiation process, and develops a model of the negotiation process that is composed of three stages. Each stage is based on what Zartman understands as being the turning points of the negotiation process, and the stages are focused on concepts that form the negotiation process.⁸⁰ The first stage is the pre-negotiation stage, where both states recognize that it is in their mutual interest to negotiate and agree on the need to negotiate.⁸¹ The second stage is the formula stage. The aim of this stage is to identify and agree on the basic principles of an agreement, also known as the guidelines or framework of the agreement, and ensure that this formula serves the interest of both states so that the agreement can be concluded and observed.⁸² Once the formula is established, negotiators can start focusing on more precise points of conflict and begin their search for agreement on details to implement the established framework.⁸³ This stage is known as the details stage. Zartman and Berman present a sequential view of negotiation, and argue that this framework of negotiation can be used to improve the conduct of negotiations, and better the chances of success.⁸⁴

Zartman develops this framework of negotiation based on his belief that the negotiation process can be properly analysed, and that no satisfactory theory on negotiation has been developed because there are aspects of the negotiation process that have not been taken into full consideration.⁸⁵ In his article "Negotiations: Theory and Reality," Zartman argues that theoretical and experimental portrayals of negotiations have interpreted negotiation as an incremental process of concessions and counter-concessions.⁸⁶ Zartman,

William Zartman and Maureen Berman, *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1994-)* 58, no. 4 (Autumn 1982): 673.

⁸⁰ William Zartman, "Negotiations: Theory and Reality," *Journal of International Affairs* 9, no. 1 (1975): 74.

⁸¹ G.R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice 4th edition*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 29.

⁸² Berridge, *Diplomacy, 4th edition*, 46; Zartman and Berman, *The Practical Negotiator*, 117.

⁸³ Zartman and Berman, *The Practical Negotiator*, 147, 152.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁸⁵ Zartman, "Negotiations: Theory and Reality," 70.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 71.

however, argues that the negotiation process is not simply an incremental process where negotiators propose offers in an effort to narrow the gap between themselves and the other party until a single point of convergence is reached.⁸⁷

The negotiation process, according to Zartman, is a search for a formula, or framework, that contains and justifies outcomes acceptable to both parties.⁸⁸ The context in which the concessions or the details are determined must be taken into consideration. The main subject of negotiations is, therefore, not the details, but what Zartman calls referent principles. Zartman defines referents as the principles of justice on which both parties can agree, and they can be philosophical principles such as equality, split-the-difference, compensation, or special rights.⁸⁹ Once the referent principles are established and agreed upon by both parties, a formula for the agreement can be recognized. The negotiation process is more than an incremental process where concessions and counter-concessions are exchanged. The negotiation process revolves around a search for referents, which become the formula of the negotiation, so that the details can be properly implemented. Zartman perceives negotiation in terms of referents, formulas, and details. The different phases of his framework of negotiation, which is set out in *The Practical Negotiator*, is, therefore, focused around those concepts, becoming important components of the negotiation process.

Limitations of the classical literature on diplomacy

In this section, I demonstrate the limitations of the classical literature on diplomacy. The classical literature on diplomacy does not take into consideration the role and function of non-state actors in diplomacy. In addition, this bulk of literature pays little attention to the

⁸⁷ Zartman, "Negotiations: Theory and Reality," 71.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 71.

nature of unofficial, or Track II diplomacy. As argued by the post-Cold War literature on diplomacy, I establish that diplomacy is conducted not only by the state, but also by non-state actors, which according to the International Relations theory of neoliberal institutionalism are also important actors of the international system.⁹⁰ The emergence of non-state actors in the domain of diplomacy, however, does not indicate that the role of the state is obsolete.⁹¹ Through the analysis of literature on Track II diplomacy, I argue that the relationship between the state and non-state actors within the domain of diplomacy can be demonstrated by a specific form of diplomacy known as Track II diplomacy. Track II diplomacy is a practice of diplomacy where non-state actors help compensate the limitations that state actors face during Track I diplomacy through its processes, such as problem-solving workshops, influencing public opinion, and cooperative economic development.⁹²

Non-state actors play a role in diplomacy

In this section, I argue that diplomacy involves a wide range of actors that includes not only the state, but also non-state actors. The post-Cold War scholarship on diplomacy argues that non-state actors are engaging in practices that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks, and have, therefore, emerged as a key actor in the domain of diplomacy.⁹³ The conceptualization of non-state actors that informs this perspective can be understood through the paradigm of the International Relations theory of neoliberal institutionalism, which regards non-state actors as essential actors in the international

⁹⁰ Kelley, "The New Diplomacy," 286; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 334; Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, "Introduction," 5.

⁹¹ Langhorne, "Current developments in diplomacy," 3, 4; Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 332.

⁹² Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 161.

⁹³ Kelley, "The New Diplomacy," 286; Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 334; Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, "Introduction," 5.

system.⁹⁴ These non-state actors appear in the form of nongovernmental organizations, corporations, and intergovernmental organizations.⁹⁵ The emergence of non-state actors in the domain of diplomacy, however, does not indicate that the role of the state and state-sanctioned representatives in diplomacy is insignificant or irrelevant.⁹⁶

Rise of non-state actors in diplomacy

Non-state actors engage in diplomacy by practicing core diplomatic tasks. The functions, or tasks, of diplomacy include facilitating communication between the political leaders of state and other entities in world politics, negotiating agreements, gathering intelligence or information about foreign countries, minimizing the effects of friction in international relations, and symbolizing the existence of rules to which states and other entities in the international system pay some allegiance.⁹⁷ The primary functions non-state actors are engaging in are information gathering and communication functions, as demonstrated by international environmental negotiations and diplomacy between states and non-state economic entities.⁹⁸

Bull's *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* understands that the state is not the only important actor of world politics, as he argues that non-state actors are engaged in diplomacy with other states and other non-state actors.⁹⁹ Aspects of Bull's work have commonalities of what would later be known as the theory of neoliberal institutionalism, represented by Robert Keohane's *After Hegemony: Cooperation and*

⁹⁴ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 6.

⁹⁵ Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 331.

⁹⁶ Kleiner, "The Inertia of Diplomacy," 322; Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, "Introduction," 5.

⁹⁷ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 170-172.

⁹⁸ Lisowski, "How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations," 361-383; Pigman, "Making Room at the Negotiating Table: The Growth of Diplomacy between Nation-State Governments and Non-State Economic Entities," 385-401.

⁹⁹ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 164.

Discord in the World Political Economy. Keohane's scholarship, like that of Bull's, is concerned with the ways in which institutions allow states to cooperate on the basis of complimentary interests, and thereby views norms and institutions as solutions to different kinds of conflicts in the international system.¹⁰⁰ In the case of Bull's scholarship, the issue is how world order is maintained in an anarchical system.

Within his framework on understanding world order, Bull does not believe that non-state actors explain the basic causes of how order is maintained in contemporary world politics.¹⁰¹ Bull, therefore, does not focus on international organizations such as the League of Nations or the United Nations as the cause of order. He instead chooses to analyse the institutions of international society, which he argues arose before the establishment of the international organizations and would continue to operate even if these international organizations did not exist.¹⁰² Although Bull argues that non-state actors do not contribute to world order, he argues that non-state actors help contribute to the workings of the institutions of international society. Diplomacy is, therefore, conducted by the state and also by political entities that are not recognized as a state, but have standing in world politics, such as the United Nations.¹⁰³ Bull's scholarship ascribes a role of greater importance to non-state actors than Political Realist assumptions, but because Bull views the international system as being anarchical, Bull still considers the state as being an important actor of the international system. Bull, therefore, does not disregard the importance of the state and state-sanctioned representatives in the domain of diplomacy, as the main unit of his scholarship is the state.

The post-Cold War literature on diplomacy also argue that non-state actors are engaging in diplomacy. In "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," Richard Langhorne argues

¹⁰⁰ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 6.

¹⁰¹ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, xxxvi.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, xxxvii

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 163.

that diplomacy involves many more participants who are experts in matters other than diplomacy and hold positions outside foreign ministries.¹⁰⁴ Langhorne's understanding of diplomacy is the management of international transactions passed between states and entities created by states.¹⁰⁵ He, however, argues that this practice is being managed increasingly more by non-state actors because global crises are becoming beyond the control of the government and relevant intergovernmental organizations.¹⁰⁶ This creates space for non-state actors to come play a significant role.¹⁰⁷ Similarly to Langhorne, Kelley argues that the key actors of diplomacy are no longer the state and state-sanctioned representatives, but non-state actors that include NGOs, public intellectuals, and religious leaders.¹⁰⁸

Langhorne and Kelly argue that one factor that induced the rise of the non-state actor's influence over diplomacy is the widespread adoption of information communication technologies (ICT), such as the Internet.¹⁰⁹ The information power gained through ICTs elevated the influence of the public domain to behave in ways that are not necessarily coextensive with the system of the states. This "communications revolution," therefore, led to the emergence of a wide range of human activities that has no connection or ties to government permission or regulation.¹¹⁰ According to Langhorne, much of these human activities are able to weaken governmental authority, diminish its role, and loosen the bonds of loyalty between the population and its government.¹¹¹ The weakening of state structures leads to state collapses and domestic political violence.¹¹²

¹⁰⁴ Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 331.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 332.

¹⁰⁸ Kelley, "The New Diplomacy," 286.

¹⁰⁹ Kelley, "The New Diplomacy," 289; Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 332.

¹¹⁰ Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 332.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

Langhorne argues that these types of situations have proven to be very difficult for the traditional international and diplomatic processes to resolve.¹¹³ The result is that non-state actors adopt higher profile roles as they fill in this gap because they promise levels of efficiency and responsiveness that the state cannot.¹¹⁴ When there are conflicts that seem to lie beyond the control of the state and state-sanctioned actors, non-state actors emerge to play significant roles.¹¹⁵ Non-state actors are, therefore, compensating for government inaction. Langhorne and Kelley are, however, not solely arguing that states are sharing the role of diplomacy with non-state actors, or that the state is coordinating with non-state actors to better manage international affairs. They are arguing that in the near future, non-state actors will be producing the more innovative and novel forms of representation in the diplomatic domain.¹¹⁶ The change in the practice of representation is, therefore, not that the state will be sharing the role of managing of international transactions with non-state actors, but that non-state actors will soon replace the role of the foreign ministry, which is the agent of the state that is traditionally responsible for diplomacy.¹¹⁷

Sole focus on non-state actor in diplomacy is not adequate

As if to compensate for the lack of importance that the literature on classical diplomacy gave to non-state actors, Kelley and Langhorne place too much importance on non-state actors, while marginalizing the state. Non-state actors are engaging in practices that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks.¹¹⁸ The emergence of non-state actors in the domain of diplomacy, however, does not mean that the role of the state and

¹¹³ Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 332.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Kelly, "The New Diplomacy," 289; Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 332.

¹¹⁶ Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 338.

¹¹⁷ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice 4th edition*, 10, 19.

¹¹⁸ Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, "Introduction," 5.

state-sanctioned representatives in diplomacy is insignificant or irrelevant, particularly since it is the state that carries law-making and law-enforcement powers.¹¹⁹ Langhorne and Kelley furthermore do not adequately demonstrate their argument that diplomacy will be practiced not by the diplomat and foreign ministries, but by non-state actors.

Langhorne acknowledges that the state is equipped with a highly developed method of representing itself to other states, which can be found in the services and structure of foreign ministries.¹²⁰ He, however, argues that governments and tax-paying constituents are no longer certain that they need the services of foreign ministries, although he fails to specify which government of which state.¹²¹ Constituents, therefore, believe that the foreign ministries can no longer carry out the job the governments want done, while non-state actors can. According to Langhorne, the rise of non-state actors will bring about the end of the diplomatic primacy of states, and diplomacy will, therefore, be practiced not by the diplomat and foreign ministries, but by non-state actors. Langhorne, however, does not provide sufficient cases to support his argument. Although Langhorne argues that a change is occurring in the practice of representation, he does not demonstrate how his argument is consistent with reality. He fails to provide concrete facts to his interpretation of the changes occurring in diplomacy.

Kelley argues that his argument of how non-state actors are becoming more influential in the domain of diplomacy is based on his belief that diplomacy is no longer an institution, but a behaviour.¹²² He, however, fails to elaborate upon his understanding of diplomacy, leaving his argument of diplomacy as a non-state behaviour unsubstantiated.¹²³

¹¹⁹ Kleiner, "The Inertia of Diplomacy," 322.

¹²⁰ Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 333.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 333.

¹²² Kelley, "The New Diplomacy," 288.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 289.

Kelley states in his article that he will examine diplomacy as a non-state behaviour in relation to power, yet he does not.¹²⁴ He rather argues that non-state actors have gained authority in the realm of diplomacy, contextualizes the idea of “newness,” and then introduces and discusses five features that he argues will permanently change the way diplomacy is practiced for the longer-term.¹²⁵ Kelley, therefore, does not clearly demonstrate his understanding of diplomacy. This lack of explanation makes it difficult to comprehend in what way non-state actors are the new diplomats of the international system.

Kelley’s article is also limited by an illogicality. Kelley argues in his article that “diplomacy is now well beyond the point of opening itself to the public—it is becoming enmeshed within the public domain.”¹²⁶ Nicolson, however, argues in his work, *Diplomacy* (1939), that the public interest is, and should be, rightly focused upon the stage where policy is being framed and decided.¹²⁷ For democratic countries, the public domain has been playing a role in the shaping of foreign policy long before Kelley’s article was published, indicating that Kelley’s argument is not new. At the end of his article, Kelley argues that diplomats are now being defined by a unique skill set rather than membership to an established class.¹²⁸ Kelley’s understanding of diplomacy as a behaviour could, therefore, mean that diplomacy is no longer a practice performed by the state, but a specific set of actions and skills that are being adopted by the non-state actors. Yet, Kelley then questions whether the activities done by the non-state actor, or the new diplomat defined by a unique skill, can still be called diplomacy.¹²⁹ His questions concerning what diplomacy is makes it difficult for the reader to comprehend his exact understanding of diplomacy.

¹²⁴ Kelley, “The New Diplomacy,” 289.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 289-302.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 289.

¹²⁷ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 3.

¹²⁸ Kelley, “The New Diplomacy,” 302.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

Langhorne and Kelley's argument places too much emphasis on the non-state actor while marginalizing the state. Although there is a rise of non-state actors in diplomacy, this does not mean that the role of the state has become irrelevant. As argued by Juergen Kleiner in his article, "The Inertia of Diplomacy," only the state carries law-making and law-enforcement powers.¹³⁰ Only states are in the position of deciding whether or not to sign international agreements and treaties.¹³¹ Non-state actors, therefore, do not have the power to sign international treaties. There is, therefore, a certain limit to what non-state actors can do. The relationship between the state and the non-state actor in the domain of diplomacy is not an inverse relationship, where if the non-state actor gains more power the state has less power. Rather, the state and non-state actors coexist in what Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann's *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics* call a "mutually constitutive relationship."¹³² The tasks that the non-state actors perform add to and change ways of doing things for the state actors, and the non-state actors model their operations on the institution of diplomacy. This relationship can be seen in a specific form of diplomacy known as Track II diplomacy.

Track II diplomacy

Scholars of "Track II diplomacy" use the term to distinguish this practice of diplomacy from official, state-to-state diplomacy, which they call Track I diplomacy.¹³³ In this section, through the analysis of the literature on Track II diplomacy, I argue that Track

¹³⁰ Kleiner, "The Inertia of Diplomacy," 322.

¹³¹ Kleiner, "The Inertia of Diplomacy," 322; Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, "Introduction," 41.

¹³² Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, "Introduction," 11.

¹³³ Fisher, "Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation," 65-89; Mapendere, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks," 66-81; Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 162; McDonald, "Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy," 201-220; Notter and John McDonald, "Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies for Peace."

II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors assist state-sanctioned actors by compensating for the limitations that the officials of Track I diplomacy face. This can be done through processes, such as problem-solving workshops, influencing public opinion, and cooperative economic development.¹³⁴ In this section, I first discuss the role and function of Track II diplomacy as well as the tasks of the processes of Track II diplomacy. I then demonstrate how the Track II diplomatic process of problem-solving workshops is able to help overcome the limitations of official diplomacy.

Role and function of Track II diplomacy

According to US State Department Foreign Service Officer Joseph Montville, Track II diplomacy is a process involving unofficial, informal interactions between members of adversary groups with the aim of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict.¹³⁵ Montville was the first to coin the term “track II diplomacy” in his co-authored article “Foreign Policy According to Freud” (1981).¹³⁶ Since Montville’s article on Track II diplomacy, various articles and books have been published on this subject, many who use and cite Montville’s understanding of Track II diplomacy.¹³⁷ The main focus of the bulk of literature on Track II diplomacy is on establishing the specific processes of Track II

¹³⁴ Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch,” 162.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ William Davidson and Joseph Montville, “Foreign Policy According to Freud.” *Foreign Policy*, 45 (Winter 1981-1982): 145-57.

¹³⁷ Diana Chigas, “Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy,” *Beyond Intractability*, August 2003.

<http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2-diplomacy>; Ronald J. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997); Mapendere, “Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks,” 66; James Notter and John McDonald, “Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies for Peace.”

diplomacy, or the question of coordination and cooperation between Track I and Track II diplomacy.¹³⁸

Montville's scholarship addresses why Track II diplomacy occurs, as he argues that Track II diplomacy is designed to assist the officials of Track I diplomacy and to compensate for the constraints imposed upon these officials.¹³⁹ Montville's scholarship assumes that they face limitations, such as the need to be seen as strong, wary, and indomitable in the face of the enemy by their constituents, and that the resources and procedures of Track I diplomacy may not be enough to resolve the conflict.¹⁴⁰ Track II diplomacy, therefore, occurs in order to compensate for the shortcomings of official diplomacy, and assist officials of Track I diplomacy. Track II diplomacy is not a substitute for Track I diplomacy, but an interdependent process of Track I diplomacy. The processes of Track II diplomacy consequently do not replace those of Track I diplomacy.

Since the coinage of Track II diplomacy, a variety of types of diplomacy have been identified, such as Track One and a Half diplomacy. Jeffrey Mapendere introduces this type of diplomatic practice in his article, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks."¹⁴¹ Mapendere understands Track One and a Half diplomacy as "public or private interaction between official representatives of conflicting governments or political entities...which is facilitated or mediated by a third party not representing a political

¹³⁸ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, Ronald J. Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly, "Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation Within a Contingency Model of Third Party Consultation," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no 1 (1991); Louis Kriesberg, "Coordinating Intermediary Peace Efforts," *Negotiation Journal* 12, no.4 (1996): 341-352; John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington DC: USIP Press, 1998); Christopher R. Mitchell and Michael Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem Solving Approach* (London: Pinter, 1996); Susan Allen Nan, "Track One - Track Two Coordination." Presentation to the Secretary's Open Forum, State Department, September 2002; Harold Saunders, *A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001.

¹³⁹ Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 162-163.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 163.

¹⁴¹ Mapendere, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks," 66.

organization or institution.”¹⁴² According to Mapendere, the main feature that distinguishes Track One and a Half diplomacy from Track II diplomacy is the participant. He argues that the participants of Track II diplomacy are not official representatives of the conflicting states, while in Track One and a Half diplomacy, the participants involved are official representatives of the conflicting groups.¹⁴³ The main distinguishing feature of Track 1.5 diplomacy is that in Track 1.5 diplomacy, there implies an element of a formal transfer of information back into the government. In Track II diplomacy, while the participants may be a current or former government official, these officials are participating within an informal context and do not represent the state formally. They, however, may still have privileged access to policymakers by virtue of their official government position.

Within the realm of the study of Track II diplomacy, there are cases of envoy diplomacy, such as the key role that Professor Kei Wakaizumi with regard to the revision of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. Wakaizumi was sent to the United States as a special envoy of Japan’s Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, and witnessed the Prime Minister and United States President Richard Nixon sign a secret document that granted the US the right to bring nuclear weapons in an emergency into Okinawa after its reversion to Japan.¹⁴⁴ Wakaizumi was an envoy of the Japanese government, and thereby a state official. Wakaizumi’s role in regards to the US-Japan Okinawa reversion talks was a state directed venture. There is also the role of interest groups and nongovernmental organizations at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, who aimed to represent emerging national minorities. Their aim, however, differs from the organisations that pursued this dissertation’s understanding of Track II diplomacy. The

¹⁴² Mapendere, “Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks,” 69.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 70.

¹⁴⁴ Roger Pulvers, “Words of wisdom from beyond the grave of Japan’s secret pacts,” *The Japan Times*, March 28, 2010, accessed August 21, 2018, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2010/03/28/commentary/words-of-wisdom-from-beyond-the-grave-of-japans-secret-pacts/#.W3yTDJNKjBI>.

private organisations were present at the Versailles Peace Conference to represent the importance of their own special interest claims.¹⁴⁵ They were not trying to achieve American foreign policy objectives nor were they trying to substitute or compensate for a failure in American diplomacy. These cases provides a further example to the study of nongovernmental negotiating approaches, they, however, do not incorporate my dissertation's understanding of Track II diplomacy. These cases are state-directed ventures, while my dissertation's understanding of Track II diplomacy is non-state directed venture.

Three interdependent processes of Track II diplomacy

In his article, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," Montville argues that Track II diplomacy involves at least three interdependent processes, which are problem-solving workshops, influencing public opinion, and cooperative economic development.¹⁴⁶ Problem-solving workshops are small, facilitated workshops or seminars that that bring together leaders, or other representatives, of conflicting groups or states.¹⁴⁷ Most problem-solving workshops are conducted and organized by non-state actors.¹⁴⁸ Non-state actors are not highly dependent on the position and interests of the state, and are, therefore, not tied to the agenda of the state. This status allows for increased trust between the participants and organizers of problem solving workshops.¹⁴⁹ In these workshops, participants develop workable personal relationships, and understand the conflict from the perspective of the adversary.¹⁵⁰ At some point, they also develop joint strategies for

¹⁴⁵ Steve Charnovitz, "Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 100 no. 2 (April 2006): 348-372; Carole Fink, "The Paris Peace Conference and the Question of Minority Rights," *Peace and Change*, vol 21 (1996): 273-288.

¹⁴⁶ Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 163-171.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 163.

¹⁴⁸ Fisher, "Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy," 67.

¹⁴⁹ Fisher, "Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy," 67; Bohmelt, "The effectiveness of tracks of diplomacy strategies in third-party interventions," 169.

¹⁵⁰ Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 163.

dealing with the conflict as a shared problem, a solution that requires reciprocal and cooperative efforts.¹⁵¹ The workshops are designed to promote relationships and build trust between the conflicted parties, develop lines and improve the quality of communication, and explore options that could meet both sides' interests and needs.¹⁵² Montville, therefore, argues that in problem-solving workshops, it is possible for participants to "develop a vastly expanded understanding of a conflict" and "to undergo a personal transformation in which their sense of and approach to the enemy becomes humanized."¹⁵³ In his article, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful Negotiation," Fisher emphasizes that in order for the results of the problem-solving workshops to be effectively used to resolve the conflict, participants should be influential, yet informal representatives of the adversarial states.¹⁵⁴ Participants should, therefore, have the potential to influence policy, but are not directly accountable for policy decisions, such as academics, advisers, or retired politicians. During problem-solving workshops, the representatives of the adversary states are brought together so that they can gain a better understanding of the conflict and develop joint strategies directed towards a mutually acceptable solution.¹⁵⁵

The second process of Track II diplomacy is influencing public opinion.¹⁵⁶ Montville assumes that it is not only the government of the adversary states that are in conflict with each other, but their constituents as well. Influencing public opinion programs are, therefore, considered by Montville as the most principal role for nongovernmental action, so that political leaders will gain public support in taking positive steps towards resolving the

¹⁵¹ Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 163.

¹⁵² Chigas, "Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy."

¹⁵³ Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 163.

¹⁵⁴ Fisher, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions," 453.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 445.

¹⁵⁶ Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 163.

conflict.¹⁵⁷ These positive steps could be those that were worked out in the problem-solving workshops.¹⁵⁸ The goal of the public-opinion programs is to develop respectful and “re-humanized” relationships among adversary groups, where the major tasks involve reducing the sense of victimhood of the parties, and breaking down negative stereotypes and generalizations of the adversary.¹⁵⁹ If this process is successful, it will create an environment that makes it safe for leaders to take positive steps towards resolving the conflict.¹⁶⁰ Montville argues that it is important to ensure that the overall political environment reflects, to some extent, the understanding that participants have gained in the problem-solving workshops because if not, the political leaders are likely to confront strong resistance when they try to take actions based on their new insights.¹⁶¹

The third process of Track II diplomacy is cooperative economic development, and involves organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict. Cooperative economic development may not be essential to resolving conflict, but Montville argues that it provides incentives, institutional support, and continuity to the first two processes.¹⁶² Montville elaborates that cooperative economic development stems from the idea that tangible economic incentives for conflicted parties can be helpful towards resolving conflict because it offers conflicted parties the prospect of growth, the enhancement of individual well-being, and a measure of stability for families and communities who have suffered significant personal loss and endured chronic instability.¹⁶³ Cooperative economic development is dependent on and a result of the success of the prior processes.

¹⁵⁷ Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch,” 167.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 163.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 163, 169.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 163.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch,” 164.

Problem-solving workshops can help compensate for limitations of official diplomacy

Of the three interdependent processes, problem-solving workshops are considered by Montville and Fisher to be the leading form of Track II diplomacy.¹⁶⁴ Problem-solving workshops contribute to Track I diplomacy in two ways. The unofficial setting of the problem-solving workshops helps overcome the risks of the pre-negotiation stage. Problem-solving workshops also compensate for the limitations of official diplomacy by facilitating movement towards successful negotiation. The procedures of problem-solving workshops create movement towards formal negotiation by opening up communication, improving attitudes, developing framework, and creating options directed towards resolution.¹⁶⁵

The pre-negotiation stage is the phase where both states recognize that it is in their mutual interest to negotiate and decide to explore the possibility of negotiating.¹⁶⁶ Zartman and Berman argue that the most positive way for one state to convince another state to acknowledge that a negotiated settlement may be in its best interest is by showing the other state the possibilities of creative solutions.¹⁶⁷ New solutions, new alternatives, new ways of defining the issue, and new possibilities for flexibility are suggested to show that the conflicted states are not locked in their stalemate.¹⁶⁸ The initiating state can also reframe the situation to show the other state that it is looking for exchanges rather than expecting the other state to give in. The possibility of exchanges, side-payments, compensation, and other contingent benefits are, therefore, suggested as an incentive for negotiation.¹⁶⁹ Another way

¹⁶⁴ Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 164; Davidson and Montville, "Foreign Policy According to Freud," 145-57; Fisher, "Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy," 69; Fisher, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions," 443.

¹⁶⁵ Fisher, "Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation," 65.

¹⁶⁶ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* 4th edition, 29; Zartman and Berman, *The Practical Negotiator*, 42.

¹⁶⁷ Zartman and Berman, *The Practical Negotiator*, 70.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 72.

of persuading the other side to negotiate is for the initiating state to suggest the idea of a jointly created gain, which could never exist by unilateral decision, and to show how the other state will gain from the new creation.¹⁷⁰

Zartman and Berman argue that the risk of this method is that the attempts to show the beneficial outcomes of negotiations may raise the expectations of the other state to the point that the suggested outcomes become part of the formal negotiation agenda.¹⁷¹ The other state may, therefore, misunderstand the suggested solutions as concrete, official propositions. Zartman and Berman, however, do not establish how these risks can be overcome. In his article, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful Negotiation," Fisher argues that the unofficial setting of problem-solving workshops provide conflicted states a safe opportunity to explore the possibility of more formal negotiations and to determine the basis for future activity.¹⁷² Problem-solving workshops, therefore, help compensate the risks of the pre-negotiation stage since the unofficial, informal setting of the workshops allows participants to explore possible solutions without the requirement of formal negotiation or bargaining for advantage.¹⁷³ Participants can freely discuss outcomes and strategies without the danger that the other side may misinterpret the ideas as a specific promise or a part of the formal negotiation agenda.

Problem-solving workshops also contribute to official diplomacy by facilitating movement in the pre-negotiation stage. The procedures of the problem-solving workshops, which focus on the perceptions and attitudes of participants, induce the start of the perceptual shift required for conflicted states to move from stalemate to negotiation.¹⁷⁴ Fisher argues in

¹⁷⁰ Zartman and Berman, *The Practical Negotiator*, 72.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 82.

¹⁷² Fisher, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions," 443.

¹⁷³ Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 162-163.

¹⁷⁴ Fisher, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions," 456.

“Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful Negotiation,” that problem-solving workshops can influence the perceptions, attitudes, and orientations of the participants in ways that will improve both the probability of negotiation occurring and the likelihood of its success.¹⁷⁵ Problem-solving workshops provide a space where participants can share perspectives and concerns about the conflict and the other party. Fisher argues that this allows for not only greater understanding of the sources and nature of the conflict, as participants understand the conflict from the perspective of the adversary, but also increased trust among participants and improvements in the relationships.¹⁷⁶ This then leads to a re-perception of the adversary as a party that is reasonable and trustworthy to some degree. Consequently, the conflict is reassessed, such that the potential benefits of negotiation outweigh the risks and costs as solutions are also generated during these workshops.¹⁷⁷ By shifting the participant’s perceptions and attitudes of the conflict and the adversary, Fisher argues that problem-solving workshops help conflicted states come to the realization that negotiation is a viable option.¹⁷⁸ Problem-solving workshops, therefore, can be used a pre-negotiation methodology, leading conflicted states into the decision to move into more formal negotiation.

Montville and Fisher’s argument concerning Track II diplomacy and the processes of Track II diplomacy is case specific. To support their argument, Montville and Fisher’s respective scholarship analyzes cases of international conflict that did not directly involve the United States. Their scholarship, moreover, assumes that conflict between states is dominated by subjective, psychological, and social processes. Conflicts can, however, be assessed on a variety of indicators, including the specific degree of subjectivity. Due to the

¹⁷⁵ Fisher, “Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions,” 443.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 450.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 453.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 468.

lack of case studies that have adopted problem-solving workshops during the pre-negotiation stage, it is yet to be determined whether Fisher's argument may be generally applicable to different kinds of conflicts, which is a question that Fisher himself acknowledges.¹⁷⁹ Fisher's scholarship, however, provides a model that demonstrates the contributions of problem-solving workshops towards the pre-negotiation stage of official diplomacy that is hindered by subjective factors. His argument can consequently be used to explain the usage of Track II diplomacy during the second North Korean nuclear crisis since movement towards negotiation was impeded by a high degree of mistrust between the US and the DPRK, and a lack of meaningful and direct communication.¹⁸⁰

In the remaining chapters of this dissertation, I demonstrate that US non-state actors pursued Track II diplomacy because they believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate for the shortcomings of United States Track I diplomacy that took place between the Bush administration and the North Korean government. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I demonstrate the ways in which the US government's practice of diplomacy, and, therefore, Track I diplomacy between the Bush administration and the DPRK, was restricted. These constraints provided an opening for a specific role pertaining to Track II diplomacy. In Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7, I demonstrate these roles and functions, and how the processes of Track II diplomacy helped compensate for United States Track I diplomacy that occurred during the second North Korean nuclear crisis.

¹⁷⁹ Fisher, "Pre-negotiation Problem-Solving Discussions," 472.

¹⁸⁰ Mike Chinoy, *Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I developed the analytical framework to explain why influential United States non-state actors initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy with the government of the DPRK during the United States administrations of George W. Bush. In the first section, I introduced the analytical framework, which draws on concepts of diplomacy established by the classical literature on diplomacy. In the second section, I argued that diplomacy is conducted by the state and that negotiation is a core component of diplomacy, as argued by the classical literature on diplomacy. In the third section, I addressed the limitations of the classical literature on diplomacy. I argued that non-state actors are also engaging in diplomacy, as demonstrated by the post-Cold War literature on diplomacy. Non-state actors are, however, not replacing the state actor as the diplomatic representative. I, therefore, argued that the relationship between the state and non-state actor in diplomacy can be seen in Track II diplomacy. Track II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors help compensate the limitations that state actors face during Track I diplomacy. This relationship can be seen especially during the pre-negotiation stage, through the processes of problem-solving workshops. The analytical framework of my dissertation is based on the concepts that have been demonstrated in this chapter.

Introduction

This chapter has a rather narrow aim; to demonstrate that although articulated and manifested in different forms by different presidencies, American exceptionalism in the theory and practice of United States diplomacy, is very profoundly embedded in the historical and conceptual framing of United States foreign policy. The specific understanding of American exceptionalism that has animated American foreign policy is the idea that the United States is uniquely virtuous compared to other states because the United States' conduct of foreign affairs is guided by ethical principles. I also show that ideas of moral exceptionalism have resulted in a reluctance to engage in diplomacy with non-democratic states.¹

Ideas about the normative or ideological functions of American exceptionalism as providing constraints to diplomacy do not of course provide the only explanation of all American foreign policy or even of all foreign policy that is directed towards non-democratic states. Many have argued, for example, for the explanatory power of, among other things, strategic actors, bureaucracies, and domestic politics.² The claim of this chapter is not, however, that American foreign policy is in all instances best explained by notions of American exceptionalism or that other theoretical prisms are not useful. The claim is simply that the idea of American exceptionalism as moral superiority remains helpful, especially in the effort to understand United States reluctance to engage

¹ Jeffrey R. Fields, "Engaging Adversaries: Myths and Realities in American Foreign Policy," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 26, no. 2 (2015): 294-321; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); Richard J. Payne, *The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interests, and Force in American Foreign Policy* (State University of New York Press, New York: 1995).

² For surveys of the literature see Steve Smith, Amelia Hadley and Tim Dunne (eds), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, 1st ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; Laura Neack, *The New Foreign Policy: Complex Interactions, Competing Interests*, 3rd edition. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014.

diplomatically with non-democratic states. This chapter shows that this policy has some longevity. It is not only about what Geoffrey Wiseman demonstrates is the United States disinclination to establish formal diplomatic relations for many years with states that it deems adversarial.³ The chapter shows that since World War II, based on an explicit self-understanding of the United States as morally superior to non-democratic states, the Truman administration further developed policies of isolationism towards adversarial states, in the form of the containment doctrine, which Litwak argues is applied to what are sometimes characterised as “rogue states.”⁴

The aim of this chapter is, therefore, not to explain American diplomacy per se, given the vast literature that has explored this subject, nor is it to explain the concept of American exceptionalism for its own sake, especially as this topic has also had a vast literature devoted to its analysis. It is to establish the power of the notion of American exceptionalism for understanding American foreign policy underpinnings that, I argue in the next chapter, helps explain the trajectory of the Bush administration’s official or Track I diplomacy towards the DPRK.

This chapter proceeds by first acknowledging that there are multiple factors that shape United States foreign policy, and thereby competing explanations that seek to explain US foreign policy decisions. I then examine the various understandings of the concept of American exceptionalism; which have at their core a common idea that the United States is necessarily more virtuous and altruistic than that of other states.⁵ I use the framing device

³ Geoffrey Wiseman, “Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy,” in *American Diplomacy*, ed. by Paul Sharp et al. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 17.

⁴ Robert S. Litwak, *Rogue States and US Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C.: 2000)

⁵ Bell, “American Exceptionalism Revisited: the Role of Civil Society,” 38-56; Davis and Lynn-Jones, “Citty Upon a Hill,” 20-38; David P. Forsythe, “Human Rights in US Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect,” *Political Science Quarterly* 105, no. 3 (Autumn 1990): 435-454; Edward A. Tiryakian, “American Religious Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 527

developed by Ceaser who argues that Americans conceive exceptionalism in two ways.⁶

The first is historiographical, as articulated, for example, by Michael Kammen in “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration.”⁷ The second is as ideology, as demonstrated by Davis and Sean Lynn-Jones in “Citty Upon a Hill.”⁸ Finally, I chart how United States governments have drawn on the ideology of American exceptionalism as a consistent framing device for a policy stance of diplomatic isolation towards states it considers as adversarial.

The Debates: Exceptional or Not?

This chapter evaluates continuing debates about the existence and potency of the theory and ideology of the American exceptionalism paradigm. Kammen, for example, shows that there has been a rise in debates about American exceptionalism, particularly since the 1990s. The chapter does not argue that theories of American exceptionalism determined United States foreign policy or even that such theories provide explanatory power for all of American diplomatic history. Arguably, for example, as I show in the next chapter, although the first years of the Bush administration policy towards the DPRK can be best explained by the power of the exceptionalism paradigm, the 2006 DPRK nuclear test forced a more realist or strategic response to the DPRK, as evidenced in the new

(May 1993): 40-54; Walt, Friedman, and Mandelbaum, “An FP Debate: Just how Special is America Anyway?” 71-78.

⁶ James W. Ceaser, “The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism,” *American Political Thought: A Journal of Ideas, Institutions, and Culture* 1 (Spring 2012): 6.

⁷ Daniel Bell, “American Exceptionalism Revisited: the Role of Civil Society,” *Public Interest* 95 (Spring 1989): 38-56; Michael Kammen, “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration,” *American Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (March 1993): 1-43; Seymour Martin Lipset, “American Exceptionalism Reaffirmed,” *International Review of Sociology* 2, no. 3 (1988): 25-69.

⁸ Davis and Lynn-Jones, “Citty Upon a Hill,” 20-38; Stephen M. Walt, Thomas L. Friedman, and Michael Mandelbaum, “An FP Debate: Just how Special is America Anyway?” *Foreign Policy* 189 (November 2011): 71-78.

mandate given to Ambassador Christopher Hill to enter into substantive security negotiations with the DPRK.

The idea of American exceptionalism has been played out differently in different historical periods.⁹ This foundational impulse to understand America as different and morally superior to adversarial states does not automatically result in any specific foreign policy practice in terms of either ‘engagement’ or ‘disengagement’ with the rest of the world. The neoconservative movement in American foreign policy, for example, whose influence on Bush administration policy to the DPRK in which I detail in the next chapter, promoted vigorous campaigns abroad to foster regime change against what were sometimes understood as rogue states. Historically, conversely, ideas of American exceptionalism have been used to justify isolationism, as when the Republican Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles after World War I.¹⁰

I do not argue that America never in practice deals with foreign policy adversaries whose values they do not share. The United States regularly makes foreign policy choices to deal with these unpalatable actors for example in the decision by Nixon to enter into relations with Communist China in the 1970s. The United States government also intentionally set aside its moral beliefs to engage directly with non-democratic states, such as South Korea under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, China under Mao Zedong and his successors, and Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and his successors. These decisions are taken in spite of the overall paradigmatic perspective of moralistic distaste, but evidentially there have always remained tensions between pragmatic relationship and underlying unease. The underlying moralistic perspective has in practice also underpinned foreign

⁹ Richard H. Ullman, “The ‘Foreign World’ and Ourselves: Washington, Wilson, and the Democrat’s Dilemma,” *Foreign Policy* 21 (1975-1976): 99-124.

¹⁰ “The Treaty of Versailles,” *United States Senate*, accessed September 25, 2018, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Feature_Homepage_TreatyVersailles.htm.

policy outcomes that have been criticised as unethical for example in terms of the indiscriminate American bombing campaigns in Indo China during the Vietnam War. In one sense, this empirical observation only serves to validate my thesis; that the moralistic perspective in the sense of seeing America as superior and different to the ‘other’ can serve to justify any foreign policy practice whose aim is to isolate and challenge those that hold antithetical values to the American polity.

These debates and tensions reflect the great debates in international relations theory. Hans Morgenthau’ for example in *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* argued that states use ideology as a justification for policy, which is based upon the pursuit of power.¹¹ Morgenthau’s assumes that international politics is a struggle for power, and so the concept of a state’s national interest is defined in terms of power.¹² According to Morgenthau, statesmen, think and act in terms of interest defined in power, but they define, or disguise, their goals in terms of ethical or legal principles in order to obtain the support of their own constituents and to ensure that other states will not unite together in resistance against their goals.¹³ The Idealist tradition, as evidenced in some of Henry Kissinger’s work, takes issue with Morgenthau’s argument that ethical principles are mainly used as a justification or cover for rational actors acting in self-interest. Kissinger argues, for example, that the Truman administration believed that the goal of United States political action in international affairs was the pursuit of ethical principles based on American normative superiority.¹⁴

¹¹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace First Edition* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 61-63.

¹² *Ibid.*, 5.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹⁴ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 599.

The works of Robert Kagan, Walter Russel Mead, Robert Osgood, Robert Tucker, and David Reynolds show that there are various competing factors that influence the making of United States foreign policy. Kagan draws upon the concepts of Morgenthau's classical realism, as his writings demonstrate that he believes international relations is governed by considerations of power. His articles, such as "Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline," and "Looking for Legitimacy in All the Wrong Places," focus on the question of American power.¹⁵ Kagan argues against the decline of American power, as he demonstrates that the United States has global influence, but he warns that the United States is not omnipotent.¹⁶ Kagan cautions that there never was a time within US history where the United States was able to shape the international community to suit its desires and get other nations to do what the United States wanted them to do.¹⁷ Kagan's main focus is power, and warns that due to a disparity of power between the United States and other states, the United States needs to earn legitimation for its actions, through promotion of not only its own national interest, but also the common interests of the liberal democratic world.¹⁸

Mead shows the impact of Jacksonian nationalism in shaping United States foreign policy. In "The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order," Mead argues that with the rise of the Jacksonian school of thought, the United States will play a smaller role in liberal order building and the policy of global engagement.¹⁹ This is due to the American constituents' lack of trust in the people that shaped such US foreign policy.

¹⁵ Robert Kagan, "Looking for Legitimacy in All the Wrong Places," *Foreign Policy*, no. 137 (Jul. - Aug., 2003): 70-72; Robert Kagan, "Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline," *Brookings*, January 17, 2012, accessed July 30, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/not-fade-away-against-the-myth-of-american-decline/>

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 71; *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁷ Kagan, "Not Fade Away," 7.

¹⁸ Kagan, "Looking for Legitimacy in All the Wrong Places," 70, 71.

¹⁹ Walter Russel Mead, "The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order" *Foreign Affairs* (March- April 2017): 1.

According to Mead, Jacksonians believe that the role of the United States government is to look after the physical security and economic wellbeing of the American people in their national home, and to do so while interfering as little as possible with the individual freedom of the American people.²⁰

In “America’s Sticky Power,” Mead also argues there are factors, other than Jacksonian nationalism, which help shape US foreign policy. Mead draws upon Nye’s international relations theory on soft and hard power.²¹ While he acknowledges that soft power will continue to have an important role within US foreign policy, the aim of his article is to underline the equal importance of military and economic power.²² He argues that together with US soft power, which includes American values, habits, and politics, United States military and economic power can sustain an American hegemony, making the US-led global system desirable, inevitable, and permanent.²³

Other views, however, reiterate the overwhelming importance of understanding American power and the direction of US foreign policy as being largely shaped by military capabilities. Osgood, for example, shows that it was the acquisition of sophisticated military technology, particularly nuclear capability, that largely shaped American foreign policy towards adversarial states. Osgood focuses on the impact that military capabilities have upon the development of US foreign policy. He argues that military technology, particularly nuclear capabilities, can influence the United States’ relations with not only states that the US government deems adversarial, such as the Soviet Union, but also with allies.²⁴ In “NATO: Problems of Security and Collaboration,” Osgood argues that

²⁰ Mead, “The Jacksonian Revolt,” 4.

²¹ Walter Russel Mead, “America’s Sticky Power,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 141 (March - April 2004): 48.

²² Mead, “America’s Sticky Power,” 48.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Robert E. Osgood, “NATO: Problems of Security and Collaboration,” *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 54 no. 1 (March 1960): 106-129; Robert E. Osgood, “Stabilizing the Military Environment,” *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 55 no. 1 (March 1961): 24-39.

independent nuclear capabilities, particularly those of European allies, influences the basic foundations of the NATO alliance.²⁵ In “Stabilizing the Military Environment,” Osgood focuses more upon United States’ policy of deterrence against the Soviet Union’s nuclear capacity. Due to the novel characteristics of the military technology that were being created during this time of publication, Osgood calls for a reappraisal of assumptions that underpin the United States’ foreign policy towards the NATO alliance and the Soviet Union, respectively.

Tucker’s “Morality and Deterrence” shows that certain United States foreign policies have been influenced by moral understandings, particularly from Catholicism, while his “The Sources of American Legitimacy,” demonstrates that US foreign policy is influenced by the nature and behaviour of men, or more specifically, the public profession of the United States’ leaders.²⁶ In “Morality and Deterrence,” Tucker discusses the principal moral issue of nuclear deterrence—the peace of deterrence ultimately rests upon the threat and the intent to do evil.²⁷ His article shows that there are American constituents, and in this specific case Catholic moralists, who expect US foreign policy to contain a moral aspect.

In “The Sources of American Legitimacy,” Tucker echoed Kagan’s argument in “Looking for Legitimacy in All the Wrong Places,” as both argued that America is losing its international legitimacy, especially after its actions in Iraq. Tucker argues that United States legitimacy was based upon four factors—United States’ leaders commitment to international law, their acceptance of consensual decision making, their reputation for

²⁵ Osgood, “NATO,” 106.

²⁶ Robert W. Tucker, “Morality and Deterrence,” *Ethics*, vol. 95 no. 3 (April 1985): 461-478; Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, “The Sources of American Legitimacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83 (Nov/Dec 2004).

²⁷ Tucker, “Morality and Deterrence,” 476.

moderation and their identification with preservation of peace.²⁸ These factors were, however, called into question due to the decisions of the high-level government officials of the George W. Bush administration.

Reynolds in *America, Empire of Liberty*, supports this chapter's argument that American foreign policy has been driven by concepts of American moral exceptionalism.²⁹ In his exploration of the theme of American faith, Reynolds argues that faith, stemming primarily from evangelical Protestantism, shaped US policy towards adversarial states. He argues that a "religious sense of mission" spurred America in its Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, and promoted Bush's war on terror.³⁰ Reynolds, then elaborates, that a "self-belief in America's mission" to spread its core values, influenced Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt to offer the war-torn world the American model of freedom and democracy.³¹

This chapter acknowledges competing traditions and schools of thought, different interpretations and explanations of United States foreign policy, for instance in the work of Kagan, Mead, Osgood, Tucker, and Reynolds, as cited above. This chapter, however, demonstrates that ideas of moral exceptionalism have provided an important foundation to United States' foreign policy arguments of non-engagement in diplomacy with non-democratic states.

²⁸ Tucker and Hendrickson, "The Sources of American Legitimacy."

²⁹ David Reynolds, *America, Empire of Liberty* (Basic Books: New York, 2009).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, xvii, 310-311.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 246, 292.

American exceptionalism: historical phenomena versus normative prospectus

Ceasar argues that a common understanding among scholars who study American exceptionalism is that American exceptionalism is a claim to uniqueness.³² According to Ceaser, the literature on American exceptionalism argues for the claim to uniqueness from two different perspectives.³³ The first is that the United States is different to other states and the difference is demonstrated by empirical studies. The second is that the United States is special, and Ceaser shows that this is based on normative ambition.

The major debates can thus be characterised as between a scholarship that argues that American exceptionalism is based on the idea that America is empirically different from other states (even as some of the same scholarship argues that in practice the United States was never any different from other industrialised states); and one that understands America as a superior ethical entity and, consequently American foreign policy as morally superior to that of other states.³⁴ From the first perspective American exceptionalism is an actual historical phenomenon. From the second perspective, American exceptionalism is an ideology that consists of a number of normative claims. One normative assumption is a sense of moral superiority.³⁵ Another is that United States behaviour in foreign affairs is better than that of other states.³⁶ I will show that it is this second perspective that underpins notions of American exceptionalism and US foreign policy.³⁷ Again, I do not argue that there are no

³² Ceaser, "The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism," 6.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 7.

³⁵ Davis and Lynn-Jones, "Citty Upon a Hill," 20-38; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); Walt, Friedman, and Mandelbaum, "An FP Debate: Just how Special is America Anyway?" 71-78.

³⁶ Walt, Friedman, and Mandelbaum, "An FP Debate: Just how Special is America Anyway?" 71-78; Tiryakian, "American Religious Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration," 40-54.

³⁷ Ceaser, "The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism," 1-25; Davis and Lynn-Jones, "Citty Upon a Hill," 20-38; Friedman, "Anthropology of an Idea: American Exceptionalism," 22-23; George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations Since 1776*; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*; Walt, Friedman, and Mandelbaum, "An FP Debate: Just how Special is America Anyway?" 71-78; Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations Since 1776*; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*;

other influences on American foreign policy, but that these ideas of moral superiority have provided a powerful and rather consistent strand in ideas about America's role in the world.

American exceptionalism as a historical phenomena

Michael Kammen, Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset argue, from differing perspectives, that within the study of history and social science, the meaning of American exceptionalism is that the United States is different in some important way from other states.³⁸ Ceaser argues that these two academic fields of study have understood the subject of American exceptionalism as a difference, rather than superiority.³⁹ Their research programmes are based on the view of American exceptionalism as a distinct historical phenomena and their research problem is based around analysing what factor makes the United States a statistical outlier. This scholarship is based on empirical studies rather than normative claims and not all of the historiography accepts the existence of a specific empirical phenomena of American exceptionalism. Ian Tyrell, for example, while analysing the empirical claims of American exceptionalism as a historical phenomenon, refutes and expresses profound scepticism towards the idea of the historical existence of American exceptionalism.⁴⁰

Kammen surveys the literature on American exceptionalism to conclude that that the term "different" is more acceptable and accurate when explaining United States history and culture, and warns against using any other term, such as unique or exceptional.⁴¹ Kammen found little evidence that the US deviated from norms underpinning the behaviour of all

³⁸ Bell, "American Exceptionalism Revisited: the Role of Civil Society," 38-56; Kammen, "The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration," 1-43; Lipset, "American Exceptionalism Reaffirmed," 25-69.

³⁹ Ceaser, "The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism," 6.

⁴⁰ Ian Tyrell, "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History," with a critique by Michael McGerr and a rejoinder by Tyrell, *American Historical Review*, no. 96 (Oct. 1991): 1031-1072.

⁴¹ Kammen, "The Problem of American Exceptionalism," 32.

industrialized nations; if that had been the case, according to Kammen, that might have indicated the moral superiority of the United States.⁴²

Kammen's understanding of American exceptionalism derives from a tradition of empirical social science that understands the United States as somehow being different from other countries, but does not argue that the US is special or superior. Kammen argues that this scholarship is persuasive since it is based on empirical case studies and historical scholarship. The historiographical work does not argue that the United States is unique or special or that it possesses a unique quality, such as the promotion of liberty, or carries a sense of mission.⁴³ Kammen argues that any understanding of American exceptionalism that is based upon the idea that the United States is special or superior compared to other states, is historically inaccurate.⁴⁴ He acknowledges that ideas about American exceptionalism may have an ideological content, but argues that there has been a lack of scholarly literature that empirically evaluates the ideological force of American exceptionalism.⁴⁵

Daniel Bell's views on American exceptionalism evolved over time. In 1975 Bell wrote "The End of American Exceptionalism" – expressing scepticism about the notion. Bell argued that the United States faced the same issues that affected other societies in history, and is, therefore, like all other nations.⁴⁶ Fourteen years later, Bell's second article, "American Exceptionalism Revisited: the role of civil society" (1989), presents a very different argument; it does not specify what events led Bell to revisit the subject of American exceptionalism.⁴⁷ Both articles argue, however, for a similar meaning to the concept of the

⁴² Kammen, "The Problem of American Exceptionalism," 33.

⁴³ Ceaser, "The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism," 7.

⁴⁴ Kammen, "The Problem of American Exceptionalism," 26.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Daniel Bell, "The End of American Exceptionalism," *The Public Interest* 10, no. 2 (Fall 1975): 2-18.

⁴⁷ Bell, "American Exceptionalism Revisited," 38.

American exceptionalism. The 1975 article seeks to empirically refute its existence; the 1989 article does the opposite.

Bell's understanding of American exceptionalism derives from the Founding Fathers of America's conviction that the United States is the providential nation whose dedication to liberty and to the dignity of the individual lays the foundation for a new and better world.⁴⁸ Bell elaborates that the Founding Fathers believed that the United States and its constituents would avoid the decadence and degeneration of previous republics, since morality grounded its political order. Bell argues that the Founding Fathers believed that America would avoid the issues that led to the collapse of previous republics. America is historically different because the United States has avoided the social instability that troubled Europe as America was founded on the creation of a vibrant civil society. Bell argues that American exceptionalism, therefore, arises historically and is due to the fact that the United States achieved social stability due to the establishment of an institutional foundation that protected individual liberties and provided a degree of continuity and consensus.⁴⁹

Bell argues that the United States has created the only complete civil society, perhaps the only one in political history, due to the United States' emphasis on individual self-interest and the utilitarian mode of thought.⁵⁰ Bell argues that due to the United States being a complete civil society, the United States avoided social instability. Bell's work can be critiqued in a number of ways; for example although he refers to the ideas of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel as the source of his understanding of civil society, he does not elaborate on Hegel's understanding of a complete civil society, nor does he explain clearly why Hegel provides explanatory power for Bell's evaluation of American exceptionalism. Bell does not

⁴⁸ Bell, "American Exceptionalism Revisited," 46.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 48.

either provide any detailed empirical and/or comparative studies to support the claim the US is the only complete civil society.

For the purpose of this study, the legitimacy of Bell's argument is less important than Bell's understanding of American exceptionalism as a distinctive historical attribute of America. Bell does not argue or make claims to how the US has a special mission or that the US is on a higher moral plane than other states as the Founding Fathers did. Rather, Bell aims to demonstrate that America's civil society is what makes the United States different from European states, and hence exceptional. Bell's understanding of American exceptionalism therefore can be understood as part of a trend in the historical scholarship and social science that regards the United States as a statistical outlier, rather than the United States as a normatively special entity.

Bell shares with Kammen the understanding of American exceptionalism as a specific historical phenomenon that can be empirically observed, especially from the late twentieth century onwards. Bell, particularly in his later work, argues that the US is different in the sense that the US has been more somewhat immune from the social ills and decadence that affected all other industrialized states.⁵¹ Kammen argues that the United States has much in common with other industrialised states but he shares with Bell that in some meaningful sense America is 'different'. Bell's understanding of American exceptionalism, therefore, differs from that of Kammen since Bell argues that the United States has deviated from a norm that describes most or all industrialized nations through its more developed civil society..

Lipset also argues that American exceptionalism is based upon the understanding that the United States is different from other countries in some important manner.⁵² Lipset

⁵¹ Bell, "American Exceptionalism Revisited," 41.

⁵² Lipset, "American Exceptionalism Reaffirmed," 25.

provides a list of factors that he argues makes the United States different from other industrialized states, such as Canada or England, thereby making the United States a statistical outlier. His article is, however, more of an assertion of American exceptionalism as he does not substantiate many of these claims through detailed empirical study and analysis. This long listing of traits also makes it difficult to determine which of these variables have explanatory power.

Among other things, Lipset argues that a major explanatory issue in the study of American exceptionalism is deciphering why the United States lacks a significant socialist movement or Labor Party.⁵³ He argues that the variables that weakened the potential for socialism and class-consciousness are America's unique class structure and religious system.⁵⁴ Yet Lipset does not go on to establish American exceptionalism by demonstrating why the United States does not have a socialist movement like other industrialized states. Instead, Lipset next discusses how the United States is exceptional because the United States was created from a revolutionary event.⁵⁵ Lipset, therefore, pauses his discussion on the lack of a socialist class in the United States, and seeks to demonstrate the exceptionality of America through the US's founding principles. What is of relevance for this thesis, however, is Lipset's core understanding of American exceptionalism. Similarly to Kammen and Bell and through his numerous examples, Lipset seeks to demonstrate America's distinctiveness from other states. He does not, however, base his analysis on how the United States might be supposedly superior to other industrialized states due to these differences. Rather, Lipset focuses on demonstrating that the United States is a statistical

⁵³ Lipset, "American Exceptionalism Reaffirmed," 27.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.

outlier compared to other industrialized states, as he seeks to specify what trait of America makes America different from other industrialized states.

American exceptionalism as moral superiority

There is both an analytical and an empirical strand to the literature on American exceptionalism as moral superiority. Analytically, the literature looks at the philosophy of the idea. Historically, the literature traces the empirical record; often with the intention of refuting the idea that America has superior moral foundations to its foreign policy compared to other states. Davis and Lynn-Jones argue that American exceptionalism is founded in a sense of moral superiority, that this understanding of American exceptionalism underpins American foreign policy and that American exceptionalism should be understood as a normative claim in the sense that American exceptionalism is based on what Americans believe the US should be, rather than an empirical attribute of the United States. For Davis and Lynn-Jones, American exceptionalism is not primarily a historical phenomenon, but an ideology that has been constructed upon the beliefs of prominent Americans.⁵⁶

According to Davis and Lynn-Jones, the belief that the United States is morally superior to other states originates from the belief of early colonial settlers and the Founding Fathers, who believed that the US would occupy a separate, and higher, moral category from the rest of the world, as they declared their independence from Great Britain.⁵⁷ Davis and Lynn-Jones, therefore, demonstrate that the belief in the moral superiority of the United States is as old as the nation itself. Davis and Lynn-Jones also show that the rhetoric of US presidents and policymakers at least from the twentieth century onwards, particularly those of the Reagan administration, has relied heavily on the tropes of moral superiority. Davis and

⁵⁶ Davis and Lynn-Jones, "Citty Upon a Hill," 20.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 22.

Lynn-Jones argue that the rhetoric of these US presidents and policymakers reflect and stem from the belief of the Founding Fathers that the United States was morally superior, and thereby, exceptional.

Henry Kissinger, influential as both a theorist and practitioner of United States foreign policy, shares some of these understandings. Kissinger argues that the United States conduct of foreign policy is different from other Western states because the US is the only state that asserts that the principles of ethical conduct apply to international conduct in the same way that they do to the individual.⁵⁸ Kissinger's argument can be critiqued, in that it can be argued that other states have understood their foreign policy as founded on moral notions similar to those held by the individual. The British empire's "civilising mission" fifteenth to the twentieth century provides one example, as does the Japanese empire's "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" of the early twentieth century.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, Kissinger argues that all twentieth-century presidents have made claims to an ethical mission abroad, in one way or another.⁶⁰ Kissinger argues that European foreign policy is based on an understanding and usage of concepts of international order and balance of power; whereas, the United States, according to Kissinger, bases foreign policy on ethical conduct and this is what makes the United States different from other states. The American claim is that the foreign policy of states should reflect the same moral standards as personal ethics; the state has no right to claim a separate morality for itself.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 22.

⁵⁹ James Patterson Smith, "Empire and Social Reform: British Liberals and the 'Civilizing Mission' in the Sugar Colonies, 1868-1874," *Albion* 27, no. 2 (1995): 253-277; Angela Yiu, "From Utopia to Empire: Atarashikimura and A Personal View of the Greater East Asia War (1942)," *Utopian Studies* 19, no. 2 (213-232).

⁶⁰ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 18.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 46.

Kissinger's understanding of American exceptionalism can be found in his description of the core components of Wilsonianism.⁶² These include that the United States has a special mission that obliges it to serve as a beacon of liberty for the rest of mankind, that the foreign policies of democracies are morally superior because the people are inherently peace loving, and that foreign policy should reflect the same moral standards as personal ethics.⁶³ Kissinger calls these components assertions of American moral exceptionalism.⁶⁴ Kissinger, therefore, understands American exceptionalism as constructed upon a United States sense of mission and moral superiority. Kissinger acknowledges that these ideals have existed since Thomas Jefferson but argues that it was the Wilson administration that gave the ideas of the Founding Fathers international influence and strength. Kissinger credits Wilson for transforming these ideals into a crusading ideology, which thereby enabled the United States to emerge as a key player in the world affairs and rest its claim to international leadership on altruism.⁶⁵

Stephen M. Walt and Edward A. Tiryakian argue that the core of the sense of American exceptionalism as moral superiority is based upon a normative claim that the United States behaves better than other states since United States foreign policy is guided by ethical principles.⁶⁶ These principles embrace moral causes, such as the eradication of evil. Although Walt seeks to repudiate the claims about American exceptionality by arguing that the normative claim does not stand against the empirical test of American history, in so doing he acknowledges the strength and longevity of ideas that cast American foreign policy as morally superior.

⁶² Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 46; Simon Schama, *The American Future: A History* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 109-110.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Tiryakian, "American Religious Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration," 40-54; Walt, Friedman, and Mandelbaum, "An FP Debate: Just how Special is America Anyway?" 71-78.

Walt provides a concrete understanding of what it means for the United States to be morally superior to other states. He argues that declarations by prominent Americans about American exceptionalism are based on the belief that the United States is a uniquely virtuous nation, a nation that loves peace, nurtures liberty, respects human rights, and embraces the rule of law.⁶⁷ Walt's understanding of American moral exceptionalism is, therefore, rooted in what Americans believe about the United States.⁶⁸ Walt can be understood, therefore, as elaborating the core conceptions provided by Davis and Lynn-Jones and Kissinger who demonstrate that American exceptionalism within the framework of US foreign policy is based upon the United States sense of moral superiority. Their work, however, does not provide much of an explanation of what it means for the United States to be morally superior.

According to Walt, the idea that the United States is morally superior to other states means that the US behaves much better than other states and other great powers because United States foreign policy decisions are based on virtuous or ethical principles, such as respecting human rights or nurturing liberty.⁶⁹ Walt shows that the sense of American exceptionalism as moral superiority is founded in the American belief that the United States conduct in international affairs are guided by what Kissinger calls principles of ethical conduct, rather than calculations of national interest or gaining power.⁷⁰ Americans believe that the US is on a higher moral plane than other states because the US behaves in a better manner than other states and it does not always act only in its own self-interest.

Tiryakian also supports a view of American exceptionalism in foreign policy as being founded in an American sense of virtue and moral superiority. He argues that Americans believe they are morally superior to other states because the United States conduct in foreign

⁶⁷ Walt, "An FP Debate," 73.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 72, 73.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 73.

⁷⁰ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 22.

affairs is guided by a moral cause, which is the eradication of evil from institutions, practices, and other empirical conditions. Tiryakian asserts that a central factor of American moralism is the religious impulse to find and eradicate evil, or a fall from grace, in empirical conditions.⁷¹ He argues that this distinction between good and evil, and the impulse to eradicate evil are components of the moral principles that guide US foreign policies.⁷² Tiryakian calls these components specifically American as he asserts that this religious element has diffused to other US social contexts to the degree that the impulse to find and eradicate evil has become a near permanent feature of modern American society.⁷³

In his volume on the history of United States foreign relations, Herring argues that American exceptionalism is the understanding that American foreign policy is guided by ethical principles rather than principles of power. Herring states that a set of assumed ideas and shared values have determined the way Americans viewed themselves and others, and how they dealt with other peoples and responded to and sought to shape events abroad.⁷⁴ The set of assumed ideas and shared values is underpinned by the United States' sense of special virtue and unique destiny; Herring elaborates that Americans perceive themselves as a chosen people with a providential mission.⁷⁵ According to his book, Americans believe that the United States is a peace-loving and righteous state, guided by ideas and values. Herring also understands American exceptionalism as being based upon a sense of mission that was given to America by Providence, Himself.⁷⁶ At core, Herring's understanding of American exceptionalism is that of a sense of moral superiority.

⁷¹ Tiryakian, "American Religious Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration," 47.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 2.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 4.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 4-5.

A number of these investigations of American exceptionalism refute the idea that American foreign policy is in practice more moral than that of other states. Fields observes that the rhetoric of United States government officials does not always match the actual practice of US foreign policy.⁷⁷ Walt shows that historically United States foreign policy actions were not peaceful, did not respect human rights, or failed to nurture liberty. The United States does not always, as he shows, behave as well as Americans believe it does or ought to.⁷⁸ Herring also shows that the conventional narrative of American exceptionalism, where the United States is more virtuous than other states, is empirically debatable to the extent of in many cases being incorrect.

There are also ambiguities and tensions in the scholarship on American exceptionalism. Kissinger's views are controversial, for example, given that foreign policy practice when Kissinger was a foreign policy advisor during the Vietnam War was brutal, involving indiscriminate bombing and napalming of civilians. Tensions exist as the contested nature of what constitutes the morality of American exceptionalism. Tiryakian does not specify how Americans arrive to their conclusion of what they perceive as evil. Herring's work is very much a synthetic text and does not base itself on primary sources, although, according to Josef Joffe, editor of the German weekly newspaper, *Die Zeit*, the text is innovative in that it provides a single-volume history of United States foreign policy from the foreign policy from George Washington to George W. Bush.⁷⁹ Payne's work has been critiqued by Campbell, Cumiford, and Ninkovich, among others, on the basis that it is empirically questionable.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 4-5.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Josef Joffe, review of *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations Since 1776*, by George C. Herring, *The New York Times*, October 31, 2008, Sunday Book Review, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/books/review/Joffe-t.html>.

⁸⁰ David Campbell, review of *The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interest, and Force in American Foreign Policy*, by Richard J. Payne, *The American Political Science Review* 90, no. 3 (Sep., 1996): 702-703;

Nevertheless, the view of American exceptionalism as moral superiority still provides a powerful prism for studying United States foreign policy. Kissinger explicitly argues that during the twentieth century the conduct of United States foreign policy was guided by American moral exceptionalism.⁸¹ Davis and Lynn-Jones show there has been a continuous reiteration of the singular and superior ethical status of the United States and claims about America's moral leadership have played a substantive part in the rhetoric of US presidents and policymakers from the twentieth century onwards.⁸² Spanos demonstrates that the concepts of American exceptionalism was particularly prominent within the neoconservatives during the post 9/11 era.⁸³

The diplomatic isolation of non-democratic states

Scholarship from a range of intellectual traditions converge around a finding that American exceptionalism as moral superiority provides a powerful explanation of American foreign policy to isolate states deemed adversarial to the United States. Payne and Fields, who investigate domestic values as a source of America foreign policy, can perhaps be understood as operating within a Liberal tradition.⁸⁴ Robert Litwak can be understood as emerging from a more state-centric scholarship, perhaps best thought of as operating within a Political Realist position.⁸⁵ Litwak and Kissinger share the view that American foreign policy has tended towards isolating non-democratic states, albeit from differing reasoning

William C. Cumiford, review of *The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interest, and Force in American Foreign Policy*, by Richard J. Payne, *Journal of Third World Studies* 16, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 304-308; Frank Ninkovich, review of *The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interest, and Force in American Foreign Policy*, by Richard J. Payne, *Political Science Quarterly* 111, no 2 (Summer, 1996): 357-358.

⁸¹ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 22, 30.

⁸² Davis and Lynn-Jones, "Citty Upon a Hill," 26.

⁸³ William V. Spanos, "American Exceptionalism in the Post-9/11 Era: The Myth and the Reality," *symptome*, vol. 21 no. 1-2 (2013): 291-323.

⁸⁴ Fields, "Engaging Adversaries: Myths and Realities in American Foreign Policy," 294-321; Richard J. Payne, *The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interests, and Force in American Foreign Policy*.

⁸⁵ Robert S. Litwak, *Rogue States and US Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C.: 2000), 12, 37.

processes, as have scholars operating in the critical tradition of international relations theory. Herring's historiographical work that, among other things, charts the ideological or normative notion of American exceptionalism and the US foreign policy stance of diplomatic isolation towards adversarial states, can perhaps be understood as deriving from a more critical analysis than that of Kissinger, whose prime aim is to better understand American foreign policy in order to improve its efficacy.⁸⁶

Payne argues that the ideology of American exceptionalism induces US policymakers to not support compromise with countries that these policymakers believe are inherently less virtuous than the United States, which he asserts is a characteristic of the states that the United States considers as adversaries.⁸⁷ The ideology of American moral exceptionalism favours diplomatic isolation with states that the US deems adversarial because Americans perceive compromise with states that are inherently less virtuous than the US as a violation of American principles and a national humiliation.⁸⁸ Payne argues that this is the case because Americans tend to view international conflicts in religious and moralistic terms. Fields argues, similarly to Payne, that an understanding of American values as natural, universal in application, and superior to those of other nations, is deep-seated in American thinking about foreign policy.⁸⁹

Payne argued that the International Relations theories that draw from Political Realism cannot explain the international relations of the post-Cold War, since Political Realism downplays the significance of internal factors and ideational considerations in the formulation and implementation of a country's foreign policies.⁹⁰ He argues that it is

⁸⁶ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations Since 1776*; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*.

⁸⁷ Payne, *The Clash with Distant Cultures*, 85.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 82-87.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 85.

necessary to understand culture as an important explanatory variable in foreign policy analysis because, he asserts, after the end of the Cold War, culture has become one of the most decisive determinants of international behaviour.⁹¹ Payne draws upon from the work of Clifford Geertz the idea of culture as a set of shared learned values, beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, modes of living, customs, and symbols.⁹² He argues that the United States possesses a consensual political culture and that this specific political culture underpins American foreign policy.⁹³ For Payne, the ideology of American exceptionalism, as the belief that the United States is unique and morally superior to other nations, emerges from domestic culture and he argues that American exceptionalism inevitably shapes US foreign policy.⁹⁴

Fields argues that this sense of American moral exceptionalism impedes diplomacy because it provides a justification for American political leaders and policymakers who do not wish to diplomatically engage with adversarial states.⁹⁵ Fields aim is to show that these rationales are baseless and inconsistent since they are articulated for some states while overlooked for others, but in so doing he demonstrates the strength of the view that compromise with countries that are understood as less virtuous than the United States is seen as a violation of American principles and, in some instances, a national humiliation.⁹⁶ Within this perspective, Fields argues that a compromise with states that are less virtuous than the United States is a violation of American principles.⁹⁷

Litwak, whose work on American foreign policy is widely respected, explains United States' post-Cold War international relations, specifically the United States policy

⁹¹ Payne, *The Clash with Distant Cultures*, xiv.

⁹² Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 36.

⁹³ Payne, *The Clash with Distant Cultures*, 5.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 13, 22.

⁹⁵ Fields, "Engaging Adversaries," 307-308.

⁹⁶ Fields, "Engaging Adversaries," 307-308; Payne, *The Clash with Distant Cultures*, 85.

⁹⁷ Fields, "Engaging Adversaries," 303.

of containment or isolation of adversarial states.⁹⁸ The coincidence of research investigation between Litwak's work with scholarship that explicitly focuses on American exceptionalism arises because of his interest in containment as the dominant US policy towards rogue states, or the states that the US government considers adversarial, during the post-Cold War era.⁹⁹ Although primarily focused on the security dilemmas provided by proliferating states, Litwak argues that the idea of rogue state reflects a view of international affairs as a struggle between good and evil.

Litwak draws from Robert Bellah's "Civil Religion in America," to argue that the view of international affairs as a struggle between good and evil, is at the core of an American civil religion.¹⁰⁰ Litwak argues that the rogue state concept and US policy towards rogue state is a product of the United States' unique political culture.¹⁰¹ Litwak's understanding of the rogue state discourse in post-Cold war American foreign policy, therefore, has a number of conceptual commonalities with the conceptual foundations of the analysis of American moral exceptionalism argued by Davis and Lynn-Jones and Tiryakian, who argue that the sharp distinction between good and evil is a core component of the American exceptionalism that is based upon the United States' sense of moral superiority.¹⁰² Litwak describes the political culture of the United States as deeply-rooted and unique. As argued by Ceaser, a claim to uniqueness is the common denominator of the scholarship on American exceptionalism.¹⁰³

Henry Kissinger argues for an empirical correlation between the ideology of American moral exceptionalism and the US foreign policy stance of diplomatic isolation

⁹⁸ Litwak, *Rogue States and US Foreign Policy*, 12.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 37.

¹⁰⁰ Robert Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," *Daedalus*, vol. 96 no. 1 (1967): 1-21.

¹⁰¹ Litwak, 48, 63.

¹⁰² Davis and Lynn-Jones, "Citty Upon a Hill," 26.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 63.

towards states that the United States government deems adversarial.¹⁰⁴ Based on analysis of reports written by presidential advisers, the rhetoric of government officials and policymakers, and official US government documents and US policies, Kissinger argues that American foreign policy has been shaped by the belief that the United States' behaviour in international affairs is guided by ethical principles, such as the spread of democracy, rather than the pursuit of the national interest defined in terms of power.¹⁰⁵ He further argued that the United States government espoused the ideology of American moral exceptionalism not as a justification that disguises a United States goal to achieve power, but as an actual guide that influences US foreign policy. For Kissinger, the corollary of the ideological understanding of American exceptionalism is a rejection of the idea of diplomacy with adversarial states.

From different normative perspectives, ranging from Kissinger's which is essentially supportive of American foreign policy abroad to those from a more critical perspective agree, the scholarship converges on an understanding that the empirical record links notions of American exceptionalism and the US foreign policy stance of diplomatic isolation towards states that the United States government deems adversarial. The authoritative work of George C. Herring that surveys the history of United States foreign policy from the sixteenth century to the twenty-first century, and Kissinger's *Diplomacy* that focuses specifically on US foreign policy during the twentieth century, illustrate the empirical correlations with both scholars identifying the Truman administration (1945-1953), as providing a formative moment for an explicit policy of isolating adversarial states, especially in the evolution of post-World War II relations with the Soviet Union, the former wartime ally of the United

¹⁰⁴ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 22.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

States.¹⁰⁶ Herring's work does not necessarily prove a causal relationship between the moral exceptionalism and US diplomatic isolation policy to adversaries, which is why his work is analysed alongside that of Kissinger, Litwak, Payne, and Fields. Their work further supports Herring's argument that concepts of moral exceptionalism have impacted United States' foreign policy to not engage in diplomacy with non-democratic states. Furthermore, I do not draw upon his work as a whole, but rather his section concerning the Truman administration.

Kissinger refers to President Truman's statement that the United States was not interested in territory or military bases, but instead that United States foreign policy was to be a reflection of American moral values that were based firmly on principles of righteousness and justice, and on refusing to compromise with evil.¹⁰⁷ Kissinger quotes Truman in order to demonstrate that Truman disdained justifying American actions in terms of security, and that Truman believed that peace should be based on American principles. The goal of the Truman administration's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was, therefore, the spread of liberty and democracy, which is one of the constitutive components of American moral exceptionalism as understood by Kissinger.¹⁰⁸

Kissinger analyses presidential adviser Clark Clifford's report to President Truman on US relations with the Soviet Union, foreign service officer George Kennan's telegram to the United States government concerning the behaviour and ideology of the Soviet Union government, and the National Security Council document (NSC-68). Drawing upon his analysis of such documents, Kissinger argues that the Truman administration believed that the Soviet-American conflict was caused by the moral shortcomings of the Soviet leadership, rather than conflicting geopolitical interests. The aim of the Truman administration was then

¹⁰⁶ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations Since 1776*, 2; Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 22.

¹⁰⁷ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 437.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 46.

not to negotiate an end to the Soviet-American conflict, but to aim at the internal transformation of the Soviet Union to a democracy.¹⁰⁹ The Truman administration decided that it would diplomatically isolate the Soviet Union until the government of the Soviet Union had met the precondition of behaviour change. Similar to Kissinger's analysis of the Truman administration, Herring argues that Truman officials were appalled by Marxist dogma and Soviet totalitarianism.¹¹⁰ Herring, furthermore, argues that Truman administration officials believed in American moral exceptionalism and held a passionate belief in an American destiny to reshape the post-World War II world order.

Truman administration officials assumed that the American ways of doing things were the correct way and that any peace should be based on American principles.¹¹¹ American statesman, therefore, perceived negotiations with the government of the Soviet Union as pointless until the Soviet Union changed its behaviour.¹¹² Litwak also argues that the Truman administration policy of containment towards the Soviet Union was a reflection of a reluctance to resolve the post-war Soviet-American conflict through negotiations.¹¹³ The philosophy of diplomatic isolation provided the foundation for what became the policy of containment towards what the United States government perceived as rogue states.¹¹⁴

American moral exceptionalism and Track II diplomacy

The central thesis of this dissertation is that American Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK during the George W. Bush administrations can be largely explained as an attempt made to fill perceived gaps and/or failures of official American diplomacy or Track

¹⁰⁹ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 46.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 612.

¹¹¹ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 599.

¹¹² Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 451.

¹¹³ Litwak, *Rogue States and US Foreign Policy*, 63.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

I diplomacy. In this chapter, I have shown a moralistic ideology of American exceptionalism, which is based upon the normative claim that America is morally superior to other states has provided a powerful and consistent underpinning of United States foreign policy. I have also shown that fundamental to the moralistic notion of foreign policy is the policy stance of diplomatic isolation towards states the United States considers as adversarial. In the next chapter I show that underpinning the failure of Bush administration diplomacy towards the DPRK is this very long-standing strand of American diplomacy based in an ideological approach to the idea of American exceptionalism. I will show how in the George W. Bush administration, ideas of American exceptionalism and the ancillary notion of non-negotiation with and isolation of adversarial states were manifested through the ideology and practice of 'neo-conservatism' that was espoused by powerful actors within the administration such as Vice-President Dick Cheney.

The downplaying of official or Track 1 diplomacy as a way to deal with adversarial states consequently created a role for Track II diplomacy, since Track II diplomacy was able to compensate for the lack of dialogue by providing a space or channel for communication between adversarial states through processes that were discussed in prior chapters. I next show in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7, how the distaste for diplomacy with the DPRK provided the context and motivation for American Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK.

Introduction

This chapter shows the extent of the impact of ideas of moral exceptionalism on the thinking of senior, influential foreign policy makers in the Bush administration, particularly in relationship to North Korea. By analysing the memoirs and speeches of influential decision-makers, as well as scholarly and policy literature, I show that the ideas underpinning an antagonism to diplomacy with North Korea were embedded in policy throughout the duration of the eight year Bush administration, although they were more forcefully applied in the period 2002-2005.¹ The lack of interest in achieving a negotiated settlement was underpinned by the preference for regime change, itself shaped by the idea that it was America's destiny to promote the transformation of the DPRK into a democratic state. If successful, regime change would have obviated the need for negotiation. This chapter shows how these understandings became embedded in legislation and policy. It then presents a detailed study of some of the most controversial events in Bush administration diplomatic relations with the DPRK, demonstrating the constraints placed upon negotiators by senior foreign policy officials in Washington DC. It shows how United States diplomats were unable to fulfil the normal functions of diplomacy, including meaningful negotiations, gathering of information, and clear and effective communication of government objectives.

The chapter considers other inhibiting factors on Bush administration diplomacy to North Korea including the lack of a consistent and coherent foreign policy, a lack of trust between the United States and the DPRK, the Bush administration's overreliance on the

¹ John Bolton, *Surrender is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2007); George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (Crown Publishers: New York, 2010); Dick Cheney and Liz Cheney, *Exceptional: Why the World Needs a Powerful America* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2015); Christopher Hill, *Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014); Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor: a memoir of my years in Washington* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011).

Chinese government as a means of communication between the United States and the DPRK, and the DPRK's own approach to negotiating with the United States.² Not all these arguments carry equal weight but equally, none of them obviate my analysis of the importance and consequences of ideological framing of American foreign policy towards the DPRK during the Bush administration. As demonstrated in the following chapters, the constraints and limitations of American diplomacy provided subsequent impetus to non-state actors, to try to fill the gaps that they identified in the official diplomacy between the United States and the DPRK.

The underlying philosophy

As demonstrated in the prior chapter, American exceptionalism is a normative claim that is based upon the United States' sense of moral superiority. The belief is that the United States is morally superior to other states because the United States behaves better than other states, and its foreign policy is guided by ethical principles, such as the spread of democracy and the eradication of evil. During the Bush administration these ideas were most prominently held by a group of senior foreign policy advisers to President Bush, who became known collectively, as "neo-conservatives."

James Mann in *The Rise of the Vulcans: the History of Bush's War Cabinet* chronicles the thirty-five year history of a group of the most influential of President Bush's foreign policy advisors, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, and Condoleezza Rice.³ Mann argues that there were important differences

² Sebastian Harnisch, "US-North Korean Relations Under the Bush administration: From "Slow Go" to "No Go," Asian Survey 42, no. 6 (November/December 2002): 856-882; Wade L. Huntley, "US Policy toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliath's Fate," Asian Survey 47, no 3 (May/June 2007), 455-480; James I. Matray, "The Failure of the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy: A Critical Analysis," International Journal of Korean Studies 17, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 140-177; C. Kenneth Quinones, "Dualism in the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy," Asian Perspective 27, no. 1 (April 2003): 1-28

³ James Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (London: Viking Penguin, 2004).

between them, with Condoleeza Rice for example, less aligned with an ideological conservatism and more influenced by concepts of Political Realism, which assumes that relationships among countries are governed by considerations of power, not morality.⁴ By contrast Mann shows how Paul Wolfowitz emphasised the value of political freedom and believed strongly in democratic ideals.⁵ Nevertheless, Mann argues that, collectively, these senior foreign policy advisers to President Bush advocated pre-emptive action to support American interests where necessary, supported the notion of an unchallengeable American superpower and an ever-greater American military power, and believed that America is ultimately a force for good despite negative consequences that may arise from American aggression.⁶ Mann shows that these were not beliefs that were adopted after the tragedy of 9/11 and a reaction to that event. Instead these were long held beliefs and convictions. Mann argues that the 9/11 terrorist attacks did not precipitate these beliefs but instead provided an opportunity for the application of these long held ideological beliefs about America's role in the world to be put into practice.

Mann's work documents the importance of the American belief that United States role and policies in international relations should support democratic ideals and be based on moral values. Funabashi also reports that senior officials of the Bush administration, most particularly Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz "believe that there is a dichotomy between Good and Evil in international politics...they believe in containment and conversion of what they regard as evil states."⁷ These very strong understandings of the notion of American exceptionalism, therefore, were shared by very senior Bush administration officials. Even when shifts in administration policy and personnel from

⁴ Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans*, 147.

⁵ Ibid., 93.

⁶ Ibid., 329.

⁷ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 141.

confrontation to attempts at some form of accommodation with the DPRK took place, with the appointments of Condoleezza Rice as Secretary of State, and Christopher Hill as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, neo-conservative understandings of how to deal with the DPRK remained influential.⁸ Despite the departure of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense in 2006, which visibly indicated a change in administration policy in broader foreign policy, advocates of non-engagement with the DPRK, as Chris Hill reports, were motivated and active in trying to undermine Hill's turn to conventional diplomacy.⁹

The self-understanding of Bush administration foreign policy

The writings and speeches of President George W. Bush, his vice-president Dick Cheney, and other senior figures in the administration, explicitly refer to ideas about American exceptionalism as fundamental drivers of American foreign policy.

Every State of the Union Address made by President Bush to Congress explicitly drew on ideas about American exceptionalism as a rationale for foreign policy. The annual State of the Union address to Congress is important as it provides a platform where American presidents rally support for their agenda, and a forum where the president can speak directly to the American people.¹⁰ Policies that President Bush discussed in his State of the Union Addresses were policies he hoped to implement. In every State of the Union Address, President Bush stated that the foreign policy of the United States should be the spread of democracy abroad in order to end the tyrannies of the world. President Bush appealed to the

⁸ Pardo, "The Bush Administration and North Korea," 334.

⁹ Stephen McGlinchey, "Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy," *Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science*, vol. 16 no. 1 (2010), 24; Christopher R. Hill, *Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014).

¹⁰ "State of the Union Address," *History, Art & Archives, US House of Representatives*, accessed February 5, 2017, <http://history.house.gov/Institution/SOTU/State-of-the-Union/>.

ethics of the American people in his explanation to why the US government's foreign policy should be the spread of democracy abroad. Bush drew on tropes from the American exceptionalism repertoire that argued for United States moral superiority to other states as a state whose foreign policies are inherently ethical. These foundational assumptions of American exceptionalism justified the preferred foreign policy of spreading democracy abroad as a fundamentally moral policy.

In his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush states that "America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere."¹¹ The spread of democracy abroad was, therefore, the moral foreign policy option. This is further reinforced by the phrase, "because they are right," which Bush uses to describe the policy of spreading democracy abroad.¹² This type of logical structure is again seen in his 2004 State of the Union Address, when President Bush stated that "the cause we serve is right, because it is the cause of all mankind."¹³ Bush underlines that this policy is moral since it benefits the international community.

In his 2003 State of the Union Address and his 2008 State of the Union Address, President Bush stated that the United States had a unique moral position in world affairs since its creation as a state.¹⁴ America's Founding Fathers dedicated the American state "to the cause of human dignity, the rights of every person, and the possibilities of every life."¹⁵ Bush again draws on concepts familiar from the ideology of American exceptionalism in the normative claim that the United States is uniquely virtuous and morally righteous. Bush was invoking a sense of American uniqueness within his audience, as he reminded the American

¹¹ "Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush," *George W. Bush White House Archives*, accessed February 5, 2017, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf, 112.

¹² *Ibid.*, 112.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 211.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 154, 540.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 154.

people that the Founding Fathers committed the United States to a separate and higher moral category from other states by ensuring that its foreign policy would be virtuous and altruistic. By referring to the intentions of America's Founding Fathers, Bush asserted a framework for thinking about America's foreign policies as having been based upon ethical principles since the creation of the American state. Within this context, Bush argued that his preferred foreign policy of spreading democracy abroad is a policy based upon ethical principles and, thereby, aligned with the intentions of the Founding Fathers.

Similarly to President Bush, Vice-President Richard "Dick" Cheney also believed in American moral exceptionalism, as demonstrated by his book *Exceptional: Why the World Needs a Powerful America*, co-authored with his daughter Liz Cheney. Cheney drew from a belief in American moral exceptionalism to critique the Obama administration's foreign policies. Cheney criticises Obama administration's foreign policies for emitting the idea that the United States is to blame for certain world events and that United States' power must, therefore, be restrained.¹⁶ Cheney calls this idea a "fundamental counterfactual," as he believes that the United States has not done any wrong, and there is, therefore, no need for the United States to apologize to other states.¹⁷ Rather, according to Cheney, what the United States has done in and for the world is guarantee freedom, security, and peace for a larger share of humanity.¹⁸ Cheney states that the United States is the greatest force for good that the world has ever known.¹⁹ Cheney perceives US foreign policies as being almost entirely benevolent; his belief is that United States foreign policies are based upon ethical principles; and his understanding of American exceptionalism is based upon United States' moral superiority.

¹⁶ Cheney and Cheney, *Exceptional*, 3, 123-130.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

UN Ambassador John Bolton is another prominent United States government official who explicitly drew on notions of American moral exceptionalism in his rationale to why the United States government should not negotiate with the DPRK. Before he was appointed as United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Bolton was the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. Bolton was, therefore, senior advisor to President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell on matters pertaining to arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament, which included North Korea's nuclear program. In his book review of Vice-President Cheney's *Exceptional: Why the World Needs a Powerful America*, Bolton writes that Cheney's understanding of the United States' proper place in the world is something "we always know to be true."²⁰ Bolton's positive review indicates agreement with Cheney's description of the United States as the greatest force for good that the world has ever known because its policies seeks to guarantee the freedom, security, and peace for a larger share of humanity.²¹ Furthermore, Bolton believes that this understanding of the United States is an empirical fact, rather than a normative claim.

The embeddedness of moral exceptionalism in policies towards North Korea

At the same time as the administration argued that it had not entirely ruled out a diplomatic strategy towards the DPRK, it sought an alternative strategy to direct talks, including economic isolation. Diplomatic engagement with the DPRK was not the preferred foreign policy approach; regime change rather than a negotiated settlement was the logical corollary of stances taken by the most senior leaders in the United States. Below, I show how

²⁰ John Bolton, "BOOK REVIEW: 'Exceptional: Why the World Needs a Powerful America'," review of *Exceptional: Why the World Needs a Powerful America*, by Dick Cheney and Liz Cheney, *The Washington Times*, September 14, 2015, Analysis/Opinion, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/14/book-review-exceptional-why-the-world-needs-a-powe/>; Bolton, *Surrender is Not an Option*, 104.

²¹ Cheney and Cheney, *Exceptional*, 1.

President Bush, Vice-President Cheney and John Bolton's approach to North Korea policy was infused with the tropes of American exceptionalism. Similarly to members of the United States Congress, President Bush did not trust the DPRK as a negotiating partner; he stated that he was "not certain as to whether" the DPRK was "keeping all the terms" of the October 1994 Agreed Framework, and that Kim Jong-il "simply cannot be trusted."²²

I then show that Congress worked off common assumptions to President Bush through a consideration of the 2003 North Korea Democracy Act and the 2006 North Korean Nonproliferation Act. Both portrayed North Korea as an irrational, unreliable negotiating partner. I also analyse the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. Members of the United States Congress agreed that North could not be relied upon, trusted or negotiated with. The 2003 and the 2006 legislation both called for the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program to be executed through economic isolation of North Korea, rather than diplomacy between the two states. The Bush administration and the US Congress understood economic sanctions as an alternative to negotiations not primarily as a tool to providing leverage over the DPRK during negotiations. The foreign policy aim was to pressure the North Korean government into accepting United States terms. The objective and aims of Bush administration's foreign policy towards North Korea's nuclear issue are drawn from United States government documents, including United States legislation and United States Congressional Records.²³

²² Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C., 2007), 108; James Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (London: Viking Penguin, 2004), 278.

²³ Senator Kyl, speaking on North Korea, 403-407; Senator Nelson, speaking on North Korea, 402; United States. Cong. Senate. *North Korea Democracy Act of 2003*; United States, Library of Congress, *North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program*; United States, National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy*; John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.

North Korea must be free

The ideas outlined in the State of the Union Addresses underpin President Bush's approach to North Korea. In his autobiography, *Decision Points*, President Bush records that he was "convinced that the only path to meaningful change is for the North Korean people to be free."²⁴ North Korea is discussed within the chapter entitled "Freedom Agenda," perhaps a further indication that President Bush's preferred foreign policy towards the DPRK was regime change rather than a negotiated settlement. The Freedom Agenda was part of what is now known as the Bush Doctrine, and it concerns the "advancement of hope and liberty as an alternative to the enemy's ideology of repression and fear."²⁵ The Freedom Agenda, therefore, had the same objectives as the foreign policy that Bush explains in his State of the Union Addresses, in that both seek and support the growth of democracy abroad, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny abroad.²⁶

Vice-President Cheney directly conceptualized foreign policy towards North Korea within this moralistic paradigm as demonstrated in a statement that he made during a White House meeting on North Korea in December 2003. Vice-President Cheney stated that "I have been charged by the president with making sure that none of the tyrannies in the world are negotiated with. We don't negotiate with evil; we defeat it."²⁷ United States foreign policy towards the DPRK is understood as one of good versus evil. Given that Cheney believes in the inherent benevolence of American foreign policy and that the actions of the United States

²⁴ Bush, *Decision Points*, 426.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 397.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 396.

²⁷ Leslie H. Gelb, "In the End, Every President Talks to the Bad Guys," *The Washington Post*, April 27, 2008, accessed December 7, 2016, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/24/AR2008042401459.html>; Joe Cirincione, "Is Iran Too Evil to Talk to?" *The Huffington Post*, March 23, 2015, accessed December 7, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-cirincione/is-iran-too-evil-to-talk_b_6921116.html; Rachel Maddow, "Dick Cheney and 'deep doo doo,'" *MSNBC*, April 10, 2013, accessed December 7, 2016, <http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/dick-cheney-and-deep-doo-doo>.

are for the betterment of the international community and by characterising the North Korean regime as evil, Cheney could argue that a United States foreign policy towards the DPRK where the natural outcome is a United States victory over North Korea. Cheney directly used these ideas to argue that the United States should not negotiate with North Korea under any circumstance.²⁸ The ideology of American moral exceptionalism provided a rationale for the preferred foreign policy of isolation and a refusal to engage in bilateral diplomacy with North Korea.

Bolton's writings concerning the North Korean regime demonstrate that Bolton's partiality towards regime change in North Korea as the solution to North Korea's nuclear program, rather than negotiation. It is this very strong interpretation of American moral exceptionalism, as further outlined in his book, *Surrender is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad* that explicitly underpins his reluctance to enter into any negotiations with the North Korean government.²⁹ For Bolton, the North Korean government is an inherently unreliable negotiation partner. Bolton's discussion of the Agreed Framework, which he sought to terminate, blamed all failure on the North Korean government, and did not analyse actions of the United States, even when respected United States sources reported that the United States government did not always fulfil or honour the its core commitments to North Korea.³⁰ In a hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate on 14 July 1998, the Chairman, former Senator Craig Thomas, reported that the United States

²⁸ Gelb, "In the End, Every President Talks to the Bad Guys."

²⁹ Bolton, *Surrender is Not an Option*, 104.

³⁰ US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, *KEDO and the Korean agreed nuclear framework: problems and prospects: hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations: 1998*. 105 Cong., 2d sess., 1998, Committee Print; Leon Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

government was late in fulfilling obligations in respect of heavy oil deliveries to the DPRK.³¹ Sigal goes so far as to argue that the North Korean government did not fulfil its commitments to the Agreed Framework as a response to prior United States failures to fulfil its obligations. Irrespective of the balance of blame, Bolton's prior commitment to the ideas of American moral superiority seems to underpin his lack of acknowledgement of any fault on the side of the United States or indeed mention of such a possibility. For Bolton, the DPRK violated the Agreed Framework, "before the ink was dry."³² Bolton insists that the collapse of the Agreed Framework was due to the North Korean government's violation of the terms of the agreement.³³

The 2003 North Korea Democracy Act

Former Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona explained during the first session of the 108th Congress that the purpose of the 2003 North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 was to "move North Korea toward a more democratic regime and forego the development of these weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of them as well as missiles throughout the world."³⁴ The North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 aimed to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program by changing the North Korean regime into a democratic one. The purpose of this legislation was, therefore, not to defend or push for direct engagement with North Korea. The legislation proposed economic isolation through the imposition of sanctions, with the aim of pressuring the DPRK into becoming a democratic state.³⁵ The authors of the Act believe that the democratization of North Korea would resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. They did not

³¹ US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, *KEDO and the Korean agreed nuclear framework*.

³² Bolton, *Surrender is Not an Option*, 101, 103.

³³ *Ibid.*, 101, 114.

³⁴ Senator Kyl, speaking on North Korea, 403.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 404-406.

believe that a negotiated settlement would be possible because of their belief that that the North Korean government violated the terms of the 1994 October Agreed Framework and was, therefore, an unreliable negotiation partner.³⁶

The legislation was underpinned by the belief that the North Korean government cheated on past negotiations. This perspective of the North Korean government aligned with that of prominent government officials, including Vice-President Richard “Dick” Cheney and UN Ambassador John Bolton, that direct talks with the North Korean government could not provide a dependable solution, since an unreliable partner implies that the state will not comply with any negotiated agreement. The North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 was highly sceptical about negotiations with the DPRK, but it did not entirely rule out a diplomatic solution. Point four of section four of the North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 discusses what diplomacy with the DPRK must achieve, although the sub-section begins with a warning that North Korea is not a trustworthy negotiating partner.³⁷ Due to authors’ perception of North Korea as an unreliable negotiation partner, the recommended diplomatic solution is rigid and comes with a specific set of demands. The Act states that if diplomacy with the DPRK should occur, it must achieve the total dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program and include highly intrusive verification requirements.³⁸ The only diplomatic solution permitted is prompt and verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program, which must be complete, verifiable, and irreversibly dismantled.

The content of the 2003 North Korea Democracy Act shows that the main objective of United States foreign policy towards North Korea was to dictate United States terms onto

³⁶ United States. Cong. Senate. *North Korea Democracy Act of 2003*.

As demonstrated by Tim Beal’s *North Korea: The Struggle Against American Power* (2005) and Yoichi Funabashi’s *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis* (2007), the question of whether the North Korean government admitted to having developed a nuclear weapons program while under the terms of the October 1994 Agreed Framework is still contested.

³⁷ United States. Cong. Senate. *North Korea Democracy Act of 2003*.

³⁸ Ibid.

North Korea, rather than reconcile the different interests of the two states.³⁹ The North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 is also significant in that recommended strategies, other than diplomacy, were proposed and these proposals were almost all adopted by the Bush administration. As with senior Bush foreign policy officials, Congress shared the view that the DPRK was inherently a state with which the United States could not engage with diplomatically, to reconcile interest and seek a compromise solution.

The 2006 Congressional Research Service Report on “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” points out that the majority of the conditions that were recommended by the North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 were executed by the Bush administration.⁴⁰ These included the termination of the 1994 October Agreed Framework, imposition of financial sanctions onto North Korea, and denial of reciprocal measures that include any nuclear cooperation agreement or type of nuclear interaction until North Korea takes steps to dismantle its nuclear program.⁴¹ Although the 2006 Congressional Research Service report demonstrates that the Bush administration did not entirely dismiss a diplomatic strategy, it also demonstrates that the Bush administration preferred alternative strategies to negotiations.⁴²

The 2006 North Korea Nonproliferation Act

The 2006 North Korean Nonproliferation Act, passed by the 109th session of Congress, and signed by President Bush on 13 October 2006 provides strong language indicating that the Bush administration believed that negotiations could not obtain the

³⁹ Senator Nelson, speaking on North Korea, 402; Senator Kyl, speaking on North Korea, 403-407; United States. Cong. Senate. *North Korea Democracy Act of 2003*.

⁴⁰ US Library of Congress, *North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program*; United States. Cong. Senate. *North Korea Democracy Act of 2003*.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² US Library of Congress, *North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program*, 6-8.

dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program in an enforceable and verifiable way. Former Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee describes North Korea as an unreliable negotiating partner when explaining why the Senate should pass the 2006 North Korean Nonproliferation Act.⁴³

The North Korea Nonproliferation Act became Public Law No: 109-353. The law argues, "it should be the policy of the United States to impose sanctions on persons who transfer such weapons, goods and technology related to such weapons, to and from North Korea."⁴⁴ The policy introduced in the North Korean Nonproliferation Act of 2006 shares the same objective as section 7 of the North Korea Democracy Act of 2003, which argues for the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea in order to deny the North Korean government currency it needed to build up its nuclear capability and to prevent them from exporting these weapons to other countries.⁴⁵ The main focus of the sanctions introduced in the 2003 North Korea Democracy Act was upon the North Korean government, while the 2006 North Korea Nonproliferation Act focused on imposing sanctions upon outside actors. Senator Bill Frist emphasised the unreliability of North Korea in his reference to North Korea's boycott of the Six-Party Talks and his argument was that the DPRK showed scant willingness to allow diplomatic efforts to succeed.⁴⁶

The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007

The Defense Authorization bill for fiscal year 2007, also known as the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, was signed by President Bush on

⁴³ Senator Frist, speaking on North Korea, on July 25, 2006, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 152., pt. 99: 8206-8207; Senator Kyl, speaking on North Korea, 333; United States. Cong. Senate. *North Korea Democracy Act of 2003*.

⁴⁴ *North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006*, Public Law 109-353, US Statutes at Large 120 (2006): 2015-2016.

⁴⁵ United States. Cong. Senate. *North Korea Democracy Act of 2003*.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

17 October 2006 and became Public Law 109-364. It further demonstrates the Bush administration's disinterest in negotiations with the DPRK.⁴⁷ Section 1211 of this law states that the President was required to appoint a senior presidential coordinator of United States policy on North Korea, no later than sixty days after the date of the enactment of the Act.⁴⁸ This direction to President Bush was a response to the Bush administration termination of the North Korea senior policy coordinator position, that had been active during the Clinton administration, the preceding presidential administration.⁴⁹ President Clinton had appointed William Perry as the North Korea Policy Coordinator in 1998.⁵⁰ One of the duties of the North Korea Policy Coordinator was to engage in direct negotiations with the DPRK. The call by Congress in 2007 indicates a change in mood of Congress towards diplomacy, but also confirms that in the view of Congress, the Bush administration had still not fully accepted that the North Korea nuclear issue could be resolved through negotiations.⁵¹ It is a reminder that even by 2007, the Bush administration did not prioritise diplomacy as a means of ending conflict with the DPRK.

Bush administration foreign policy towards the DPRK

The main objective of the Bush administration's foreign policy towards the DPRK was to secure the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner.⁵² United States officials entered into diplomacy with North Korea

⁴⁷ *John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007*, 2083-2521.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ US Department of State, Office of the North Korea Policy Coordinator, *Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations*, by William J. Perry, Unclassified report (1999), <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/1997%20NKPR.pdf>.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007*, 2420; "Senators advocate N. Korea Talks," *The Washington Times*, June 26, 2006, accessed August 9, 2016, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/jun/26/20060626-124030-7186r/>.

⁵² Quinones, "Dualism in the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy," 197-224; Senator Kyl, speaking on North Korea, 403-407; United States, Library of Congress, *North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program*.

with these stated aim of achieving these policies but were unable to perform conventional diplomatic functions because the underlying philosophy of the ideology of American moral exceptionalism impeded active diplomatic engagement with the North Korean government. Bush administration diplomatic activities towards the DPRK took place primarily through the multilateral vehicle of the Six-Party Talks, that included the United States, the DPRK, the Republic of Korea, China, Russia and Japan. The first round of the Six-Party Talks was held from 27-29 August 2003. The second round of the Six-Party Talks was held from 25-28 February 2004. The third round was held from 23-26 June 2004. The fourth round took place in 2005; the fifth in 2006-2007; the final set of talks started in 2007 and was formally discontinued in 2009.

The commitment to multilateralism and to avoiding bilateral communication with the DPRK was such that it pushed the Bush administration, by contrast with the Clinton administration, into a policy based upon cooperation with China. While the Bush administration made the argument that its reliance upon China as an intermediary during the Six-Party Talks was to maintain solidarity and cohesion of the negotiation process, Funabashi convincingly argues that it pursued a multilateral approach because it did not want to engage in bilateral negotiations with North Korea.⁵³ The United States was also very focused on the issue of Iraq and the war against terrorism in the early 2000s, in the aftermath of the 9.11 attack on New York, and Funabashi also shows that due to its focus on Middle East, the Bush administration temporarily outsourced the North Korea nuclear issue to China.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, whatever the rationale, as far as North Korea was concerned, the Bush administration's reliance on China and the lack of direct communication between the United

⁵³ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 159.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 306.

States and the DPRK indicated to the North Korean government that the Bush administration was not serious about pursuing a negotiated settlement.⁵⁵

The US delegation to the first three rounds of the Six-Party Talks was headed by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly. Kelly's successor was Ambassador Christopher R. Hill (2005-2009). The United States delegation to the Six-Party Talks were given strict instructions by the sector of Bush administration that was reluctant to enter into diplomatic engagement with the North Korean government.⁵⁶ The constraints imposed on United States negotiators from Washington DC were extremely rigorous in the first three rounds of talks.

Ambassador Hill was given more autonomy by the Bush administration than Assistant Secretary of State Kelly, for instance, he was permitted to conduct direct talks with his North Korean counterparts, but surveillance from Washington DC continued. The Bush administration became more open to the idea of a negotiated settlement but at the same time neoconservative voices, although less dominant than earlier in the administration, were powerful enough to obstruct any development that seemed to offer legitimacy to the DPRK and remained intent on doing so.⁵⁷ Yoichi Funabashi reports that National Security Council staffers Professor Victor Cha and William Tobey were included in the US delegation to the Six-Party Talks to ensure that Ambassador Hill did not go beyond his instructions from the Bush administration.⁵⁸ Both Kelly and Hill's interactions with North Korean counterparts were monitored by the Bush administration.

⁵⁵ Donald Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asia Security."

⁵⁶ Chinoy, *Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008), 183-184; Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 338; Charles L. Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 110, 138.

⁵⁷ Christopher R. Hill, *Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 196-197; Ramon Pacheco Pardo, "The Bush Administration and North Korea: Explaining Policy Change through Soft Balancing," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 26, no. 3 (September 2014): 334-335; Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 348.

⁵⁸ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 379.

Diplomacy with the DPRK

There is a plethora of descriptive and policy-focused literature on the Bush administration's foreign policy towards North Korea and its nuclear program; a common contemporaneous theme was the question of whether the Six-Party Talks remained an effective solution to the North Korea nuclear issue.⁵⁹ There is research that examines the Six-Party Talks within the larger context of the Bush administration's foreign policy. In this bulk of literature, scholars seek to demonstrate why the Bush administration changed its policy from confrontation to accommodation, or to determine whether the Bush administration's response to the second North Korean nuclear crisis was effective.⁶⁰ This body of work does not allow questions to be asked and answered about diplomatic processes. In order to examine the actual practices of United States diplomacy, I draw on the theories of diplomacy introduced earlier in the dissertation. These include the conventional understanding of the functions of diplomacy as facilitating communication between states, and allowing states to gather intelligence, or information, about other states.⁶¹ These functions allow states to determine whether there is compatibility between the interests of the states. As established within the earlier chapters, when states recognize that their respective interests can be

⁵⁹ Ralph Cossa, "Six-Party Talks: Will/Should They Resume?" *American Foreign Policy Interests* 34, no. 1 (January/February 2012): 27-33; Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (New York: Basic Books), 2004, 395-398; Juergen Kleiner, "The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 2 (June 2005): 203-226; Kyung-Ae Park, "North Korea in 2004: From Brisk Diplomacy to Impasse," *Asian Survey* 45, no. 1 (January/February 2005): 16; Gilbert Rozman, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and US Strategy in Northeast Asia," *Asian Survey* 47, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 604.

⁶⁰ Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes, and David G. Victor "The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making," *American Political Science Association* 11, no. 2 (June 2013): 368-386; Virginie Grzelczyk, "Carrots and Sticks: The Construction of an American Foreign Policy toward North Korea," *The Institute of Korean Studies* 39, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 539-570; Ramon Pacheco Pardo, "The Bush Administration and North Korea: Explaining Policy Change through Soft Balancing," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 26, no. 3 (September 2014): 333-349; Gilbert Rozman, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and US Strategy in Northeast Asia," *Asian Survey* 47, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 601-621.

⁶¹ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1977), 170-171; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1993), 530-531; Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 26.

reconciled, they are able to enter into the negotiation process to negotiate an agreement.⁶² The negotiation process is, therefore, a core component of diplomacy, as argued by the classical literature on diplomacy.⁶³

In this section, I first of all show how the United States developed an approach to dealing with the DPRK that comes close to the antitheses of diplomacy; whereby negotiation was discouraged and strict instructions from Washington DC forbade United States officials from participating in conventional diplomatic interaction. I show the genesis of this approach in the October 2002 Pyongyang meeting between United States officials and DPRK officials. I trace the progress of United States participation in the Six-Party Talks to show how the normal functions of diplomacy could not be carried out effectively by United States officials. In particular, I show that the US delegation to the Six-Party Talks could not gather adequate information concerning its adversary's position on the nuclear issue because of the constraints placed upon it from foreign policy directions from the White House. I show that these constraints also severely hampered the possibility of the United States delegation to the Six-Party Talks being able to perform the conventional diplomatic function of facilitating clear communication between negotiating adversaries.⁶⁴ I draw on United States government policy and legislations, United States Congressional Records, as well as the journalist and scholarly, and governmental community's analysis of the policy towards North Korea.⁶⁵ I

⁶² William Zartman, "Negotiations: Theory and Reality," *Journal of International Affairs* 9, no. 1 (1975): 74.

⁶³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 170; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 108, 530-531; Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 3, 39, 52.

⁶⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 171.

⁶⁵ Victor Cha and David Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007); Senator Kyl, speaking on North Korea, on January 10, 2003, 108th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 149, pt. 1: 403-407; Senator Nelson, speaking on North Korea, on January 10, 2003, 108th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 149, pt. 1: 402; United States. Cong. Senate. *North Korea Democracy Act of 2003*, January 13, 2003, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2003, S. 145; United States, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program*, by Larry A. Niksch, RL33590 (2006); United States, National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy*, Press Secretary, September 2002; *John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007*, Public Law 109-364, *US Statutes at Large* 120 (2006): 2083-2521.

reconstruct the rounds of the Six-Party Talks, by using secondary sources, as well as the statements released by the foreign ministries of relevant states.⁶⁶

The 2002 Pyongyang meeting

The unwillingness and disinterest of the Bush administration to enter into direct talks with the North Korean government and the aversion to any process that could be seen as negotiating a compromise, one of the core functions of diplomacy, inevitably downgraded all other diplomatic functions. Arguably, this absence of focus on the conventional functions and potential contribution of diplomacy was a significant factor in the now notorious meeting that Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly held in Pyongyang in 2002, which resulted in, among other things, ambiguities about the important question of whether the North Korean government had pursued a highly enriched uranium program.

In early summer of 2002, the American intelligence community had made an assessment that suggested the need for a reinterpretation of North Korea's enrichment program.⁶⁷ According to Robert Carlin, former CIA analyst responsible for North Korea, the analysis was not based upon direct knowledge of how far the program had actually developed, but rather was based upon a synthesis of information about material and machinery the DPRK had procured, or sought to procure, over the past several years.⁶⁸ The Central Intelligence Agency provides President's Daily Brief, which is a summary of high-

⁶⁶ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 183-184; "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks," *The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy*, accessed on Feb 6, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/docs/0402/doc26.htm#03>; "Foreign Ministry Statement, August 30," *The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy*, accessed February 8, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/docs/0308/doc10.htm>; Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 338; Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy*, 110; Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor: a memoir of my years in* Washington (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 348.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 363.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

intelligence and analysis about the developments on the Korean Peninsula.⁶⁹ It is written for the president and his top advisers. The procurement efforts suggested that the DPRK was making a major effort to move beyond small-scale experimentation and launch a production-scale program.⁷⁰ According to Carlin, the intelligence community made great efforts to make clear that it was impossible to conclude whether the DPRK had assembled and was actually operating a highly enriched uranium program.⁷¹ Senior officials of the Bush administration nonetheless began to perceive the North Korean government through the lens of having violated the 1994 Agreed Framework, and instructed Kelly to address North Korea's nuclear weapons development efforts within that context.

High-level government officials argued, and believed, that the North Korean government violated the terms of the 1994 October Agreed Framework.⁷² They argued that the 2002 United States intelligence agency report concluded that the North Korean government had been secretly developing its uranium enrichment program beyond the experimental level.⁷³ The creation of such a program was a serious violation of international agreements, such as the 1994 October Agreed Framework and the 1992 Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The purpose of Kelly's visit to the DPRK in October 2002 to meet with Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK Kim Gye-Gwan was to inform the North Korean government that the United States believed that the DPRK had violated the October 1994 Agreed Framework, and that until the issue was corrected, there would be no further diplomatic discussions

⁶⁹ Charlie Savage, "What Is the President's Daily Brief?" *The New York Times*, December 12, 2016, accessed on August 26, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/politics/president-daily-brief.html>.

⁷⁰ Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 363.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² United States. Cong. Senate. *North Korea Democracy Act of 2003*.

⁷³ Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C., 2007), 95.

between the United States and the DPRK.⁷⁴ On 4 October 2002, the United States diplomatic delegation led by Kelly met with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK in Pyongyang. Vice Minister Kim denied the allegation about having developing a highly enriched uranium program.⁷⁵ The following day, the United States delegation met with First Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK Kang Sok Ju.⁷⁶

The public outcome reported by the Bush administration was that Kang had admitted to the illicit continuing development of the nuclear programme, although the literature that reconstructs Kelly's meeting states that there was confusion among the members of the United States delegation about what exactly Kang said in response to the allegation.⁷⁷ Due to his strict instructions that forbade him from going beyond his pre-determined talking-points Kelly did not ask First Vice Minister Kang further questions nor did he probe for more information.⁷⁸ After hearing Kang's response, Kelly left the room since he had followed and completed his directions to deliver the Bush administration's message concerning enrichment. According to Carlin, the Korean speakers within the United States delegation did what they could to reconstruct a transcript based on what Kang had said in Korean.⁷⁹ Because there was no opportunity to schedule another meeting to ask Kang for clarification, the American Korean speakers had to compare notes among themselves.⁸⁰ The United States delegation was unable to obtain a clear answer concerning whether the DPRK was engaged in industrial-scale enrichment that could have led to an arsenal of highly enriched uranium bombs, as believed by the American intelligence community and the Bush administration,

⁷⁴ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 98; Oberdorfer and Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 371.

⁷⁵ Oberdorfer and Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 369.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 371.

⁷⁷ Mike Chinoy, *Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (St. Martin's Press: New York, 2009), 121-122; Yoichi Funabashi's *The Peninsula Question*, 102-104; Oberdorfer and Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 371.

⁷⁸ Oberdorfer and Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 371.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

because Kelly was instructed by the Bush administration to present to his North Korean counterpart the United States' message and leave no room for discussion.⁸¹

Pritchard recalls how Kelly read, and then re-read the following day, his prepared script without variation during his meeting with his North Korean counterpart in October 2002.⁸² Kelly was only allowed to reiterate the United States official position, which limited his ability to manoeuvre and gather information about the North Korean nuclear issue. Statements released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK also reported that Kelly merely recited the United States position of the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program.⁸³ Kelly was unable to enter into any form of meaningful diplomacy as Bush administration instructions included not only what Kelly could do, but also what Kelly could say at these diplomatic meetings.

The process

Yoichi Funabashi's *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis*, which is based upon direct interviews with Assistant Secretary of State Kelly as well as other government officials from the participating states of the Six-Party Talks, reports that the Bush administration gave the United States delegation headed by Kelly strict instructions, which he lists in the book.⁸⁴ Although the talks were multilateral, the instructions were focused upon the United States delegation's interaction with its North Korean counterpart. The series of instructions were exact, specific and expected to be followed.⁸⁵ Charles Pritchard, United States special envoy to negotiations with North Korea

⁸¹ Oberdorfer and Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 372.

⁸² Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy*, 37.

⁸³ "Foreign Ministry Statement, August 30"; Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 342; Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 203.

⁸⁴ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 338.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

(2000-2003), reported that the Bush administration expected the United States delegation to follow its instructions precisely.⁸⁶ The practice of giving strict instructions to Kelly and the United States delegation was routinised to the extent that, according to Pritchard, Kelly “had been completely hamstrung by onerous instructions from officials opposed to a negotiated settlement with North Korea.”⁸⁷ Pritchard’s explicitly states that his recollections do “not attempt to present opposing views on issues in which [the author] was personally involved.”⁸⁸ Nevertheless, this particular observation on the tight constraints placed on Kelly in is not very controversial, given the prolific amount of information in the public arena about this issue, not the least from Funabashi’s work.

According to Funabashi’s interview with Kelly, the United States delegation was not allowed to conduct any talks with their North Korean counterpart that could take the form or appearance of a bilateral negotiation.⁸⁹ The objective was to enforce a sense of isolation on the DPRK delegation. The Bush administration also was using the Six-Party Talks as a space where it could enlist the other states into applying more pressure onto the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner.⁹⁰ These instructions however also meant that meaningful negotiations on a bilateral basis could not take place. With bilateral discussions not permitted, the United States delegation did not conceive of the diplomatic function of gathering information as either possible or necessary in the format of the Six-Party Talks.

The United States delegation was instructed to conduct all US-DPRK consultations within the multilateral framework.⁹¹ The Bush administration gave strict instructions as to

⁸⁶ Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy*, 21

⁸⁷ Ibid., 138.

⁸⁸ Ibid., x.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Oberdorfer and Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 397; Rozman, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and US Strategy in Northeast Asia,” 604.

⁹¹ Chinoy, *Meltdown*, 183; Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 338.

the form that the multilateral processes could operate, thus also limiting the possibility for a negotiation process involving some form of compromise. Instructions included exact directions on what the US delegation should do to avoid the form or appearance of bilateral negotiations. The United States delegates were allowed to chat with the North Korean delegation during coffee breaks and buffet meals, either standing or seated on sofas, and they could enter with the North Korean delegation into a room equipped only with chairs or sofas.⁹² The delegation, however, was not allowed to enter into a room having a table, and if for some reason the United States delegation had to use a separate room with the North Korean delegation, it had to first request permission from the Secretary of State.⁹³

Throughout the talks in which Kelly was engaged, the approach was to reiterate the official US position during any bilateral exchange. A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement of 30 August 2003 asserts that during the first round of the Six-Party Talks, the US side “flatly denied a package solution and the order of simultaneous actions proposed by the DPRK,” and “made assertions that a full range of other issues of concerns including missiles, conventional weapons and human rights should be discussed for the normalization of relationship between the DPRK and US only after its nuclear program is scrapped.”⁹⁴ Kelly was not able to offer views, however, on the North Korean proposal or exchange information about their respective proposals. The United States delegation was highly restricted to its instructions and pre-determined talking points, and this control over the process continued during the Six-Party Talks.⁹⁵

Press briefings from the White House and the State Department provide little to no information regarding the interactions between the United States delegation and the DPRK

⁹² Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 338

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ “Foreign Ministry Statement, August 30.”

⁹⁵ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 338.

delegation. They, however, repeatedly emphasise that the United States' position on the nuclear issue was the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program.⁹⁶ Philip Reeker, Deputy State Department Spokesman, in a press briefing on 27 August 2003 is at pains to confirm that even in informal meetings, Kelly followed his instructions to avoid the appearance of bilateral negotiations with the North Korean delegation, ensuring that even informal meetings took place in the plenary meeting room where members of the other delegations to the Six-Party Talks were present.⁹⁷

A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement released on 29 February 2004 indicates that even by 2004, James Kelly was still not permitted to step outside a tightly circumscribed remit. The DPRK statement asserts that Kelly "only read the prepared script," and gave "no answer even to the questions raised."⁹⁸ Both Pritchard's recollections and these North Korean statements confirm that Kelly abided by the instructions from Washington DC. North Korea's comments and statements are not normally perceived as unbiased, accurate information, especially from the American perspective, which includes that of the United States government. They are, therefore, easily dismissed as being irrelevant or untruthful.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ "Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan," *The White House President George W. Bush*, June 23, 2004, accessed February 8, 2017, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040623-14.html>; "Six-Party Talks on North Korean Nuclear Program, US Press Statement, February 28, 2004," *The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy*, accessed on Feb 6, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/docs/0402/doc26.htm#03>; "State Department Noon Briefing, August 27, 2003," "State Department Daily Briefing, August 28," *IIP Digital*, August 28, 2003, accessed February 8, 2017, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2003/08/20030828185835relhcie0.8001825.html#axzz4Y5bZN3IQ>; "State Department Noon Briefing, June 23," *IIP Digital*, June 23, 2004, accessed February 8, 2017, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2004/06/20040623193446eafas0.9734156.html#axzz4Y5bZN3IQ>; "State Department Noon Briefing, June 28," *IIP Digital*, June 28, 2004, accessed February 8, 2017, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2004/06/20040628173851eafas0.1589014.html#axzz4Y5bZN3IQ>; "State Department Press Briefing, September 2," *The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy*, accessed February 8, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/docs/0308/doc10.htm>; "White House Press Briefing, August 28," *The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy*, accessed February 8, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/docs/0308/doc10.htm>.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks," *The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy*, accessed on Feb 6, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/docs/0402/doc26.htm#03>.

⁹⁹ Hugh Gusterson, "Paranoid, Potbellied Stalinist Gets Nuclear Weapons: How the US Print Media Cover North Korea," *Nonproliferation Review* 15, no 1 (March 2008): 21-42; "In quotes: N Korea talks end," *BBC*

The North Korean Foreign Ministry's description of Kelly and Kim's bilateral discussion as well as its description of the US delegation's unwillingness to negotiate with the DPRK, however, align with Yoichi Funabashi's construct of the rounds of the Six-Party Talks in his book, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Crisis*.¹⁰⁰ According to an interview that Funabashi held with a senior United States administration official, Kelly did not answer North Korea's questions during the bilateral meeting of the first round of the Six-Party Talks.¹⁰¹ Instead, Kelly repeatedly told Kim to carefully read his opening remarks at the plenary session.¹⁰² Kelly's opening remarks were about how the United States position was the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program.¹⁰³ As stated by the North Korean Foreign Ministry statement of 30 August 2003, Kelly solely insisted upon the United States position by referring to his opening remarks.

The instructions for the second round of the Six-Party Talks again limited Kelly's ability to manoeuvre in the negotiations. Kelly could only reiterate that the United States policy was to insist upon the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program. The United States was not willing to negotiate with the DPRK.¹⁰⁴ Kelly, therefore, did not gather information about the DPRK's position on the nuclear issue. Funabashi's *The Peninsula Question* reports that the second round of the Six-Party Talks was summarized by Kelly as a "farewell to bilateral negotiations with North Korea."¹⁰⁵

News, August 29, 2003, accessed February 20, 2017, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3191389.stm>.

¹⁰⁰ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 342, 350.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 342.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ "State Department Daily Briefing, August 28," "White House Press Briefing, August 28," *The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy*, accessed February 8, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/docs/0308/doc10.htm>.

¹⁰⁴ "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks".

¹⁰⁵ Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 350.

Inadequate gathering of information about the nuclear issue

The constraints placed upon the United States delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of State Kelly severely hampered the ability of United States officials to carry out one of the most basic functions of diplomacy, which is to gather information about the adversary. In this case, the United States delegation's inability to gather more detailed information about the DPRK's nuclear capacity and intentions was a product of the tight constraints under which American diplomats were placed which ruled out discussion, compromise proposals and bilateral talks. The lack of discussion at the October 2002 meeting, for example, contributed to the output of highly mixed messages about North Korea's nuclear capacity.

Assistant Secretary of State Kelly's opening remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, delivered after the end of the second round of the Six-Party Talks, indicate that the United States delegation did not understand the diplomatic function of gathering information about the adversary's position as necessary. Kelly's opening remarks focus solely upon the United States objective of complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program.¹⁰⁶ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is a body of government that is charged with leading foreign policy legislation and debate in the Senate. It, therefore, was important for Kelly to emphasize that he was executing the policy that the United States government legislated. Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee believed that if diplomacy with the DPRK should occur, it must be preceded by the total dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program and include highly intrusive verification requirements.¹⁰⁷ Kelly did not mention North Korea's proposal

¹⁰⁶ "Six-Party Talks; James Kelly, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Opening Remarks Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC," *US Department of State Archive*, March 2, 2004, accessed February 6, 2017, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/30093.htm>.

¹⁰⁷ United States. Cong. Senate. *North Korea Democracy Act of 2003*.

concerning the nuclear issue as there was no interest by the Bush administration in receiving, discussing or negotiating any other solution other than the stated objective of the administration. The United States delegation, therefore, had no need to gather information about the position of the DPRK concerning the nuclear issue.

By contrast, in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 15 July 2004, Kelly outlined the DPRK proposal, after explaining the United States proposal tabled at the third round of the Six-Party Talks.¹⁰⁸ Establishing the reason why Kelly discussed the DPRK proposal after the third round of the Six-Party Talks, but not after the second, is difficult as there is no government statement or document that provides such explanation. The Congressional Record of 15 July 2004 states that the objective of Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearing was to examine the current conditions on the latest round of the Six-Party Talks.¹⁰⁹ Given that the proposal introduced by the North Korean delegation at the third round of Six-Party Talks was the official position of the DPRK, Kelly may have decided it was important that the US government become aware of what the DPRK's proposal entailed for the record.

Ambassador Hill was given slightly more room to manoeuvre than his predecessor Assistant Secretary Kelly, even though his activities were still closely monitored by those who still maintained the stance that the United States should never compromise with the DPRK. This meant, among other things, that information gathering became more accepted as a necessary function of the diplomatic process, particularly in respect of the DPRK's energy sector. The 13 February 2007 statement formulated a change in approach in the "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement": "recalling Section 1 and

¹⁰⁸ "Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Programs," *US Department of State Archive*, July 15, 2004, accessed on February 8, 2017, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm>.

¹⁰⁹ *Daily Digest*, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Congressional Record* 150, pt. 98: D776.

Section 3 of the Joint Statement of the 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK.”¹¹⁰ To implement the September 2005 Joint Statement, the participating states of the Six-Party Talks established a Working Group on economy and energy cooperation. As a party of the Six-Party Talks, the US government needed information about the DPRK’s energy and economic situation in order to be able to address the duration and scale of the DPRK’s need for energy and economic assistance.¹¹¹

Lack of effective communication between the United States and the DPRK

This section demonstrates that the United States delegations headed by Assistant Secretary of State Kelly and his successor, Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, were not consistently able to fulfil the normal diplomatic function of facilitating effective communication between states. The United States delegation was unable to clearly communicate to the DPRK that the proposal presented at the Six-Party Talks was the official policy of the Bush administration, as demonstrated by the DPRK’s continuous concern over the Bush administration’s policy intent. One factor in the inability of the United States delegation at the Six-Party talks to convince North Korean counterparts that they were engaged in meaningful diplomacy was that the Bush administration outsourced communication between the United States to the Chinese government. Throughout both Bush administrations, to a greater or lesser extent, Washington foreign policy officials hostile to the idea of negotiation with the DPRK, continued to constrain, limit and try to prevent their

¹¹⁰ “North Korea-Denuclearization Action Plan,” *US Department of State Archive*, February 13, 2007, accessed on October 11, 2017, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm>.

¹¹¹ “Economic, energy working group holds first meeting, focusing on assistance to DPRK,” *Embassy of People’s Republic of China in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, March 15, 2007, accessed on October 13, 2017, <http://kp.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/cxbdhw/6fht5/t310324.htm>.

own diplomats from engaging in some of the conventional functions and activities of diplomatic practice.

The opening remarks that Assistant Secretary of State Kelly gave to the first and second round of the Six-Party Talks, and the North Korean Foreign Ministry statements about Kelly's remarks demonstrate the lack of clear communication between the United States delegation and the North Korean delegation about United States policy intent towards the DPRK.¹¹² Kelly reiterated that the United States government had no intention of invading or attacking the DPRK, or demanding regime change.¹¹³ These remarks, however, did not persuade the North Korean government. The spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK stated that "the US did not show any stand to co-exist with the DPRK in peace" after the end of the second round.¹¹⁴ This statement from the North Korean Foreign Ministry, released on 29 February 2004, expressed concern that the United States government had no desire to improve relations with the DPRK, nor any intention to change its policy of regime change within the DPRK. The concerns of the North Korean government about the position of the United States are the same concerns described in the North Korean Foreign Ministry statement released on 30 August 2003.¹¹⁵ This indicates that the United States delegation was unable to clearly communicate to the DPRK delegation that the Bush administration did not have hostile intentions towards the North Korean state.

The lack of clarity concerning the Bush administration's intentions towards the DPRK persisted after the third round of the Six-Party Talks, as the North Korean government

¹¹² "Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Programs"; "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks"; "Foreign Ministry Statement, August 30," Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 341; "Remarks on Day One of the Second Round of Six-Party Talks," *US Department of State Archive*, February 25, 2004, accessed on February 22, 2017, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/29861.htm>.

¹¹³ "Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Programs"; Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 341; "Remarks on Day One of the Second Round of Six-Party Talks."

¹¹⁴ "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks."

¹¹⁵ "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks"; "Foreign Ministry Statement, August 30."

continued to believe that the Bush administration had no intention to peacefully coexist with the DPRK, and instead sought its collapse. This belief eventually became the North Korean government's justification as to why it suspended its participation in the Six-Party Talks. On 10 February 2005, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement stating that the official political stance of the second Bush administration "contained no word showing any willingness to co-exist with the DPRK or make a switchover in its policy toward it."¹¹⁶ The statement explains that the DPRK suspended its participation in the Six-Party Talks because the rhetoric of the second Bush administration indicated that United States policy towards the DPRK was regime change.¹¹⁷ The DPRK government, therefore, no longer found the Six-Party Talks beneficial to its interests. United States delegation to the Six-Party Talks could not convincingly communicate to the DPRK delegation that the actual objective of the Bush administration's policy towards the DPRK was not the collapse of the North Korean regime.

Christopher Hill also faced difficulty clearly communicating to the North Korean delegate that the proposal that the United States was presenting at the Six-Party Talks was the official policy of the Bush administration. As described in Ambassador Hill's memoir, internal battles continued within the second Bush administration about how United States foreign policy towards the DPRK would be implemented.¹¹⁸ The division within the Bush administration impeded the negotiation process of the Six-Party Talks. For instance, just after the announcement of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, the US Treasury Department

¹¹⁶ "DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-Party Talks for Indefinite Period," *KCNA*, February, 10, 2005, accessed February 9, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/news/200502/north-korea-suspends-participation-in-six-party-talks-claims-have-manufactured-nukes>.

¹¹⁷ "DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-Party Talks for Indefinite Period"; George W. Bush, "The Second Inaugural Address," Speech, George W. Bush White House Website, Washington, D.C., January 20, 2005, 273-278; "Rice names 'outposts of tyranny,'" *BBC News*, January 19, 2005, accessed February 22, 2017, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4186241.stm>.

¹¹⁸ Hill, *Outpost*, 221.

placed economic sanctions on North Korean trading entities as well as Banco Delta Asia of Macau, a bank in which several North Korean companies held accounts.¹¹⁹ Hill states in his memoir that the purpose of this action was not to give him added negotiation leverage or to put further negotiating pressure on the DPRK, “but rather to sidetrack the negotiations entirely.”¹²⁰ According to Ambassador Hill, the aim of the economic sanctions was to hinder the entire negotiation process.

The freeze on North Korean-related accounts not only provoked strong condemnation from the North Korean government, but also led the DPRK to once again suspend its participation in the Six-Party Talks, with the repeated justification that the Bush administration was not serious about producing a negotiated solution, and instead sought the collapse of the North Korean regime.¹²¹

Complicating factors

Prominent officials in the Bush administration perceived the North Korean government through a moralistic paradigm and this constrained diplomatic options. It would be remiss however not to identify other factors that inhibited the use of diplomacy in conflict resolution with North Korea. These included the lack of a consistent and coherent US foreign policy on North Korea, the lack of trust between the US and the DPRK, and the Bush administration’s overreliance upon the Chinese government.¹²²

¹¹⁹ Hill, *Outpost*, 240-243; David Lague and Donald Greenlees. "Squeeze on Banco Delta Asia hit North Korea where it hurt - Asia - Pacific - International Herald Tribune." *New York Times*, January 18, 2007. Accessed June 3, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/world/asia/18iht-north.4255039.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.

¹²⁰ Hill, *Outpost*, 241.

¹²¹ "Dialogue and Sanctions Can Never Go together: Rodong Sinmun." *KCNA*, November 2, 2005. Accessed June 3, 2014. <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200511/news11/03.htm>; Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 418.

¹²² Sebastian Harnisch, "US-North Korean Relations Under the Bush administration: From "Slow Go" to "No Go," *Asian Survey* 42, no. 6 (November/December 2002): 856-882; Wade L. Huntley, "US Policy toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliath's Fate," *Asian Survey* 47, no 3 (May/June 2007), 455-480; James I. Matray, "The Failure of the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy: A Critical Analysis,"

Lack of a consistent and coherent US foreign policy towards the DPRK

One reason that the United States delegation was unable to clearly communicate its intentions to the DPRK delegation was because of ongoing political debate within the Bush administration over which strategy should be adopted to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The Bush administration's foreign policy towards the DPRK shifted from bilateral negotiations to placing restrictions onto the North Korean regime, including economic sanctions, with the aim of moving the North Korean regime towards a more democratic state.¹²³ The aim remained broadly the same but there was an inconsistency in tactics. This confusion over tactics sent a message to the DPRK that the United States was also confused over policy aims.

Harnisch argued in 2002, prior to the first round of the Six-Party Talks in 2003, that the Bush administration "suffered from serious bureaucratic infighting between moderate skeptics...and hardline critics."¹²⁴ Harnisch establishes that there officials within the Bush administration were divided; some sought a negotiated settlement, and others sought military action. Harnisch argues that the obstacles to diplomatic negotiations included the presence within the Bush administration of those that wanted to undermine the negotiation process so that a military solution could not be ruled out.¹²⁵ Harnisch shows that there was disagreement among officials over US foreign policy towards the DPRK since the early days of the Bush

International Journal of Korean Studies 17, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 140-177; C. Kenneth Quinones, "Dualism in the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy," Asian Perspective 27, no. 1 (April 2003): 1-28.

¹²³ Harnisch, "US-North Korean Relations Under the Bush administration: 865, 871; Huntley, "US Policy toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliath's Fate," 459; Matray, "The Failure of the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy: A Critical Analysis," 140; Quinones, "Dualism in the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy," 2, 3.

¹²⁴ Harnisch, "US-North Korean Relations Under the Bush administration," 859.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

administration while James I. Matray argues that the Bush administration lacked a coherent and consistent policy on North Korea throughout both administrations, from 2001 to 2008.¹²⁶

Matray argues that those who pursued a policy of regime change hindered the negotiation process, since their aim was not a negotiated settlement with the DPRK, but the destruction of the North Korean regime.¹²⁷ Matray argues that throughout the Six-Party Talks, there was a powerful sector within the Bush administration that pushed for administration official policy towards the DPRK to be regime change. The Bush administration's lack of a coherent and consistent policy on North Korea allowed these powerful voices to shape policy on North Korea and hinder alternatives, even if it could not determine policy outcomes. This duality also made it difficult for the US delegation to the Six-Party Talks to clearly convey that its approach, which did not include regime change, was the official position of the Bush administration.

C. Kenneth Quinones also notes the divide within the Bush administration over its policy towards the nuclear crisis.¹²⁸ There were officials who favoured diplomatic negotiations with the DPRK and those who favoured a more assertive and unilateral approach.¹²⁹ Quinones points to President George W. Bush and his indecision as the main reason for the continuous debate over strategy.¹³⁰ Quinones empirically demonstrates this lack of coherence in North Korea policy by chronicling the times when different preferred policies were supported by President Bush.¹³¹

These scholarly articles demonstrate that there was a lack of a consistent and coherent United States foreign policy towards the DPRK during the first three rounds of the Six-Party

¹²⁶ Matray, "The Failure of the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy: A Critical Analysis," 140-177; Quinones, "Dualism in the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy," 1-28.

¹²⁷ Matray, "The Failure of the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy: A Critical Analysis," 141.

¹²⁸ Quinones, "Dualism in the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy," 1-28.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 3, 8, 12.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

Talks, due to the internal division of the Bush administration on which strategy to adopt to resolve the nuclear issue. One ramification of internal division was that the United States delegation was unable to clearly communicate to the DPRK delegation that the proposal it was tabling at the Six-Party Talks was the Bush administration's official policy towards the DPRK.

The lack of trust between the US and the DPRK

The Bush administration perceived the DPRK as an unreliable negotiation partner. This was a view shared across the administration, including by those who favoured diplomacy. For regime change or neo-conservative sectors, however, this lack of trust, compounded by what they understand as DPRK direct deception, meant that diplomacy was an inherently inappropriate strategy.

In a meeting with South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung, President Bush stated that Kim Jong-Il could not be trusted and stated his suspicions concerning whether the DPRK would keep to the terms of any future agreement.¹³² In a press conference two years after his meeting with President Kim, Bush made similar comments about the October 1994 Agreed Framework stating that “the United States honoured its side of the agreement; North Korea didn't. While we felt the agreement was in force, North Korea was enriching uranium.”¹³³ The distrust that the Bush administration had towards the DPRK, and the DPRK's perceived lack of compliance, were important factors in consolidating an aversion to diplomacy with those that preferred regime change. Others, however, while accepting they were dealing with a very difficult negotiating partner, understood diplomacy as a tough process that was precisely about forging agreements between inherently adversarial partners.

¹³² Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 108.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 153.

The Bush administration's overreliance on the Chinese government

The North Korean Foreign Ministry statement of 10 February 2005 referral to the rhetoric of senior officials of the Bush administration signifies that they understood that United States diplomats were not empowered to conduct diplomacy, in the sense of facilitating communication between the United States and the DPRK. Pritchard states that the Bush administration allowed the Chinese government to become the official and only channel of US communication with the North Korean government because dominant neo-conservative foreign policy makers in Washington DC were uncomfortable with the direct contact between the United States Department of State and the DPRK Mission to the United Nations, sometimes called the New York channel.¹³⁴

The New York channel of communication had been the customary channel of communication between the United States and the DPRK, and at times considered by the United States to be the only official channel of diplomatic communication between the US and the DPRK.¹³⁵ The Bush administration, therefore, allowed the Chinese government to facilitate communication between the United States and the DPRK, due to the influence of the sector within the administration that sought to have no appearance of direct or bilateral communication with the North Korean government. The Chinese government replacing the New York channel meant that when the North Korean government sent comments or

¹³⁴ Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy*, 63; C. Kenneth Quinones, "Secret Meeting in New York- Last Chance for the Six-Party Talks?" *Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones*, May 24, 2005, accessed March 4, 2017, <http://www.ckquinones.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/Secret-Meeting-in-New-York-5-05.pdf>; Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 110.

¹³⁵ Sang-Hun Choe, "North Korea Cuts off Only Diplomatic Channel with US over Sanctions," *New York Times*, July 11, 2017, accessed March 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/world/asia/north-korea-missile-defense-thaad.html?_r=0; Alastair Gale, "North Korea Cuts Rare Diplomatic Channel With US," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 11, 2016, accessed March 4, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-cuts-rare-channel-with-u-s-1468238426>.

questions to the Bush administration through its United Nations mission in New York, the Bush administration would reply through the Chinese government.¹³⁶

This communicational setting was originally meant for communication regarding the trilateral talks among China, the United States, and the DPRK, that took place in April 2003.¹³⁷ Pritchard states that the Bush administration, however, continued to use this channel of communication on issues that were not related to the mechanism or logistics of multilateral talks.¹³⁸ The Bush administration stopped using the New York channel and instead relied predominantly upon the Chinese government for all matters that concerned communication with the North Korean government. This allowed the Bush administration to avoid all forms of direct talks with the DPRK. This practice continued throughout the first three rounds of the Six-Party Talks, as confirmed by Donald Zagoria's 2004 report on the Second Northeast Asia Security Conference, initiated by the non-profit organization National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), and which took place after the third round of the Six-Party Talks that was held from 23-26 June 2004.¹³⁹

Zagoria reported that a North Korean participant, "complained that the US is not negotiating with the DPRK in a serious manner, as demonstrated by its practice of relaying messages to the DPRK through China."¹⁴⁰ The North Korean participant's complaint, therefore, indicates that as at 2004, the Bush administration was avoiding all forms of direct talks with the DPRK by continuously relying upon the Chinese government to relay the United States government's messages. The North Korean government believed that the Bush administration was being flippant about the Six-Party Talks and believed it had little reason

¹³⁶ Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy*, 63.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Donald Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asia Security," *NCAFP*, August 9-11, 2004, accessed May 22, 2015, <https://www.ncafp.org/articles/04%20second%20conference%20on%20northeast%20asian%20security.pdf>.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

to consider the position that the United States delegation was presenting at the Six-Party Talks as the official position of the Bush administration. This made it difficult for the US delegation to convey to the DPRK delegation that the proposal that the US delegation was presenting at the Six-Party Talks was the official policy of the Bush administration towards the DPRK.

The role of the DPRK

Scott Snyder argues that the DPRK was not committed to reaching agreement through diplomacy.¹⁴¹ Snyder argued that DPRK concerns about the Bush administration as aiming at regime change was merely a North Korean negotiation tactic. Snyder's argument is that concern expressed by North Korean governments over United States hostile intent is a North Korean negotiation tactic that the North Korean government practiced long before the advent of the Bush administration. Snyder argues that this is because the DPRK has a strong idea about sovereignty and this underpins North Korea's strategy and tactics in international negotiations.¹⁴² He argues that North Korean negotiators place a strong emphasis on the "principle of non-interference with the state's internal affairs," as they often go out of their way to demonstrate the independence of the North Korean regime.¹⁴³

Snyder argues that North Korea's "unique historical experience" shape negotiating tactics, and that it stems from Kim Il Sung's life experience.¹⁴⁴ The theoretical framework of Snyder's *Negotiating on the Edge* draws from Raymond Cohen's theory that a state's cultural identity shapes the way its negotiators perceive negotiating choices.¹⁴⁵ Cohen explains his

¹⁴¹ Scott Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999).

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 9, 31.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

theory in his own work, *Negotiating Across Cultures* (1997).¹⁴⁶ Snyder identifies factors of North Korea's national identity, values, and socializing processes, which he argues shapes North Korea's negotiating behaviour. Snyder argues that North Korean cultural identity, which influences its negotiation behaviour, can be directly traced to the lifestyle and experiences of Kim Il Sung and that behaviour and worldview of North Korean negotiators are greatly influenced by the life of Kim Il Sung.¹⁴⁷ The negotiation behaviours that Snyder examines are, however, derived from a number of negotiation processes that occurred when Kim Il Sung was alive. That the life of Kim Il Sung, the founder of the North Korean state, would have a great influence upon state affairs, including negotiation processes, while he was alive and in power, is a logical conclusion. Snyder's analysis does not factor in negotiations between the United States and the DPRK that occurred before the 1990s, such as the USS Pueblo Incident of 1968.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, since its publication in 1999, Snyder's book has yet to be revised or updated. This begets the question of whether Snyder's argument about the North Korean government's concern over United States hostile intent is relevant and apposite to the DPRK's negotiation behaviour at the Six-Party Talks.

Opening the space for Track II diplomacy to the DPRK

This chapter demonstrated that during the Bush administration active diplomatic engagement with the North Korean government was impeded by an understanding of American foreign policy as mission to engage in democracy promotion and which understood direct engagement of the Communist DPRK as a betrayal of those ideas. This

¹⁴⁶ Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

¹⁴⁷ Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge*, 22.

¹⁴⁸ "USS Pueblo Crisis," *Wilson Center: Digital Archive*, accessed March 21, 2017, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/85/uss-pueblo-crisis>.

influential ideology of American moral exceptionalism did not prevent all contacts with the DPRK, especially from 2005 onwards, but it contributed to a lack of coherence to US policy as divisions within the administration continued. United States delegations that were nominally tasked with the negotiations with DPRK officials were hampered as they were unable to take part in the give and take of conventional negotiation processes nor were they able to gather useful information about the adversary's position, or effectively facilitate communication between the United States and the DPRK.

This chapter, therefore, provided contextual explanations for why United States non-state actors pursued and initiated Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK. In the next three chapters, Track II diplomacy is explained as an effort to compensate for what was understood as the failings of United States official or Track I diplomacy. The core of my thesis, presented in the next three chapters, shows that United States' non-state actors sought to compensate for what they understood as the gaps in United States official or Track I diplomacy, through the inception and pursuit of Track II diplomatic processes of dialogue between the United States and the DPRK. Through the analysis of three different Track II diplomatic efforts that took place during the Bush administration, the following chapters demonstrate that non-state actors initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy in order to compensate for the limitations of US Track I diplomacy towards the DPRK.

The core aim of these next chapters is to not to demonstrate whether or how Track II diplomacy changed official policies or the perceptions of the government officials that make official policy, as that question is beyond the scope of this research. The question of whether Track II diplomatic initiatives have an impact on official government policymaking is research that deserves its own analytical framework and in-depth research. It is explored within the Ph.D. dissertation of Alexander Thomas Jacobson Lennon, titled, "Why Do We Do Track Two?: Transnational Security Policy Networks and U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation

Policy.”¹⁴⁹ Lennon’s analytical framework combines and condenses various models, observations, and descriptions to focus on what he calls four potential areas of influence.¹⁵⁰ The first are the contacts and perceptions facilitated by networks. The second are ways that networks seek to interact with government participants. The third is any network effect on the US policy agenda, and the fourth are potential policy options that networks may develop. As demonstrated by Lennon’s analytical framework explains the impact and influence of Track II diplomacy upon Track I diplomacy. By contrast, the analytical framework of this dissertation focuses on concepts of diplomacy, rather than models and concepts of policy implementation structures.

¹⁴⁹ Alexander Thomas Jacobson Lennon, “Why Do We Do Track Two?: Transnational Security Policy Networks and U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,” Partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, 2006.

¹⁵⁰ Lennon, “Why Do We Do Track Two?,” 16.

Introduction

In this chapter, I argue that the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), a non-profit policy organization, pursued and initiated a series of Track II meetings from 2003 to 2005 to compensate for the United States delegation to the Six Party Talks' inability to facilitate the communication of United States policy objectives to the DPRK. The United States delegation to the Six Party Talks, headed by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly (2003-2005), was instructed by the Bush administration to not conduct direct talks with its North Korean counterpart, unless it was to reiterate the official United States policy of complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of the DPRK's nuclear program. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, these instructions were from the faction of the Bush administration's whose perspective of United States foreign policy towards the DPRK was underlined by the philosophy of the ideology of American moralism, which impeded active diplomatic engagement with the North Korean government. The United States delegation to the Six Party Talks headed by Ambassador Chris Hill (2005-2009) was given permission by the Bush administration to conduct direct talks with its North Korean counterpart that went beyond the reiteration of US official policy. This chapter's argument concerning the NCAFP Track II meeting on the North Korean nuclear issue is, therefore, relevant to the US diplomacy with the DPRK that was conducted from 2003 to 2005, and why this chapter's timeframe of analysis is from 2003 to 2005.

In the first section, I outline the data of this chapter to introduce the supplementary data that pertains specifically to this chapter. In the second section, I analyse Herbert C. Kelan and Stephen P. Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop, which they establish in "The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution

of International Conflicts.”¹ As established in the analytical framework of this dissertation, problem-solving workshops have the potential to compensate for limitations of official diplomacy. I will, therefore, be using their model to help explain the NCAFP’s Track II diplomatic approach. In the third section, I demonstrate the significance of the NCAFP as a nongovernmental organization that practices Track II diplomacy.

In the fourth section, I establish the assumptions that inform the NCAFP’s Track II approach, the purpose of the NCAFP’s Track II meetings concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis, the objectives, the methodology, and the participants. The assumptions that inform the NCAFP’s approach towards conflict resolution is that there are aspects of conflicts in which the individual is the most appropriate unit of analysis, hence the NCAFP’s focus on the individual. The purpose of the NCAFP’s Track II meetings concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis was to compensate for the limitations of US diplomacy that occurred during the first three rounds of the Six Party Talks (2003-2005), and thereby assist the official negotiation process. The objectives of the NCAFP Track II meetings was to open a channel of communication between the United States and the DPRK, change participants’ perspectives of the adversary and the North Korean nuclear issue, and transfer the results generated by its meeting into the official policy sphere. The NCAFP’s procedure for accomplishing its objectives was to engage the participants in discussions, within a setting free from official diplomatic formalities and reiteration of official position, where participants would be exposed to new information concerning each other and the North Korean nuclear issue itself. The participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings share some of the qualities of Kelman and Cohen’s ideal participant for the problem-solving workshop, which would allow the results generated by the NCAFP Track II meetings to be

¹ Herbert C. Kelman and Stephen P. Cohen, “The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International Conflicts,” *Journal of Peace Research* 13, no. 2 (1976): 79-90.

transferred back into the official decision-making process. In the last section, I establish that the NCAFP was able to partially achieve its objectives but had difficulties in meeting all of them.

Data

This chapter first makes use of the scholarly literature concerning Track II diplomacy and the problem-solving workshop as this literature offers insights into the specific nature of the NCAFP's Track II diplomatic activity.² It analyzes the work of Herbert C. Kelman and Stephen P. Cohen. Kelman and Cohen are credited by Roger J. Fisher and Joseph Montville, themselves authorities in the theory of Track II diplomacy, as leaders in the field of the theory and practice of problem-solving workshops as part of the conflict resolution processes.³ Kelman and Cohen's scholarship is based upon their own experience in running problem-solving workshops.

It then evaluates primary data from reports about the NCAFP Track II meetings available on the NCAFP website, and articles from the NCAFP's flagship publication, *American Foreign Policy Interests*.⁴ It does not make use of interviews and instead relies

² Ronald J. Fisher, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful Negotiation," *International Journal* 44, no. 2 (1989): 442-474; Herbert C. Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving: An Approach to Conflict Resolution and Its Application in the Middle East," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 31, no. 2 (Jun 1998): 190-198; Herbert C. Kelman and Stephen P. Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International Conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 13, no. 2 (1976): 79-90.

³ Fisher, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions," 457; Joseph Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," in *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships Vol II* ed. V.D. Volkan, J. Montville & D.A. Julius (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991), 164

⁴ Donald Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asian Security," *NCAFP*, August 9-11, 2004, accessed April 3, 2017, <https://www.ncafp.org/articles/04%20second%20conference%20on%20northeast%20Asian%20security.pdf>; "East Asian Security Challenges, 2006," *NCAFP*, February 5, 2011, accessed March 29, 2017, <https://www.ncafp.org/east-asian-security-challenges-2006/>; "The Nuclear Standoff with North Korea," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 26, no 1 (February 2004): 73-75; "A Case for Track II Diplomacy: The North Korean Nuclear Issue," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 27, no 5 (October 2005): 450-453; "The North Korean Nuclear Issue," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 28, no 3 (June 2006): 269-270; "Multilateral Dialogue to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue," *NAPSNet Special Report*, August 9, 2005, accessed March 29, 2017, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/multilateral-dialogue-to-resolve-the->

mainly on the written material provided on the NCAFP website, as I was unable to schedule interviews with the participants of the conferences. The reports were issued after every conference and were written by Dr. Donald Zagoria. Zagoria is the NCAFP-Project Director for the Forum on Asia-Pacific Security (FAPS), which is an initiative of the NCAFP that runs the Track II meetings concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. He declined an invitation to be interviewed for this dissertation, recommending instead that the publicly available NCAFP reports should be used as the main source of information.⁵ Zagoria moderated the NCAFP's Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue, making these reports an especially valuable source of information.

The NCAFP Track II meetings were unofficial, as government officials participated in their private or unofficial capacity; the reports reveal who participated in these meetings, but they do not attribute specific comments to any of the participants. If appropriate, the reports identified the participants by nationality. The reports provide summaries of the discussions of the meetings, and state the various topics that the participants discussed, such as the question of North Korea's uranium enrichment program, and the scope of the proposed North Korean nuclear freeze.⁶ The reports and the journal articles, therefore, provide a vital source of material about the NCAFP-initiated Track II meetings.

Data is obtained from NCAFP reports pertaining to meetings that took place between 27 August 2003, which is when first round of the Six Party Talks began, to 29 June – 1 July 2005, the NCAFP's Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The NCAFP held multiple Track II meetings with the DPRK during the Bush administration. Not all these

north-korean-nuclear-issue/; "News and Views," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 26, no. 5 (October 2004): 421-429; "News and Views," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 27, no. 5 (October 2005): 459-461; "News and Views," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 28, no. 3 (June 2006): 276-279; "Track I 1/2 & Track II Diplomacy," *NCAFP*, accessed March 29, 2017, https://www.ncafp.org/what-we-do/track-1_5-and-track-2-diplomacy/.

⁵ Donald Zagoria, e-mail message to author, October 19, 2016.

⁶ Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asian Security."

meetings resulted in publicly available reports. There is no report available on the NCAFP website concerning the First Conference on Northeast Asian Security that was held in September 2003. There is, therefore, limited data on some of the NCAFP Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue.

There is a lack of scholarly literature concerning the NCAFP's Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue. The literature that discusses the NCAFP's Track II project on the North Korean nuclear issue is more descriptive than analytical.⁷ Moreover, the literature that discusses the work of the NCAFP is rather scarce. There is thereby little commentary about the NCAFP Track II meetings. The articles that refer to the NCAFP-initiated Track II diplomacy do so to demonstrate that the US has had Track II exchanges with the DPRK. The articles, however, cannot be considered scholarly work, as they do not engage with any diplomatic or International Relations theory. There is, therefore, little analysis available concerning the NCAFP Track II diplomacy on the North Korean nuclear issue. This chapter is, therefore, original in that it provides a scholarly analysis of the NCAFP Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue.

The chapter also makes use of primary data concerning the Six Party Talks. The data concerning the Six Party Talks are obtained from a variety of sources, including newspaper articles, government press conferences from respective states' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and document archives concerning the Six Party Talks compiled by nongovernmental organizations, such as the National Committee on North Korea or the Acronym Institute for

⁷ Ronda Hauben, "Track 2 Talks for North Koreans and US Held by NCAFP in New York," *taz.blogs*, August 8, 2011, accessed May 29, 2017, http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2011/08/04/track_2_talks_for_north_koreans_and_us_held_by_ncafp_in_new_york/; Karin J. Lee, "The DPRK and Track II Diplomacy," *NCNK Newsletter* 1, no. 6 (November 2008): 1-6; John Power, "Millions spent, but what has Track II with N. Korea achieved?" *NK News*, October 29, 2015, accessed May 29, 2017, <https://www.nknews.org/2015/10/millions-spent-but-what-has-track-ii-with-n-korea-achieved/>.

Disarmament Diplomacy.⁸ Although some of the opening remarks from the head of the delegations to the Six Party Talks are available, transcriptions of the discussions that were held during the rounds are not. There is, therefore, restricted data available for analysis concerning the Six Party Talks. Information concerning the issues that were discussed during the Six Party Talks is, however, derived from press conferences given by the heads of the participating states' delegation, and documents concerning the Six Party Talks released by the states' foreign ministries and their United States equivalent, the Department of State.⁹

Problem-solving workshop: An approach to conflict resolution

Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop offers insight into the specific nature of the NCAFP's Track II diplomatic activity. Kelman and Cohen's work helps

⁸ The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy is a nonprofit organization founded in 1996 and is based in London, England. One of its current priorities is bringing awareness about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. The website, therefore, has an archive on documents and treaty developments concerning the Six Party Talks and the North Korean nuclear issue. "Chairman's Statement of the Third Round of the Six Party," *The National Committee on North Korea*, June 28, 2004, accessed on March 26, 2015, http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/ChairmanStatement_3rdRound_SixParty.doc/file_view; "Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," *Arms Control Association*, accessed February 9, 2016, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2005>; "Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov, remarks to press after close of meeting, August 29," *The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy*, accessed February 8, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/docs/0308/doc10.htm>; "Kim Kye-Gwan, North Korea's vice foreign minister and chief delegate to the talks, at a news conference in North Korea's embassy after the talks," *The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy*, accessed on Feb 6, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/docs/0402/doc26.htm#03>; "State Department Daily Briefing, August 28," *IIP Digital*, August 28, 2003, accessed February 8, 2017, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2003/08/20030828185835relhcie0.8001825.html#axzz4Y5bZN3IQ>; "Vice FM Wang Yi, Head of Chinese Delegation to the Six-party Talks Gives a Press Conference," *Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN*, August 30, 2003, accessed on February 8, 2017, <http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/ch/t25552.htm>.

⁹ "Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Programs: James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Washington, D.C.," *US Department of State Archive*, July 15, 2004, accessed on February 8, 2017, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm>; "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks," *The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy*, accessed on Feb 6, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/docs/0402/doc26.htm#03>; "New Consensus and New Steps: Remarks on the Third Round of the Beijing Six-Party Talks by Wang Yi," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, June 26, 2004, accessed on February 8, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/chlft_665896/t141649.shtml; "Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan," *The White House President George W. Bush*, June 23, 2004, accessed February 8, 2017, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040623-14.html>.

explain the NCAFP's Track II philosophy, purpose, objectives, method, and participants. This section, therefore, establishes the reasoning behind Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop, the objectives and purpose of their model, the method, and the authors' criteria of the ideal participant.

Assumptions that inform Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop

Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop is based upon the assumption that there are aspects of international conflict and conflict resolution where the individual represents the most appropriate unit of analysis, such as the satisfaction of human needs concerning identity and security.¹⁰ Kelman and Cohen's approach concerning international conflict resolution, therefore, focuses on the changes that need to be made at the level of the individual. Kelman acknowledges that international relations are societal and intersocietal processes that cannot be reduced to the level of individual behaviour.¹¹ He, however, argues that a mutually satisfactory resolution to an international conflict is one that addresses the identity, security and other psychological needs of the individual, as these unfulfilled needs drive conflict and create barriers to its resolution.¹²

Kelman and Cohen's approach towards resolving international conflicts, therefore, assumes that conflict between states is driven by subjective and psychological processes. Conflicts can, however, be assessed on a variety of indicators, including the specific degree of subjectivity. Due to the lack of case studies that have adopted problem-solving workshops as a means to assist conflict resolution, it is yet to be determined whether Kelman and Cohens' model of the problem-solving workshop may be generally applicable to different

¹⁰ Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving," 191.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

kinds of conflicts. Kelman and Cohen are aware of the limitations of their model of the problem-solving workshop, and that it may not be applicable to all international conflicts.¹³

Central purpose and series of objectives of problem-solving workshop

Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop is one in which "representatives of conflicting national groups are brought together for face-to-face communication."¹⁴ Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop provides a space where participants can discuss potential solutions to the conflict that can then be transferred back into the official negotiation process. The central purpose of their model of the problem-solving workshop is seen by Kelman and Cohen as a supplement to or preparation for official, Track I negotiations.¹⁵ The series of objectives that is designed to achieve the central purpose of their model is to produce within the participants a positive and differentiated image of each other, and new realizations about the source and nature of the conflict; and to increase the probability that the insights and ideas generated by the problem-solving workshops are transferred back into the official political process.¹⁶

Methodology

The key elements of Kelman and Cohen's methodology are an isolated and informal setting, guided discussions on specific topics, and capacity to invite participants who are able to communicate with the political leadership. Kelman and Cohen argue that the first two components are necessary because it gives participants "the freedom, opportunity, and impetus to move away from the rigid reiteration of official positions and from efforts to

¹³ Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 80.

¹⁴ Ibid., 79.

¹⁵ Ibid., 80.

¹⁶ Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving," 191; Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 83.

justify their own side and score points against the other side, and instead, to absorb new information, explore new ideas, revise their perceptions, reassess their attitudes, and engage in a process of creative problem solving.”¹⁷

Kelman and Cohen argue that problem-solving workshops should be conducted within a relatively isolated setting that is free from governmental and diplomatic protocol. They argue that this type of setting encourages participants to move away from their respective states’ official position due to the confidentiality that this setting offers. The distance between the participants and their respective states’ official position allow the participants more freedom to engage in informal negotiations with the other side.¹⁸

The topic of discussion is a necessary component to Kelman and Cohen’s methodology, as they propose that the type of topic helps obtain the objective of changing participants’ perspectives, and thereby improve the atmosphere for conflict resolution.¹⁹ The discussions that take place within Kelman and Cohen’s problem-solving workshop are guided. Kelman and Cohen argue that the organizer of the problem-solving workshop, or one who moderates the problem-solving workshop “keep the discussion moving in constructive directions. And they inject ideas, observations, and information on which new learnings and insights can be build.”²⁰ The organizers of the problem-solving workshop are, therefore, able to direct the discussions in the manner they deem necessary.

Kelman and Cohen propose that the discussions should first focus on specific functional problems, such as common or parallel institution problems of education or welfare.²¹ They argue that a focus on this type of topic will permit the development of trust

¹⁷ Kelman and Cohen, “The Problem-Solving Workshop,” 83.

¹⁸ Kelman, “Interactive Problem Solving,” 190; Kelman and Cohen, “The Problem-Solving Workshop,” 79; Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy,” 165.

¹⁹ Kelman and Cohen, “The Problem-Solving Workshop,” 84.

²⁰ Ibid., 86.

²¹ Ibid., 84.

between participants.²² By beginning the discussions with a relatively less controversial topic, it increases the chance that the participants' perspectives of the other side will begin to change as a modicum of trust is developed among participants.²³ Kelman and Cohen then argue that over a series of workshops, the discussions would gradually address topics that are more closely related to the core issues.²⁴ They conclude that the trust and openness in communication that was developed from discussing the topics of past series of workshops will help create an atmosphere in which participants can engage in creative problem solving.

Kelman and Cohen argue that the participants, who engaged in the guided discussions of the problem-solving workshop, are exposed to new information concerning the specific topic, which may change their own perceptions and attitudes.²⁵ They are, therefore, able to acquire new insights into "the goals and intentions, the perceptions and anxieties, the flexibilities and limits of the other side."²⁶ Kelman and Cohen argue that these new insights may affect the participants ideas of what is feasible, necessary, and promising in the search for solutions.²⁷ The changes within the participants' perspectives that are formed by the candid and open discussions of the problem-solving workshops is, therefore, a means towards the development of an atmosphere in which creative problem-solving can become possible. These changes are then to be transferred back into the official policy process through the participant's efforts to communicate with the political leadership.²⁸

²² Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 84.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., 80.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 83.

Ideal participant of the problem-solving workshop

Kelman and Cohen perceive the type of participant to be an important feature of their model of the problem-solving workshop, which is why this section focuses on their work concerning the ideal participant of the problem-solving workshop. Kelman and Cohen argue that the “selection of potentially influential participants and the coordination with political leaders” is geared to achieving the second objective of their model of the problem-solving workshop.²⁹ The participant is, therefore, crucial to their model of the problem-solving workshop. Kelman and Cohen explain that the ideal participant for the problem-solving workshop are individuals who are generally influential within their respective societies, who speak for some significant segment of opinion, and who have potential access to political leaders.³⁰ The government officials who participate in problem-solving workshops are invited as private individuals. They, therefore, participate in their private or unofficial capacity, rather than as official representatives of their respective government. Kelman and Cohen do not provide any other information concerning the status of government officials, such as whether they still retain their diplomatic status while participating in the problem-solving workshop. They, however, underline that since the workshop is of an unofficial character, the participants are invited as private individuals.³¹

According to Kelman and Cohen, the ideal participants are those who are at an intermediate distance from official leadership.³² These are individuals whose perceptions and attitudes are able to make a difference in the policy process, but are not too close to the leadership that they are constrained by official positions and decision-makers’ expectation. The participant is, therefore, not responsible for speaking on behalf of its government, but

²⁹ Kelman and Cohen, “The Problem-Solving Workshop,” 83.

³⁰ Ibid., 84.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

has access to speak to its government. They are able to freely move between the private and public sphere. Kelman and Cohen assume that this quality of the participant is what allows for coordination between the Track II process and the official policy process. The type of participant is, therefore, an important feature of Kelman and Cohens' model of the problem-solving workshop.

Critiques of the Kelman and Cohen's model

A limitation of Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop that the authors acknowledge is the problem of transferring the changes into the policy process.³³ Kelman and Cohen's criteria for the ideal participant is more theoretical than empirical, in that their scholarship does not empirically demonstrate whether their ideal participant is able to successfully transfer the results generated by the workshop into the official negotiation process. Although Kelman and Cohen have their own experience in running problem-solving workshops, they do not provide a specific example of the ideal participant in their scholarship. Moreover, while Kelman and Cohen discuss their understanding of "potential influential participants," they do not elaborate on what "coordination with leadership" entails.³⁴ Kelman and Cohen assume that since the ideal participant has influence within the policymaking community, that individual will have an impact on the policy process and will, therefore, be able to enhance the probability that the insights and ideas generated by the workshop will be transferred into the official policy process. Kelman and Cohen, however, do not adequately demonstrate in their scholarship that a participants' deliberate effort to communicate with political leaders after the problem-solving workshop can have a direct impact on the official decision to start negotiations. Their proposal concerning the question

³³ Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 79.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 83.

of transfer is too broad, and relies too much upon the individual. The question of coordination and cooperation between Track I and Track II diplomacy is, therefore, still a matter of ongoing research, as the question of how the results and products generated by Track II diplomacy can be transferred and thereby contribute, to the processes and outcomes of official negotiation still remains.

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy

In this section, I establish the significance of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy as a nongovernmental organization that conducts Track II diplomacy. The NCAFP has had a significant impact on different international conflicts. Under the leadership of then-Chairman William J. Flynn, the NCAFP contributed to the Peace Process in Northern Ireland in 1994. It has also made an impact on Cross-Taiwan-Strait relations. The NCAFP is currently the only policy organization in the United States that is hosted annually for visits to Taipei, Taiwan and Beijing, China by Taiwan's Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office. Furthermore, the NCAFP's personal connection with former Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger contributes to the NCAFP's influence within the official Track I levels.

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) was founded in 1974 by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau and others. It is a non-profit policy organization "dedicated to the resolution of conflicts that threaten US interests. Toward that end, the NCAFP identifies, articulates, and helps advance US foreign policy interests from a nonpartisan perspective within the framework of political realism."³⁵ The NCAFP is important as it is one of the few non-governmental foreign policy organizations that hosts dialogues which

³⁵ "Our Mission," *NCAFP*, accessed on May 29, 2017, <https://www.ncafp.org/about-us/our-mission/>.

stimulate and inform the American public and US government on current issues, such as cybersecurity initiatives, US-Russia relations, and the Middle East. The NCAFP fulfils its mission through Track I ½ and Track II diplomacy, which according to the NCAFP consists of “closed-door and off-the-record conferences” that “provide opportunities for senior US and foreign officials, subject experts, and scholarship to engage in discussions designed to defuse conflict, build confidence, and resolve problems.”³⁶ The NCAFP is funded by corporations and individuals, who in 2016 included Carnegie Corporation of New York, Henry Luce Foundation, and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.³⁷

The Forum on Asia-Pacific Security (FAPS) is one of the initiatives of the NCAFP. It is “dedicated to building peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific...and runs Track II dialogues with some of the region’s most influential officials and policy experts on key security issues.”³⁸ FAPS runs six major Track II dialogues on regional security issues in the Asia-Pacific. The focus areas are reducing strategic mistrust between the United States and China through a U.S-China strategic dialogue; exploring and building support for a cooperative, multilateral means of ensuring a denuclearized Korean Peninsula; improving cross-Taiwan Strait relations through a US-China-Taiwan trilateral dialogue; promoting quadrilateral cooperation among the region’s powers—the United States, Japan, China, and South Korea; fostering trilateral cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and China on North Korea policy; and managing China-Japan tensions through a US-China-Japan trilateral dialogue.³⁹ The work of the Forum on Asia-Pacific Security is accomplished through a variety of exchanges, which includes annual conferences on each of the six projects

³⁶ “Our Mission,” *NCAFP*.

³⁷ “Forum on Asia-Pacific Security,” *NCAFP*, accessed on May 29, 2017, https://www.ncafp.org/2016/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/NEW_2016-FAPS-Brochure_ENGLISH.pdf; The full list of 2016 corporate and foundation supporters of FAPS can be found here.

³⁸ “Forum on Asia-Pacific Security (FAPS),” *NCAFP*, accessed on May 29, 2017, <https://www.ncafp.org/projects/by-region/asia/>.

³⁹ “Forum on Asia-Pacific Security.”

attended by government officials, former officials, and area experts, and private roundtable discussions with visiting delegations, all with the goal of stimulating productive dialogue.

The NCAFP recognized the serious challenge that the DPRK's efforts to develop nuclear weapons posed upon the international community.⁴⁰ It also recognized that the Bush administration's policy on North Korea was incoherent due to the infighting within the administration.⁴¹ Moreover, the inability of US officials to talk directly with their North Korean counterparts, as well as the harsh US rhetoric from the high levels of governance, such as President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, became a concern of the NCAFP.⁴² Due to these elements, the NCAFP launched its Track II project on the denuclearization of North Korea to increase mutual understanding and communication between the US and the DPRK.⁴³ The NCAFP-initiated Track II meetings concerning the North Korean nuclear issue are officially titled as "Conference on Northeast Asian Security."⁴⁴ During the timeframe of when Assistant Secretary of State Kelly was head of the US delegation to the Six Party Talks (2003-2005), the NCAFP sponsored three of these conferences.

The NCAFP's First Conference on Northeast Asian Security was launched in September 2003.⁴⁵ The Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security was held on 9-11 August 2004.⁴⁶ The Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security was held from 29 June to 1 July 2005.⁴⁷ These conferences were hosted by the NCAFP with a North Korean delegation led by Ambassador Ri Gun, deputy director of the DPRK Institute of Disarmament and

⁴⁰ "A Case for Track II Diplomacy," 450.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 451.

⁴³ Zagoria, e-mail message to author.

⁴⁴ Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asian Security."

⁴⁵ "The Nuclear Standoff with North Korea," 73.

⁴⁶ Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asian Security."

⁴⁷ "A Case for Track II Diplomacy," 450.

Peace. The last NCAFP-initiated Track II meeting that was attended by US participants and DPRK participants was in July 2012. Since then, there have been other Track II meetings concerning the North Korean nuclear issue, but they were not attended by the DPRK.⁴⁸

NCAFP Track II approach: Supplement to, and preparation for Six Party Talks

The NCAFP's Track II diplomatic approach concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, particularly from 2003 to 2005, can be explained by Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop. I reconstruct the NCAFP's Second and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security in order to demonstrate that the NCAFP designed its Track II meetings as a supplement to, and preparation for the official, Track I negotiations. The NCAFP report concerning the First Conference on Northeast Asian Security is not publicly available. In this section, I establish the assumptions that inform the NCAFP's Track II approach, the purpose of the NCAFP's Track II meetings concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis, the objectives, the methodology, and the participants to better demonstrate this chapters' argument.

Assumptions that inform the NCAFP Track II approach

The assumption that informs Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop is that there are aspects of international conflict and conflict resolution where the individual represents the most appropriate unit of analysis.⁴⁹ There are, therefore, certain processes central to conflict resolution that need to take place at the level of the individual. The NCAFP view was that the individual is a crucial unit of analysis in order to adequately

⁴⁸ "US-Japan-China-ROK Quadrilateral Meeting on North Korea and the Future of the Korean Peninsula: One Last Chance for Diplomacy?" *NCAFP*, accessed on May 29, 2017, <https://www.ncafp.org/u-s-japan-china-rok-quadrilateral-meeting-north-korea-future-korean-peninsula-one-last-chance-diplomacy/>

⁴⁹ Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving," 191.

resolve the conflict. The NCAFP's Track II diplomatic approach, therefore, placed its focus upon individual and interaction between the individuals.

The NCAFP states in its website how it fulfils its mission through Track II diplomacy. The NCAFP is dedicated to the resolution of conflicts that threaten US interests, through Track II diplomacy. The NCAFP understands Track II diplomacy as "closed-door and off-the-record conferences" that allow "senior US and foreign officials, subjects experts, and scholars to engage in discussions designed to defuse conflict, build confidence, and resolve problems."⁵⁰ The NCAFP's Track II diplomatic approach, therefore, focuses on the individual and interactions between the individuals. The NCAFP recognized that North Korea's nuclear ambitions was to some degree driven by unfulfilled human needs, and that interactions between individuals could have a role in developing a mutually satisfying resolution. The NCAFP's Track II approach is consequently informed by the same assumption as Kelman and Cohen's model, in that there are aspects of international conflict and conflict resolution where the individual represents the most appropriate unit of analysis.

Purpose of NCAFP Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue

In this section, I establish the reason to why the NCAFP initiated its Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue. The central purpose of the NCAFP's Track II meetings concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis was to compensate for the limitations of US diplomacy that occurred during the first three rounds of the Six Party Talks (2003-2005), and thereby assist the official negotiation process. The limitations of US diplomacy that the NCAFP Track II meetings aimed to compensate for was the United States delegation to the Six Party Talks' inability to ensure clear communication of objectives between the United

⁵⁰ "Our Mission," *NCAFP*.

States and the DPRK. Kelman proposes that problem-solving workshops can “play an important complementary role at all stages of the negotiation process,” such as creating a political atmosphere that is conducive to the negotiation process.⁵¹ Although Kelman does not elaborate more upon this relation, his analytical framework on the problem-solving workshop helps explain why the NCAFP designed its Track II meeting to be a supplement to, or preparation for the official Six Party Talks.

In the previous chapter, I established that the US delegation to the Six Party Talks headed by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly (2003-2005) was unable to fulfil the normal diplomatic function of ensuring clear communication of objectives between the US and the DPRK. The US delegation was given instructions by the Bush administration, which forbade the US delegation from conducting direct talks with its North Korean counterpart. During the timeframe of 2003 to 2005, the faction within the Bush administration that was reluctant to engage in negotiations with the DPRK held more influence on US-DPRK foreign policy decisions than the faction that preferred a diplomatic approach that accented traditional negotiation.⁵²

The United States delegation to the Six Party Talks was not allowed to have any direct communication with the DPRK delegation other than the reiteration of US policy, which was the complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. The US delegation was, therefore, unable to persuade the North Korean delegation that the Bush administration did not intend to seek regime change. Since the beginning of the Six Party Talks (27 August 2003), the North Korean government suspected the Bush administration’s policy towards the DPRK to be regime change. As demonstrated by the North Korean

⁵¹ Kelman, “Interactive Problem Solving,” 190.

⁵² C. Kenneth Quinones, “Dualism in the Bush Administration’s North Korea Policy,” *Asian Perspective* 27, no. 1 (April 2003): 1-28.

Foreign Ministry's statement of 30 August 2003 and its statement of 29 February 2004, the DPRK expressed its concern that the US government had no desire to improve relations with the DPRK, nor any intention "to co-exist with the DPRK in peace."⁵³ As there were some government officials within the Bush administration who favoured a policy that would result in the collapse of the North Korean regime, the US delegation to the Six Party Talks faced the issue of trying to assure the North Korean delegation that the official position of the Bush administration towards the DPRK was not regime change.⁵⁴ Throughout the first three rounds of the Six Party Talks, the North Korean government continued to believe that the Bush administration had no intention to peacefully coexist with the DPRK, and instead sought its collapse. This belief eventually became the North Korean government's justification as to why it suspended its participation in the Six Party Talks. On 10 February 2005, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement that pointed to the US' "aim to seek the latter's 'regime change'" as the DPRK's reason for the its suspension.⁵⁵

The United States delegation's inability to clearly communicate US policy objectives to its North Korean counterpart is why the NCAFP initiated its Track II meetings concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. Although the NCAFP's Track II meetings, in general, sought to compensate for this limitation of US diplomacy, the NCAFP designed the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security in a subtly different manner than the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The purpose of the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security (9-11 August 2004) was to become a supplement to the Six Party Talks. At the Second Conference on

⁵³ "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks"; "Foreign Ministry Statement, August 30."

⁵⁴ "Multilateral Dialogue to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue."

⁵⁵ "DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period," *KCNA*, February 10, 2005, accessed February 9, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/news/200502/north-korea-suspends-participation-in-six-party-talks-claims-have-manufactured-nukes>.

Northeast Asian Security, the NCAFP aimed to have the US delegation engage in discussions with the North Korean delegation that they could not conduct at the official level, concerning the differences from the third round of the Six Party Talks (23-26 June 2004).⁵⁶ One of the differences that remained from the third round was the DPRK and the United States both harboured deep suspicion that the other side did not seek a genuine resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.⁵⁷ The Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security was meant to enhance the discussions that the state actors were having concerning the differences remaining from the third round of the Six Party Talks. The purpose of the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security (29 June-1 July 2005) was to become a preparation for the Six Party Talks, as the NCAFP designed this Track II meeting to help the state actors restart the Six Party Talks that was suspended by the DPRK in February 2005.⁵⁸ The DPRK had suspended its participation in the Six Party Talks due to its suspicion over US policy intent. The Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security was meant to be a forum where the state actors could break the diplomatic impasse.

According to Fisher, the level of coordination and cooperation between the Track I and Track II level can include a spectrum of engagement.⁵⁹ Coordination between the two levels can be of an indirect nature, wherein coordination is limited to the sharing of information and analyses that assist the formal negotiations.⁶⁰ It can also involve the most engaged forms of strategy planning and joint implementation.⁶¹ The articles published by the NCAFP do not specify whether the form of coordination that the NCAFP sought between its Track II activity and the official policy process was to be limited to information sharing, or

⁵⁶ Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asia Security."

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ "News and Views," (2005): 460.

⁵⁹ Ronald J. Fisher, "Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation," *International Negotiation* 11 (2006): 65-89.

⁶⁰ Fisher, "Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy," 65.

⁶¹ Ibid.

expanded to the more engaging activities of joint strategy planning and collaboration in implementation. This dissertation, however, assumes that the NCAFP aimed to have more collaboration and engagement than just information sharing between its Track II meetings and the official Track I diplomatic process. The articles published by NCAFP's journal underline the "continuing need for meetings such as ours," and the "important role" a Track II effort, such as the NCAFP's Track II projects, can play in assisting the official policy process.⁶² The NCAFP's emphasis concerning its role indicates that the NCAFP wanted the US government to use its Track II meetings as complementary role to the official negotiation process.

Objectives of NCAFP Conference on Northeast Asian Security

I establish in this section the series of objectives designed to achieve the central purpose of the NCAFP Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue. These objectives can be explained through the paradigm of Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop. The objectives of the NCAFP Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue were to open a channel of communication where the US delegation to the Six Party Talks could engage in discussions with the North Korean delegation that could not be conducted at the Track I level due to the restrictions of the US government's official position; change participants' perspectives of the adversary and the North Korean nuclear issue so that participants could engage in a process of creative problem solving; and transfer the information and ideas, the changed perceptions and attitudes, and the resolutions generated by its Track II meetings into the official policy process.

⁶² "A Case for Track II Diplomacy," 453.

The NCAFP's article about its Track II diplomacy on the North Korean nuclear issue establishes that the NCAFP was concerned about the "lack of direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang."⁶³ The NCAFP realized that an obstacle hindering the process of official negotiation was the US delegation to the Six Party Talks' inability to talk directly with North Korean delegation.⁶⁴ The NCAFP, therefore, wanted its Track II diplomatic approach concerning the North Korean nuclear issue to open another channel of communication between the US and the DPRK.⁶⁵ Unlike the channel of communication established by the official Six Party Talks, in the channel of communication established by the NCAFP, representatives of the US delegation would be able to talk face-to-face with their North Korean counterpart on the various issues pertaining to North Korea's nuclear program, such as the DPRK's misgivings about the Bush administration. The US delegation would, therefore, be able to engage in discussions that could not be conducted at the Track I level due to the instructions of the Bush administration.

The NCAP reports concerning the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security demonstrate that an objective of the NCAFP was to change the participants' perspective of each other and the North Korean nuclear issue itself, so that the participants could engage in a new process of problem-solving. The report of the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security states that the second conference was sponsored in "an effort to foster mutual understanding among the parties to the official Six-Party Talks and to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue."⁶⁶ As indicated by the NCAFP's Track II approach that is stated within its website, the

⁶³ "A Case for Track II Diplomacy," 451.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ "Track I ½ & Track II Diplomacy," *NCAFP*, accessed July 8, 2017, https://www.ncafp.org/what-we-do/track-1_5-and-track-2-diplomacy/.

⁶⁶ Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asia Security."

NCAFP's understanding of fostering mutual understanding among the parties to the official Six-Party Talks was changing the attitudes of the conflicted parties by working to break down negative stereotypes and generalizations of the other side resulting from political barriers.⁶⁷ The change within the participants' perspectives would then help create an atmosphere that would allow participants to provide new options for negotiation by generating creative ideas.⁶⁸ By changing the participants' perspectives of each other and the conflict, the NCAFP aimed for its participants to generate a resolution towards the North Korean nuclear issue.⁶⁹

The content of the report of the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security reiterate that that the objective of the NCAFP's Track II meeting concerning the North Korean nuclear issue was to facilitate change within the participants' perceptions of each other and the North Korean nuclear issue, so that the participants could engage in a process of creative problem-solving. The report states that American participants and North Korean participants, who included US and North Korean government official representatives, engaged in discussions that aimed to change the DPRK's perspective of the Bush administration and US policy intent. The American participants conducted talks with the North Korean participants that changed the DPRK's view that US government's policy towards the DPRK was regime change.⁷⁰ The report states that in the following session, participants proceeded to discuss possible ways to break the diplomatic impasse and thereby provided new options for negotiation.⁷¹ This sequence of topics demonstrates that the NCAFP aimed to change the participants' perspectives of each other and the state of the North Korean nuclear issue, so that they could engage in a process of conflict resolution.

⁶⁷ "Track I ½ & Track II Diplomacy."

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ "A Case of Track II Diplomacy," 451; "Multilateral Dialogue to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue."

⁷¹ "Multilateral Dialogue to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue."

The last objective of the NCAFP Track II meetings was to transfer the information and ideas, the changed perceptions and attitudes, and the resolutions generated by its Track II meetings back into the official policy process. This objective is indicated by the type of individuals that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings. As will be further demonstrated in the later section, these individuals had political access to political leaders, and had the potential to have an impact on the official policy process. The individuals that the NCAFP had invited to its Track II meetings, therefore, had capability to transfer the products generated by the problem-solving workshop back into the official policy process, as argued by Kelman and Cohen.⁷²

Methodology

In this section, I establish the procedure that the NCAFP used to accomplish its objectives. The main components of the NCAFP's methodology were an informal and isolated setting free from governmental and diplomatic protocol, ability to engage participants in informal negotiation, open discussion on specific topics, and capability to invite participants who are able to communicate with the political leadership. The NCAFP modality can be partially understood through the prism of the Kelman and Cohen analytical framework. The ability to engage participants in informal negotiation is not a part of Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop, and, therefore, cannot be explained through the paradigm of Kelman and Cohen's analytical framework.

The NCAFP conducted its Track II meetings in a setting that was unofficial and private.⁷³ The setting created by the NCAFP offered to its participants confidentiality and freedom from the formality of formal dialogues. An informal and isolated setting free from

⁷² Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 84.

⁷³ "Track I ½ & Track II Diplomacy."

governmental and diplomatic protocol was, therefore, a necessary component for the NCAFP's Track II meetings as the NCAFP believed that this type of setting would encourage the participants, particularly the US government officials and North Korean government officials who were invited to the Track II meetings, to move away from their respective states' official position, and instead to feel free to participate in discussions that they could not have at the official level due to the Bush administration's instructions.⁷⁴ The NCAFP, therefore, assumed that an informal and isolated setting would give participants the freedom to move away from reiteration of official policy, and instead to absorb new information, explore new ideas, revise their perceptions, reassess their attitudes, and engage in a process of creative problem solving, as argued by Kelman and Cohen.⁷⁵ Through this type of setting, the NCAFP would be able to achieve its objective of becoming a channel of communication where US and North Korean government officials could engage in discussions that they could not conduct at the official Six Party Talks due to the instructions of the Bush administration.

The components of open discussion on specific topics and the ability to engage participants in informal negotiations were necessary to the NCAFP's methodology. These components were geared to facilitate the process of changing participants' perspectives of each other and the North Korean nuclear issue, so that participants would be able to engage in a process of creative problem-solving. This section assumes that the NCAFP did not control the direction of the discussions. The NCAFP does not explicitly explain its role as moderator of the discussions. When mentioning its role within the reports on the NCAFP Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue, the NCAFP highlights its ability to convene the meetings, rather than on what ideas, observations, and information the NCAFP

⁷⁴ Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 83; "Track I ½ & Track II Diplomacy."

⁷⁵ Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 83.

provided to its participants.⁷⁶ Based upon this account, this section assumes that the NCAFP did not guide the participants' discussion in the sense that the NCAFP did not intervene or provide a certain paradigm in which participants were to perceive the specific topic. The NCAFP allowed the participants to approach the specific topic from whichever viewpoint the participant chose. The discussions were, therefore, open in that participants could address the topic from their own paradigm.

The NCAFP's objective of changing participants' perspectives of the adversary and the North Korean nuclear issue so that participants could engage in a process of creative problem solving was to be accomplished through the NCAFP's open discussions on its topics concerning the issues of the official Six Party Talks, and the NCAFP's ability to engage participants in informal negotiation. The NCAFP believed that its participants would become exposed to new information concerning each other and the North Korean nuclear issue, as the NCAFP assumed that the setting of its meetings would encourage participants to engage in discussions that could not be conducted at the official Track I level. The participants' exposure to the new information would allow participants to change their own perceptions and attitudes of the other side and the North Korean nuclear issue. The change within the participants' perspectives would provide the participants the basis to build not only professional networks, but also personal relations. As relations are built, confidence and trust is developed among the participants. These newly established relations that are based upon trust and confidence were a means towards the development of an atmosphere in which creative problem-solving becomes possible process.⁷⁷ As participants build professional and personal relations with each other, participants would feel more free to move away from the

⁷⁶ Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asia Security"; "Multilateral Dialogue to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue."

⁷⁷ Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 83; "Track I ½ & Track II Diplomacy."

reiteration of their respective official government's position and instead engage in a process where participants consider new options for negotiation by generating creative ideas. The participants would thereby be engaging in a process of informal negotiation, as they consider the areas of commonalities between their respective states' different interests. This process, which is directed at changing individual perceptions and attitudes, would result in a facilitation of resolution on the North Korean nuclear issue, or at least partial agreement on the different interests.⁷⁸

The topics that the NCAFP selected for the participants to discuss at the NCAFP Track II meetings were about specific problems that stemmed from the stage of the official Six Party Talks that the NCAFP wanted its Track II meeting to play a complementary role to. The topics were thereby closely related to the issues of the official Six Party Talks. The NCAFP's selection of its topics further reinforced that participants would be able to have discussions concerning the issues of the official Six Party Talks that could not be conducted at the official level. It, therefore, also provided participants the opportunity to change their perspectives, so that they could enter into a process of resolving the topic, since participants would be exposed to new information concerning these topics. The discussions of the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security focused on the differences that remained from the third round of the Six Party Talks.⁷⁹ The discussions of the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security focused on the state of the official Six Party Talks, and possible ways to resume the Six Party Talks.⁸⁰

The proposal that the DPRK tabled at the third round of the Six Party Talks (23-26 June 2004) offered a freezing of its nuclear programs in return for compensatory measures,

⁷⁸ Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 83; "Track I ½ & Track II Diplomacy."

⁷⁹ Donald Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asia Security."

⁸⁰ "A Case of Track II Diplomacy," 450.

while the United States' proposal sought an agreement on a framework that would result in the total dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program.⁸¹ A difference between the proposals was thereby the question of sequence, as the North Korean proposal sought a freeze as the first step, while the US proposal sought complete dismantlement rather than a freeze. Another difference between the two proposals concerned the scope of the preliminary measures towards nuclear dismantlement, specifically on whether North Korea's freeze of its nuclear programs included its uranium enrichment program.⁸² Other differences included how the freeze would be adequately verified, and what the corresponding measures entailed.⁸³ The statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on 26 June 2004 concerning the third round of the Six Party Talks stated that some states severely lacked mutual trust.⁸⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was referring to the issue of mistrust between the US and the DPRK. The lack of trust between the US and the DPRK was, therefore, an obstacle to the progress of the negotiation progress of the official Six Party Talks.

The NCAFP reports that the topics of discussion for the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security were the mutual lack of trust between the US and North Korea, the question of North Korea's uranium enrichment program, the scope of the proposed North Korean nuclear freeze, North Korea's right to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program, US participation in delivering fuel aid to North Korea, and US willingness to negotiate with North Korea.⁸⁵ By selecting the differences that remained after the third round of the Six

⁸¹ "Third Round of Six-Party Talks Concerning North Korean Nuclear Issues," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, June 26, 2004, accessed February 9, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/Asian-paci/n_korea/6party/talk0406.html.

⁸² "New Consensus and New Steps: Remarks on the Third Round of the Beijing Six-Party Talks by Wang Yi"; "Third Round of Six-Party Talks Concerning North Korean Nuclear Issues."

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asian Security."

Party Talks as the focus of the discussions of the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security, the NCAFP aimed to change participants' perspectives of each other and the North Korean nuclear issue, so that the participants could achieve at least partial agreement concerning the differences of the tabled proposals.

The discussions of the NCAFP's Third Conference on Northeast Asia Security focused upon the question of the Bush administration's policy intent and the basis on which the DPRK would be willing to return to the Six Party Talks. The NCAFP hoped that by focusing on this topic, participants would have informal talks where participants, particularly American and North Korean participants, would be able to understand the other side's concerns and thereby change their perspectives. The NCAFP believed that the change would lead participants into a process of creative problem-solving where participants would find a way to break the diplomatic impasse in order to resume the Six Party Talks.

The participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings have the qualities of the ideal participant, as understood by Kelman and Cohen.⁸⁶ The qualities of the participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings indicate that the aim of the NCAFP was to invite individuals who had influence within the US government. Its reasoning was that the products generated by the NCAFP Track II meetings could then be transferred back into the official policy process.

NCAFP Track II meeting participants

The participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis match the criteria of Kelman and Cohen's ideal participant.⁸⁷ The American participants that the NCAFP invited to its Second Conference on Northeast Asian

⁸⁶ Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 84; "Track I ½ & Track II Diplomacy."

⁸⁷ Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 84.

Security and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security included United States government officials, who were participating in their private capacity, and former United States government officials. A complete list of the participants can be found in either the NCAFP reports or NCAFP journal articles.⁸⁸ The North Korean participants were from the Institute of Disarmament and Peace, which is a policy research institute under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Institute studies ways to achieve disarmament, peace, and security on the Korean Peninsula, and makes policy recommendations in this regard.⁸⁹ The Institute, thereby, has a role within the policy-making structure of the North Korean government, as it provides policy recommendation but the final decision rests in the hands of the Supreme Leader of the DPRK.

Of the individuals that the NCAFP invited, I argue that Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of State; the Honorable Joseph R. DeTrani of the State Department of the United States, special envoy to the Six Party Talks; Charles W. Jones, Director of Asian Affairs, National Security Council; and Dr. Victor Cha, Director of Asian Affairs, National Security Council are of importance to the NCAFP. These individuals participated in both the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Conference and the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Conference. Moreover, the NCAFP consistently highlighted their participation in its reports or articles concerning the NCAFP Track II meeting.⁹⁰

The National Security Council, and the US Department of State provides policy recommendation to the United States President. The National Security Council's function is

⁸⁸ "News and Views," (2005): 460; "The Nuclear Standoff with North Korea," 74; Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asia Security."

⁸⁹ "Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, accessed on August 26, 2018, <http://www.mfa.gov.kp/en/about-us/>.

⁹⁰ "News and Views," (2005): 460; Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asia Security."

to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies.⁹¹ The US Department of State is the agency responsible for negotiations with North Korea.⁹²

These agencies have a role within the United States policy-making structure, as they provide much of the intelligence about DPRK's nuclear program to the president, which can influence his thinking about United States foreign policy issues. Due to their positions within the United States government, these individuals had access to the official leadership, and thereby the capability to have an impact on the policy process. The participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II diplomatic meetings were, therefore, those who had the potential to transfer the results of the problem-solving workshops back into political process, as understood by Kelman and Cohen.⁹³

Of the American participants, Kissinger, attended not only the Second and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security, but also the First Conference on Northeast Asian Security.⁹⁴ The NCAFP states that it "benefited greatly" from Kissinger's participation in all three of the meetings.⁹⁵ The NCAFP report underlines that he was not speaking on "behalf of the government," but his "ties to the current Bush administration lent substantial authority" to the NCAFP's endeavours.⁹⁶ Although Kissinger was no longer directly involved in the decision-making process, he was considered an influential member of the policymaking community during the Bush administration. Beginning from 2001, Kissinger met with President Bush every other month, as he advised the Bush administration on the Iraq War.⁹⁷

⁹¹ "National Security Council," *White House*, accessed on August 26, 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/>.

⁹² "Remarks on the Appointment of Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun," *U.S. Department of State*, August 23, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/08/285370.htm>.

⁹³ Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 84.

⁹⁴ "News and Views," (2005): 460; "The Nuclear Standoff with North Korea," 74; Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asia Security."

⁹⁵ "A Case for Track II Diplomacy," 452.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ The Associated Press, "Woodward: Kissinger Advising Bush," *The Washington Post*, September 29, 2006, accessed March 16, 2017, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp->

President Bush also sought his advice concerning issues on the US-Russia agenda.⁹⁸ Kissinger, therefore, had the ability to have an impact on the policy process, as his perceptions and opinions were sought by the Bush administration.

United States Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Joseph R. DeTrani attended the Second and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The US government provides little information regarding what DeTrani's position entails.⁹⁹ The information concerning the responsibilities of this position is, therefore, drawn from Charles L. Pritchard's *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb*.¹⁰⁰ Before his resignation in 2003, Pritchard was US Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, or what at that time was titled as the Special Envoy for Negotiations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.¹⁰¹ This section assumes that DeTrani, who was Pritchard's successor, had similar job responsibilities as Pritchard. According to Pritchard, the position of special envoy was to be the official interface with North Korea for talks on a variety of issues.¹⁰² For DeTrani, his position was to be the official interface with North Korea for the official Six Party Talks and issues pertaining to the Six Party Talks. As US Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, Pritchard communicated and met directly with the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State, and the Assistant Secretary of State of the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs.¹⁰³

dyn/content/article/2006/09/29/AR2006092900380.html; Robert Dallek, "The Kissinger Presidency," *Vanity Fair*, May 2007, accessed March 16, 2017, <http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2007/05/kissinger200705>

⁹⁸ Eric Draper, January 2008, The White House: President George W. Bush, Washington D.C., accessed March 13, 2017, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/images/20080118-1_d-0080-2-515h.html

⁹⁹ "Six-Party Talks (Special Envoy): Vacant," *US Department of State*, accessed March 21, 2017, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/title/as/214018.htm>

During the time that this dissertation was being written, the position of US Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks was still vacant.

¹⁰⁰ Charles L. Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 63.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., 47.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 57, 60.

Pritchard was able to recommend policy for US policy towards the DPRK.¹⁰⁴ He prepared a memo for Kelly that outlined the objectives, themes, and goals for the trilateral talks of April 2003.¹⁰⁵ The instructions he had written for Kelly had, however, been re-written by National Security Council Staff.¹⁰⁶ This incident demonstrates that Pritchard had the potential to have an impact on the policy process, but was not directly accountable for policy decisions. Based upon Pritchard's account of his time as US Special Envoy for the Six Party Talks, DeTrani had access to American leaders of high-governance. Moreover, he was able to have some influence over the official policy process since he was able to communicate with such leaders. DeTrani, however, was not directly involved in the making of US foreign policy decisions. As understood by Kelman and Cohen, DeTrani had the capability to transfer the products generated by the NCAFP Track II meetings into the official policy process, making him an ideal participant for the Track II meetings.¹⁰⁷

The director for Asian Affairs of the National Security Council (NSC) attended the Second and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. For the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Affairs, this post was held by Charles W. Jones.¹⁰⁸ For the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Affairs, the post was held by Dr. Victor Cha.¹⁰⁹ Jones was, therefore, the director for Asian Affairs of the National Security Council for the first Bush administration, while Cha was the director for Asian Affairs of the National Security Council for the second Bush administration. Jones and Cha, however, were not the head of the Asian Affairs office. The title for the head of the Asian Affairs office of the NSC is Special Assistant to the

¹⁰⁴ Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy*, 64.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 84.

¹⁰⁸ Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asia Security."

¹⁰⁹ "News and Views," (2005): 460.

President and Senior Director.¹¹⁰ The Senior Director of Asian Affairs of the National Security Council advises and assists the high-levels of American governance, who include the President and members of the President's Cabinet, on national security and foreign policy matters pertaining to the Asia-Pacific region.¹¹¹ There is little information concerning the responsibilities for the position of director of Asian Affairs. The responsibilities of the position of director are, however, drawn from the general responsibilities of the Asian Affairs office.

The Asian Affairs office of the NSC is part of the National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) that was established for the East Asia region.¹¹² The PCCs provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NCS system, the Deputies Committee and the Principals Committee who consist of the President and the members of the President's cabinet.¹¹³ The PCCs are also responsible for the management of the development and implementation of national security policies, and are accountable for the day-to-day interagency policy coordination.¹¹⁴ This section, therefore, assumes that Cha and Jones were part of these processes. Due to the lack of information concerning their responsibilities, this section cannot determine whether Cha and Jones had access to the senior government officials of the Bush administration. They, however, had the potential to have some impact on the policy process, as they were responsible for providing policy analysis for consideration by the senior government officials of the Bush administration. Cha and Jones, similar to Kissinger and DeTrani, had qualities of the ideal participant of the problem-

¹¹⁰ Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy*, 49; "Torkel Patterson," *US-China Education Trust*, accessed July 13, 2017, <http://uscet.org/torkel>.

¹¹¹ "What is the National Security Council?" *VOA News*, February 17, 2017, accessed July 12, 2017, <https://www.voanews.com/a/what-is-national-security-council/3724078.html>

¹¹² "National Security Presidential Directives-1," *Federation of American Scientists*, February 13, 2001, accessed July 12, 2017, <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm>.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ "National Security Presidential Directives-1"; Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy*, 48.

solving workshop, as understood by Kelman and Cohen. The reason why the NCAFP continued to invite these individuals to its Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue was because they had the capability to transfer the products of the Track II meetings back into the official policy process.

Achievements of the NCAFP Track II diplomacy on the DPRK nuclear issue

In this section I demonstrate that the NCAFP was able to partially achieve its objectives but had difficulties in meeting all of them. The NCAFP partially achieved its objective of opening a channel of communication where the US delegation could engage in talks with the North Korean delegation that could not be conducted at the official Track I level. Although the NCAFP opened a channel of communication between the US and the DPRK, it was used by the Bush administration more as a forum where the US and the DPRK could work out certain details that would provide a decisive diplomatic breakthrough when official negotiations were not proceeding.

The NCAFP was not able to achieve its objective of changing participants' perspectives of the adversary and the North Korean nuclear issue so that participants could engage in a process of creative problem solving at the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The NCAFP was, however, able to partially achieve this objective at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security, as the NCAFP helped make possible a change within the North Korean participants' perspective of the US and the Bush administration's policy objectives towards the DPRK. The change within the North Korean participants' perspective that the NCAFP helped facilitate was, however, not what allowed participating US government officials to engage in a process of problem-solving with the North Korean officials. Participants were able to engage in this process due to external factors, such as the Bush administration's policy on the DPRK, rather than the NCAFP's modality.

The NCAFP did not achieve its objective of a successful transfer of the information and ideas, the changed perceptions and attitudes, and the resolutions generated by its Track II meetings back into the official policy process in either the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security or the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings had a contradictory effect, which made this transfer process implausible. The contradictory effect of the individuals that the NCAFP invited was that the NCAFP wanted US government officials to attend its meetings, but the US government officials were unable to be a part of the processes of the NCAFP Track II meetings, such as changing their perspectives and attitudes, due to the constraints of the US government's official position and expectations of US decision-makers. Since the participating US government officials were unable to experience the change within their perspective which would lead to the formulation of solutions, I argue there was nothing for the participants to transfer back into the official policy process.

Open a channel of communication between US delegation and DPRK delegation

In this section I demonstrate that the NCAFP partially achieved its objective of opening a channel of communication where the US delegation could engage in talks with the North Korean delegation that could not be conducted at the official Track I level. Although the NCAFP opened a channel of communication between the US and the DPRK, it was used by the Bush administration more as a forum where the US and the DPRK could work out certain details that would provide a decisive diplomatic breakthrough when official negotiations were not proceeding. The US delegation's usage of the channel of communication that was opened by the NCAFP was dependent upon whether the Bush administration's political approach towards the DPRK accented direct engagement.

The NCAFP sought to open another channel of communication between the US and the DPRK due to its concern that the US and the DPRK were not engaging in direct talks at the official Six Party Talks.¹¹⁵ In order for the NCAFP to successfully open a channel of communication between the US and the DPRK, an important factor was, therefore, that representatives of the US and the DPRK attend the NCAFP Track II meetings. Members of the US delegation and the North Korean delegation to the Six Party Talks participated in the Second and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. From the US delegation, Ambassador DeTrani, Special Envoy to the Six Party Talks, attended both conferences.¹¹⁶ From the North Korean delegation, Ri Gun, deputy negotiator for the Six Party Talks, also attended both conferences. To encourage these participants to have discussions that could not be conducted at the official Six Party Talks due to the restrictions of the US government's official position, the NCAFP hosted its Second and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security within a setting that was to be free from governmental and diplomatic protocol. It is also why the NCAFP invited government officials to participate as private individuals rather than official representatives. The NCAFP, therefore, provided its participants a setting where the invited-US government officials would be able to engage in discussions with the North Korean government officials that they could not conduct at the Track I level.

Although the NCAFP conducted its second and third Track II meeting on the North Korean nuclear issue within the same informal and isolated setting, the participating US government officials did not engage in direct discussions with the participating North Korean government officials at the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security, but they did so at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security.¹¹⁷ As reported by the NCAFP, during

¹¹⁵ "A Case of Track II Diplomacy," 450.

¹¹⁶ "News and Views," (2005): 460; Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asia Security."

¹¹⁷ "A Case of Track II Diplomacy," 451.

the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security, the US government officials were not allowed much room by the Bush administration to take part in direct dialogues with the North Korean participants.¹¹⁸ This indicates that the instructions of the Bush administration, which forbade the US delegation from engaging in direct talks with its North Korean counterpart, applied to informal settings. The US officials who attended the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security were, therefore, unable to freely engage in direct discussions with the North Korean government officials. The same NCAFP report, however, states that US government officials talked directly to the North Korean government officials at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security.¹¹⁹

The NCAFP's ability to open a channel of communication where US delegation could engage in talks with the North Korean delegation that could not be conducted at the official Track I level was, therefore, not dependent on the setting of the NCAFP Track II meetings, but the Bush administration's policy towards the DPRK. One of the main differences between the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security and the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security, which I argue had the biggest impact on how the US delegation used the channel of communication that was opened by the NCAFP, was the Bush administration's political approach towards the DPRK. The NCAFP initiated its Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security (9-11 August 2004) almost immediately after the third round of the Six Party Talks (23-26 June 2004). The instructions that the Bush administration gave to the US delegation who attended the third round of the Six Party Talks, which forbade the delegation from entering into any form of direct engagement with its North Korean counterpart, demonstrates that the Bush administration was disinterested and

¹¹⁸ "A Case of Track II Diplomacy," 451.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

unwilling to enter into bilateral negotiations with the DPRK.¹²⁰ As implied by the NCAFP report, the instructions of the Bush administration extended to all forms of direct engagement with the DPRK, including engagement held within an informal setting.

The political atmosphere between the Bush administration and the DPRK had, however, changed when the NCAFP initiated its Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security (29 June – 1 July 2005). In past NCAFP Track II diplomatic conferences, participating US government officials were not able to freely discuss with their North Korean counterparts. At the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security, US government officials were able to talk directly to the North Korean government officials.¹²¹ A reason for this change in the constraints imposed upon American participants was due to important changes in personnel that took place during President Bush's second term. Condoleezza Rice had replaced Colin Powell as Secretary of State. Moreover, government officials who did not support engagement with the DPRK, such as Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Joseph, had left the Bush administration.¹²² Rice identified herself as a realist, and therefore believed that relationships among countries are governed by considerations of power, not mortality.¹²³ As a result, she and the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill were able to move the Bush administration's policy towards the DPRK toward a more accommodative stance.

Moreover, beginning from the spring of 2005, senior US government officials had decreased its usage of harsh rhetoric and began to show some flexibility in its policy. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had publicly stated that the United States recognized

¹²⁰ Mike Chinoy, *Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008), 183-184; Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 338; Charles L. Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy*, 110, 138.

¹²¹ "A Case of Track II Diplomacy," 451.

¹²² Pardo, "The Bush Administration and North Korea," 335.

¹²³ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 147.

that North Korea is a sovereign state; President Bush began to refer to North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-Il, as "Mr." Kim Jong-Il; and Ambassador DeTrani had met with North Korean Ambassador Han Song-ryol of the DPRK Permanent Mission to the United Nations twice.¹²⁴ The softening of the Bush administration's stance towards the DPRK indicate that the Bush administration's policy objective towards the DPRK during this timeframe was to restart the Six Party Talks, which had been stalled since June 2004. The Bush administration, therefore, aimed to make use of the channel of communication that the NCAFP had opened to accomplish its policy objective, as the NCAFP reports that the United States delegation conducted private discussions with the North Korean government officials to reach determine the way in which to break the diplomatic impasse.¹²⁵

The NCAFP, therefore, had little control over how the United States delegation to the Six Party Talks would use the channel of communication that the NCAFP had opened. The NCAFP aimed for the United States delegation to use its channel of communication as a way to avoid the restrictions of the United States government's official position. The United States government's official position that had restricted the level of interaction between the United States and the DPRK at the official Six Party Talks, however, had also restricted the level of interaction between the United States and the DPRK at the NCAFP Track II meetings. These American participants were, therefore, constrained by official positions and decision-makers' expectation, despite being in an informal setting. When the Bush administration's political approach towards the DPRK had softened, the United States delegation was able to engage in direct discussions with the participating North Korean

¹²⁴ "A Case of Track II Diplomacy," 451; David Wall, "America's flexible notion of sovereignty," *The Japan Times*, June 20, 2005, accessed on July 13, 2017, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2005/06/20/commentary/world-commentary/americas-flexible-notion-of-sovereignty/#.WWedQtPyvBI>.

¹²⁵ "A Case of Track II Diplomacy," 451.

government officials at the NCAFP Track II meetings. The NCAFP had successfully opened another channel of communication between the United States and the DPRK. It, however, was used by the United States delegation to achieve the Bush administration's policy objectives towards the DPRK when official negotiations were not proceeding. When the channel of communication between the DPRK and the United States provided by the official Six Party Talks was no longer available, the Bush administration had the United States delegation use the channel of communication that the NCAFP had opened to fulfil its policy objective.

Change participants' perspectives of each other and the North Korean nuclear issue

In this section, I demonstrate that the NCAFP was not able to achieve its objective of changing participants' perspectives of the adversary and the North Korean nuclear issue so that participants could engage in a process of creative problem solving at the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The NCAFP was, however, able to partially achieve this objective at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security, as the NCAFP helped make possible a change within the North Korean participants' perspective of the Bush administration's policy intent towards the DPRK. The change within the North Korean participants' perspective that the NCAFP helped facilitate, however, was not what allowed US participants to engage in a process of problem-solving with the North Korean participants. This process was due to external factors rather than the NCAFP's modality.

The NCAFP's objective of changing participants' perspectives of the adversary and the North Korean nuclear issue so that participants could engage in a process of creative problem solving was to be accomplished through the NCAFP's open discussions on topics concerning the issues of the official Six Party Talks, and the NCAFP's ability to engage participants in informal negotiation. During the Second Conference on Northeast Asian

Conference, the NCAFP was unable to commence the implementation of its methodology, due to the instructions of the Bush administration that did not allow the US delegation to engage in direct talks with the North Korean delegation. The NCAFP, however, was able to partially implement its methodology at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Conference, as the instructions of the Bush administration were no longer relevant. The NCAFP was, therefore, able to engage the participating US government officials in a direct discussion with North Korean government officials.

The first step of the NCAFP's modality was for participants, particularly the US government officials and North Korean government officials, to engage in discussions that could not be conducted at the official Track I level. This was necessary so that participants would be exposed to new information concerning the other side and the North Korean nuclear issue, which would then lead participants into a process of problem-solving. At the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Conference, the US officials did not engage in direct discussions with the North Korean officials pertaining to the differences that remained from the third round of the Six Party Talks. As reported by the NCAFP, the participating US delegates were not given much room by the Bush administration to take part in direct dialogues with the North Korean officials.¹²⁶ Since the first step of the NCAFP's method was unable to be achieved, the remaining steps could not be implemented.

Moreover, the NCAFP report concerning the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security demonstrates that participants chose to expand on their government's respective position, rather than to engage in conflict resolution. The report provides a summary of the conference, and thereby includes the topics that the participants discussed as well as the content of the discussions.¹²⁷ The reports' lack of information about how new ideas or

¹²⁶ "A Case of Track II Diplomacy," 451.

¹²⁷ Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asian Security."

solutions were generated indicates that participants did not come to the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Conference to achieve at least partial agreement on the differences from the third round of the Six Party Talks. The NCAFP sought to play an important role in assisting the official Six Party Talks.¹²⁸ Its report would, therefore, highlight all the contributions that the NCAFP made concerning its assistance to the official Six Party Talks. The NCAFP report on the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security states that participants, including the North Koreans and Americans, agreed that the NCAFP conference had been useful in clarifying differences.¹²⁹ The contribution that the NCAFP highlights is, therefore, that its participants were able to further expand upon their respective government's position. The report does not mention that participants aimed to resolve the differences of their respective government's position.

The report records that some participants offered ideas to alleviate the differences between the two proposals, such as the suggesting a trade-off between the US and the DPRK in response to question of US participation in delivering fuel aid to North Korea after specific conditions are met.¹³⁰ The idea proposed that the US would provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK in the first stage, and in return the DPRK would fully expose its suspected uranium enrichment program.¹³¹ The report, however, provides no record to how participants further discussed how the ideas could become part of a future solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. At the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security, participants clarified the differences that remained from the third round of the Six Party Talks, instead of aiming to resolve them.

¹²⁸ "A Case of Track II Diplomacy," 453; Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asian Security."

¹²⁹ Zagoria, "Conference on Northeast Asian Security."

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

While the NCAFP was unable to implement its modality for the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security to achieve the objective of changing participants' perspectives of each other and the North Korean nuclear issue, the NCAFP was able to partially implement the procedures at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The participating US government officials were able to have direct talks with the participating North Korean government officials. The NCAFP was, therefore, able to achieve the first step of its modality, allowing the NCAFP to implement the remaining procedures. The participating US government officials made the distinction between American rhetoric about regime change and actual US policy intent. The discussions between the North Korean and US government officials at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security allowed the North Korean officials to change their perspective concerning the Bush administration's policy intent.¹³² The NCAFP report states that a North Korean participant said that he was "relieved" to hear some of the American presentations.¹³³ This indicates that the North Korean participant was reassured by these presentations, and thereby less anxious that the Bush administration's official policy towards the DPRK was regime change. From these discussions, the North Korean participants were able to obtain some official assurance that the Bush administration did not seek regime change, which consequently changed their perspective concerning the Bush administration's policy objectives towards the DPRK.¹³⁴

The NCAFP report on the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security highlights that the participants had a session on how they would break the impasse, indicating that participants entered into a process of problem-solving.¹³⁵ Participants discussed possible

¹³² "A Case of Track II Diplomacy," 451; "Multilateral Dialogue to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue."

¹³³ "Multilateral Dialogue to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue."

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

ways to break the diplomatic impasse.¹³⁶ An American participant stated that “a good way to break the impasse would be to reconvene the six-party talks.”¹³⁷ The first steps of this participant’s solution for breaking the diplomatic impasse was for the parties to set an early date for the resumption of talks.¹³⁸ The United States and DPRK government officials implemented this participants’ recommended solution, as DeTrani and Ri discussed ways to resume the Six Party Talks. In a private discussion between DeTrani and Ri at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Conference, Ri told DeTrani that if the US side were to meet the head of the North Korean delegation to the Six Party Talks, Kim Gye-Gwan, then the DPRK would be willing to return to the Six Party Talks.¹³⁹

This section, however, cannot confidently conclude that it was the NCAFP’s modality that led the US participants to enter into a process of problem-solving with the DPRK. Rather, it proposes that the US participants entered into this process because the Bush administration wanted the participating US government officials to enter into a process of problem-solving with the DPRK.¹⁴⁰ The Bush administration wanted to resolve the issue of the suspended Six Party Talks and find a way to break the diplomatic impasse.¹⁴¹ The cause for participating US government officials to enter into a process of problem-solving with the DPRK was, therefore, because this process, and the development of solutions that would emerge from this process, was within the expectations of United States decision makers. The United States delegation was consequently implementing the policy objectives of the Bush administration at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The development of solutions which

¹³⁶ “Multilateral Dialogue to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue.”

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Christopher R. Hill, *Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 210.

¹⁴⁰ Paul Kerr, “Allies Seek to Restart North Korea Talks,” *Arms Control Association*, June 1, 2005, accessed on July 14, 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/NorthKoreaTalks.

¹⁴¹ Kerr, “Allies Seek to Restart North Korea Talks.”

would break the diplomatic impasse did not emerge from the discussions moderated by the NCAFP, but was rather the Bush administration's efforts to re-start the Six Party Talks.

Transfer of results from NCAFP Track II meeting back into official policy process

In this section, I argue that the NCAFP did not achieve its objective of a successful transfer of the information and ideas, the changed perceptions and attitudes, and the resolutions generated by its Track II meetings back into the official policy process at either the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security or the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. Since this chapter assumes that the NCAFP aimed to have more collaboration and engagement than just information sharing between its Track II meetings and the official Track I diplomatic process, this chapter's understanding of a successful transfer is one where the official Track I diplomatic process has been shaped by the participants' efforts to communicate to the Bush administration about the products that had been generated by the Track II meetings. I argue that a successful transfer did not occur, as the participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings had a contradictory effect, which made this transfer process implausible. The NCAFP thereby was unable achieve this objective.

To enhance the possibility that the products generated by the NCAFP Track II meetings would be transferred back into the official policy process, the NCAFP invited individuals who had influence within the US government and access to the US political leadership. The NCAFP assumed that the participants' efforts to communicate with the leadership would allow for a successful transfer of information into the policy process. As demonstrated in an earlier section, the NCAFP had invited individuals that matched the criteria of an ideal participant, as understood by Kelman and Cohen.¹⁴² The Second

¹⁴² Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 84.

Conference on Northeast Asian Security and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security, however, demonstrate that the participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings had a contradictory effect, which made it difficult for them to transfer the products generated by the Track II meetings back into the official political process.

The contradictory effect of the individuals that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings was that the NCAFP wanted United States government officials to attend its meetings, but the US government officials were unable to take part of the processes of the NCAFP Track II meetings, such as the changing of their perspectives and attitudes, due to the constraints of the United States government's official position and expectations of United States decision-makers. The NCAFP wanted United States government officials to attend its meetings, since the NCAFP designed its Track II meetings in consideration of the United States delegation to the Six Party Talks. Moreover, these government officials had the capability to transfer the results generated by the Track II meetings back into the policy process. At the Second and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security, the US government officials, however, were not necessarily participating in the discussions, but rather implementing the Bush administration's policy. The United States government officials did not go beyond what the United States decision-makers were prepared to accommodate. Although the United States government officials were invited as private individuals, they were still constrained by the United States government's official position and the American decision-makers' expectations. The individuals whose perceptions and attitudes that the NCAFP hoped to make a difference were, therefore, too close to the leadership.

Kelman and Cohen argue that participants who are too close to the leadership are "less free to take an analytical role, less open to new information and insights, and less

available for change in their perceptions and attitudes.”¹⁴³ According to Kelman and Cohen’s explanation, the US government officials were unable to become an actual participant of the NCAFP Track II meetings. Since the US government officials were hindered from taking part in the processes that would result changed perceptions and attitudes, and formulation of problems and solutions, there were no products to be transferred back into the official policy process.

This chapter argued that Kissinger was also an ideal participant of the problem-solving workshop, as understood by Kelman and Cohen. Since Kissinger was a former US government official, he was not constrained by the US government’s official policy or the expectations of decision-makers. Moreover, he had access to President Bush. This section is, however, unable to conclude that Kissinger’s efforts to communicate with President Bush led to a change in the Bush administration’s policy on the DPRK. The literature that seeks to explain why the Bush administration changed its policy refers to: the evolving security situation of the Korean Peninsula; the effect of American domestic politics on foreign policy as the Democratic Party, who favoured a more accommodative approach towards the DPRK, gained control of Congress; and the changes in personnel during the Bush administration’s second term.¹⁴⁴ The literature, therefore, proposes that the change in policy was made due to the changes that were being made at the level of the state. There is no reference to how the Track II meetings of the NCAFP was able to influence the Bush administration concerning United States policy towards the DPRK. This, however, indicates that there is a need for further research concerning the question of coordination and cooperation between the Track

¹⁴³ Kelman and Cohen, “The Problem-Solving Workshop,” 84.

¹⁴⁴ Bonnie S. Glaser and Wang Liang, “North Korea: The Beginning of a China-US Partnership,” *Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (2008): 165-80; Wade L. Huntley, “US Policy toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliath’s Fate,” *Asian Survey* 47, no. 3 (2007): 455-480; Sang-young Rhyu and Jong-Yun Bae, “The Politics of Economic Sanctions against North Korea: The Bush Administration’s Strategy towards a Multilateral Governance,” *Pacific Focus* 25, no. 1 (2010): 112-135; Robert Sutter, “The Democratic-Led 110th Congress: Implications for Asia,” *Asia Policy* 3 (2007): 125-150.

I and Track II level, as the question remains on whether Kissinger was able to influence President Bush's position on the North Korean nuclear issue.

The US government officials were unable to transfer the products of the NCAFP Track II meetings back into the official policy process, as they were unable to experience the processes which would generate the products of the NCAFP Track II meetings. The products of the workshop were, therefore, unable to be generated, and there was consequently nothing to transfer back into the official policy process. Although participants formulated a solution that would resume the Six Party Talks and break the diplomatic impasse at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security, this solution did not shape the Bush administration's policy towards the DPRK, as the Bush administration was already prepared and eager to see the resumption of the Six Party Talks. The NCAFP did not achieve its objective of transferring the information and ideas, the changed perceptions and attitudes, and the resolutions generated by its Track II meetings back into the official policy because the participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings had a contradictory effect, which made this transfer process implausible.

Although the NCAFP Track II meetings did not generate change perceptions and attitudes within participating US government officials, and thereby formulation of solutions, the NCAFP Track II meetings still had a tangible achievement. The NCAFP had successfully opened a channel of communication between the US and the DPRK which ultimately played a decisive role in the resumption of the Six Party Talks. Critiques of Track II diplomacy, therefore, cannot conclude that the NCAFP Track II meetings were ineffective.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ John Power, "Millions spent, but what has Track II with N.Korea achieved?" *NKNews*, October 29, 2015, accessed July 13, 2017, <https://www.nknews.org/2015/10/millions-spent-but-what-has-track-ii-with-n-korea-achieved/>.

Conclusion

In Chapter 5, I argued that the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), a non-profit policy organization, pursued and initiated a series of Track II meetings from 2003 to 2005 to compensate for the US delegation to the Six Party Talks' inability to clearly communicate US policy objectives to the DPRK. In the first section, I outlined the data of this chapter to introduce the supplementary data that pertains specifically to this chapter. In the second section, I analysed Herbert C. Kelan and Stephen P. Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop, which they establish in "The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International Conflicts."¹⁴⁶ I used their model to help explain the NCAFP's Track II diplomatic approach. In the third section, I demonstrated the significance of the NCAFP as a nongovernmental organization that practices Track II diplomacy. In the fourth section, I established the assumptions that inform the NCAFP's Track II approach, the purpose of the NCAFP's Track II meetings concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis, the objectives, the methodology, and the participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings. In the last section, I established that the NCAFP was able to partially achieve its objectives but had difficulties in meeting all of them.

¹⁴⁶ Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 79-90.

Introduction

In this chapter, I explain that the visits by Stanford University academics to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in the DPRK between January 2004 and November 2010, and the activities of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability DPRK Energy Experts Working Group between June 2006 and September 2010, can be understood as science diplomacy as explained by Fähnrich, Weiss, and Flink and Schreiterer.¹ The literature on science diplomacy is helpful in explaining the aims of the Stanford University academics' visits to Yongbyon and the Nautilus Institute's DPRK Energy Experts Working Group meetings. It does not, however, help in the development of my thesis, which investigates science diplomacy as a distinct strand of the Track II diplomacy that, effectively, compensated for the failings in official, or Track I, US diplomacy to the DPRK.

I argue that the Stanford University academics' visits to Yongbyon and the activities of the Nautilus Institute's DPRK Energy Experts Working Group can be understood as a distinct and discrete strand of United States Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK. In lieu of the unsuccessful efforts by the Bush administration to obtain information about the DPRK's nuclear program, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, these activities can be explained by diplomatic theories, also introduced in previous chapters, especially the work of Bull, Langhorne, Fisher, and Kelman and Cohen.² I argue that the scientific activities can be

¹ Birte Fähnrich, "Science diplomacy: Investigating the perspective of scholars on politics-science collaboration in international affairs," *Public Understanding of Science*, 26, no. 6 (2017): 688-703; Tom Flink and Ulrich Schreiterer, "Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs: toward a typology of national approaches," *Science and Public Policy* 37, no. 9 (2010): 665-677; Charles Weiss, "Science, technology and international relations," *Technology in Society* 27 (2005): 295-313.

² Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1977); Ronald J. Fisher, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful Negotiation," *International Journal* 44, no. 2 (1989): 442-474; Herbert C. Kelman and Stephen P.

understood as fulfilling the Track I diplomatic function of gathering information about another state. By gathering information and transferring their findings back into the United States Track I policymaking processes, the Stanford University academics and the Nautilus Institute compensated for the Bush administration Track I diplomatic limitations.

In the first section, I introduce the primary data, which includes data from interviews and policy reports, that pertains specifically to this chapter. In the second section, I critique the scholarly and policy literature on science diplomacy. I then draw on diplomatic theories introduced in previous chapters to establish a theoretical framework for discussion in the following section of the significant science diplomacy conducted by Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute in the DPRK. The final section connects the theoretical framework with the empirical material to conclude the chapter.

Data

There is no scholarly literature that analyzes the Stanford University academics' visits to Yongbyon, as well as the activities of the Nautilus Institute's DPRK Energy Experts Working Group project within the context of US foreign policy towards the DPRK. There is consequently a lack of secondary literature that is available for analysis, which is why this chapter relies mainly upon primary data. This chapter makes use of primary data from interviews with Dr. Siegfried Hecker of Stanford University, and policy analyst Robert Carlin, who were members of the delegation that visited the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Scientific Center.³ I was unable to interview Professor John W. Lewis, who led and organized

Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International Conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 13, no. 2 (1976): 79-90; Richard Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 2 (2005): 331-339; Michael Lisowski, "How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 2 (2005): 361-383.

³ Robert Carlin, interview with author, November 10, 2016; Siegfried Hecker, interview with author, December 9, 2016

the visits to Yongbyon. He did not respond to the e-mail request for an interview.⁴ This dissertation however makes use of Professor Lewis' oral interview for Stanford University's Oral History Collections, where he briefly discusses some of his earlier Track II diplomatic work with the DPRK.⁵ I had e-mail correspondence with Dr. Peter Hayes, Director and co-founder of the Nautilus Institute, when he gave permission to quote or cite his co-authored report, "Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances, Engagement Options, and Future Paths for Energy and Economic Redevelopment."⁶ Hayes, however, did not respond to the e-mail request for an interview. Although interviews raise some methodological and theoretical concerns, interviews with participants of these endeavours are important as there is a lack of information concerning the details and logistics of these events. Interviews are, therefore, essential as they help fill the gaps that appeared after the primary literary was reviewed and analysed.

The chapter also makes use of primary data from the reports and articles written by Dr. Hecker concerning his visits to Yongbyon.⁷ The reports about Yongbyon that were sent to the US government were written by Dr. Hecker, making them a valuable source of information.⁸ The chapter then evaluates primary data from the reports about the DPRK

⁴ Professor John W. Lewis passed away in September 2017.

⁵ John W. Lewis, Stanford Historical Society Oral History Program Interviews (SC0932), *Department of Special Collections & University Archives, Stanford University Libraries*, Stanford, California, May 12, 2015, accessed September 26, 2017, <https://exhibits.stanford.edu/oral-history/catalog/zn669ty7580>.

⁶ Peter Hayes, e-mail message to author, October 12, 2016.

⁷ Chaim Braum, Siegfried Hecker, Chris Lawrence, and Panos Papadiamantis, "North Korean Nuclear Facilities After the Agreed Framework," *Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies*, May 27, 2016, accessed on November 6, 2017,

http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/khucisacfinalreport_compressed.pdf; Siegfried S. Hecker, "Adventures in scientific nuclear diplomacy," *Physics Today* (July 2011): 31- 37; Siegfried S. Hecker, "Extraordinary Visits: Lessons Learned from Engaging with North Korea," *Nonproliferation Review* 18, no. 2 (July 2011): 445-455; Siegfried S. Hecker, "Report of Visit to the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK)," *The National Committee on North Korea*, March 14, 2008, accessed on November 6, 2017, <https://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/HeckerDPRKreport.pdf>; Siegfried S. Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on 'Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea'," *Federation of American Scientists*, January 21, 2004, accessed on November 6, 2017, https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf.

⁸ Hecker, 2016.

Energy Experts Working Group project available on the Nautilus Institute website, as well as the report released by the Nautilus Institute about the DPRK energy needs, “Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances, Engagement Options, and Future Paths for Energy and Economic Redevelopment.”⁹ These reports establish the purpose of the project and the information that the Nautilus Institute obtained from the meetings of the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group.

Scholar and policy literature on science diplomacy

The scholarship on science diplomacy focuses on two areas; the first is on whether science and technology have an impact on international affairs and the second is on establishing the political objectives, strategies, and instruments of specific participants of science diplomacy, as demonstrated respectively by Weiss, and Flink and Schreiterer.¹⁰ The policy literature on science diplomacy focuses on establishing the roles of science diplomacy, and how these roles can be put into practice by the scientific and political community on specific issues, such as climate change or nuclear disarmament.¹¹ The conventional literature identifies the key actors in science diplomacy as scientists, academics, and the state; the

⁹ “DPRK Energy Experts Working Group (2006-2010), *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, accessed on October 11, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/>; David von Hippel and Peter Hayes, *Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances, Engagement Options, and Future Paths for Energy and Economic Redevelopment*, Berkeley: The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 2012, accessed on October 11, 2017, http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/1990-2009-DPRK-ENERGY-BALANCES-ENGAGEMENT-OPTIONS-UPDATED-2012_changes_accepted_dvh_typos_fixed.pdf.

¹⁰ Elizabeth L. Chalecki, “Knowledge in Sheep’s Clothing: How Science Informs American Diplomacy,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 19, no. 1 (2008): 1-19; Flink and Schreiterer, “Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs,” 665-677; Josephine Anne Stein, “Globalisation, science, technology and policy,” *Science and Public Policy* 29, no. 6 (2002): 402-408; Weiss, “Science, technology and international relations,” 295-313.

¹¹ Micah D. Lowenthal, “Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security,” *USIP*, October 2011, accessed October 17, 2017, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/09/science-diplomacy-nuclear-security>; “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” v-vi; “Scientific cooperation to support nuclear arms control and disarmament,” London: The Royal Society, March 2010, accessed September 6, 2017, https://royalsociety.org/~media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2010/4294970232.pdf.

purpose of science diplomacy as the usage of science as an instrument of foreign policy; and the aims of science diplomacy as providing the official policymaking process with scientific advice, building cooperation among states based upon science, and using science cooperation to improve international relations between states.¹²

Scholarly literature on science diplomacy

The concepts of science diplomacy, within the field of political science, have been analysed with a specific focus on researching the impact that science and technology have on the conduct of international relations.¹³ According to Weiss and Fähnrich, Eugene Skolnikoff's *The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics* is one of the few studies that provides a comprehensive contribution on this subject.¹⁴ Skolnikoff considers the overall impact that science and technology have on traditional concepts of International Relations, such as state sovereignty, competition and dependency, and military force.¹⁵ His conclusion is that the impact of science and technology upon international affairs has been substantial but incremental, posing only limited challenges to the fundamentals of state governance. Skolnikoff argues that "it is more likely that the fundamentals of the present system of nation-states will prove to be more, rather than less, necessary to manage the increasingly difficult future international environment that technology will help create."¹⁶ According to Skolnikoff, science and technology, therefore,

¹² "New frontiers in science diplomacy: Navigating the changing power of balance," *The Royal Society*, January 2010, accessed November 2, 2017,

https://royalsociety.org/~media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2010/4294969468.pdf

¹³ Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "The political role of scientific cooperation," *Technology in Society* 23 (2001): 461-471; Charles Weiss, "Science, technology and international relations," *Technology in Society* 27 (2005): 295.

¹⁴ Eugene Skolnikoff, *The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Fähnrich, "Science diplomacy: Investigating the perspective of scholars on politics-science collaboration in international affairs," 690; Weiss, "Science, technology and international relations," 296

¹⁵ Skolnikoff, *The Elusive Transformation*, 224.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

do not have the capability to alter the underlying concepts of international affairs. Skolnikoff's work, however, does not take into consideration the usage of the Internet and the World Wide Web, as these were not as widely used and accessible during the time of this book's publication, compared to their usage in the 21st century. His work is, therefore, in need of a revision as science and technology have advanced since 1993. Although Skolnikoff provides one of the few comprehensive studies concerning the impact of science and technology on international affairs, his work does not provide a framework that would explain the scientific activities pursued by Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute. Skolnikoff's work aims to explain whether science and technology will produce some revolutionary change to the traditional order of sovereign states, rather than explaining why the state or scientific community uses science as a tool of diplomacy.

Drawing upon the work of Skolnikoff, Charles Weiss' "Science, technology and international relations," seeks to "go beyond" Skolnikoff's conclusion, and analyzes "the many and diverse impacts of science and technology, and the mechanisms by which science and technology influence and are influenced by international relations."¹⁷ Weiss, therefore, does not agree with Skolnikoff's conclusion that science and technology constitute only limited challenges to the conduct of international relations. Instead, Weiss argues that science and technology impacts international relations in various ways, as his article aims to create an alternative comprehensive framework in the form of an empirical classification or typology that establishes the different types of impact that science and technology have on international relations. He does so that students and practitioners of International Relations can easily recognize typical patterns of science, technology, and international affairs, and thereby better understand and anticipate the implications that science and technology have

¹⁷ Weiss, "Science, technology and international relations," 296.

on international relations, and the implications that developments in politics, economics, and culture have on science and technology.¹⁸ Weiss argues that science and technology can impact international affairs through one of four main mechanisms: changing the architecture of the international system such as its structure, its key organizing concepts, and the relations among its actors; changing the processes by which the international system operates, including diplomacy, war, administration, policy formation, commerce, trade, finance, communications, and the gathering of intelligence; creating new issue areas, new constraints and trade-offs in the operational environment of foreign policy; and providing a source of changed perceptions, of information and transparency for the operation of the international system, and of new concepts and ideas for International Relations theory.

Weiss, however, demonstrates his argument by listing scientific cases that he argues prove the mechanisms of his framework, leaving his work largely unsubstantiated. He does not provide an adequate analysis of how the numerous cases in which he lists are consistent with the comprehensive framework that he has placed upon them. A mechanism of Weiss' framework is that science and technology impacts international relations by creating new issue areas, new constraints and trade-offs, and issues in which domestic and international issues penetrate each other, and by changing the scope and domain of different paradigms of International Relations theory. To demonstrate the impact, Weiss lists the results of scientific endeavours, as he states that many scientific issues "have given rise to new treaties," and that "advances in technology have led to new international organizations."¹⁹ He, however, does not provide a narrative that sufficiently demonstrates the process of how a scientific issue gave rise to a treaty or how advances in technology have led to new international organizations. Nor does he address the states' response to these scientific issues. By not doing

¹⁸ Weiss, "Science, technology and international relations," 296.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 300.

so, Weiss implies that science and technology has had more of an impact on international relations than it actually did. Weiss' work does not provide an appropriate framework for explaining the science diplomacy conducted by Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute, since Weiss concentrates on establishing the ways that science and technology impact international relations, rather than explaining why the scientific community conducted science diplomacy.

Chalecki argues that the scientific community as a whole is capable of helping refine state interests by bringing fact-based knowledge to public policy formation.²⁰ Chalecki, therefore, seeks to demonstrate that the scientific community can and has changed the minds of politicians and diplomats. Chalecki analyzes three historical cases in which she argues the scientific community made a significant contribution to the political outcome. They are the German-American Pork War of 1880-1881, the International Geophysical Year of 1956-1957, and the Montreal Protocol of 1987. Chalecki describes the scientific issue and its effect on international affairs, and the scientific community's response to the issue. Chalecki, however, does not substantiate her argument. In her reconstruction of the German-American Pork War of 1880-1881, she states that the "American science community, bolstered by their 'emerging scientific internationalism,' began pushing foreign policy from behind, and in 1890, Congress passed two laws requiring that pork be microscopically inspected for trichinae."²¹ Chalecki does not provide a clear logical narrative that demonstrates that it was the pushing from the scientific community that led Congress to pass the two laws, as she does not adequately demonstrate that it was the scientific community who influenced the decisions of policymakers and diplomats.

²⁰ Chalecki, "Knowledge in Sheep's Clothing," 2.

²¹ Ibid., 5.

The German-American Pork War of 1880-1881 was a trade dispute between the United States and Germany over the quality of American exported pork.

Chalecki, moreover, does not address the political community's response to the scientific community's recommendations concerning the conflict. Similar to Weiss' "Science, technology and international relations," she does not address the political context in which the scientific community operated within. Addressing the political context would better demonstrate whether it was the scientific community that influenced the political outcome. Chalecki does not provide a framework that can explain the science diplomacy pursued by Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute, as her work does not demonstrate the transfer process of information from the scientific community to the political community. Since an important feature of Track II diplomacy is the transfer process, it is critical that the theoretical framework that explains the science diplomacy pursued by Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute takes into account how scientific knowledge is transferred into the policymaking process.

Skolnikoff addresses the political context in which scientists were working within. Skolnikoff extends his conclusion that he establishes in his book, *The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics*, concerning the capability of science and technology to transform the traditional order of sovereign states, as he argues that the role of science and scientists in influencing foreign policy issues has decreased since the end of the Cold War.²² Skolnikoff analyzes case studies that Keynan and de Cerreño reviewed, which includes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Pugwash, and the International Institute of Science and Technology.²³ Skolnikoff argues that they present case studies that argue that scientists have used science for political ends.²⁴ Skolnikoff aims to provide an additional perspective to the question of whether science

²² Skolnikoff, "The political role of scientific cooperation," 461.

²³ Alexander Keynan and Allison L.C. de Cerreño, ed., *Scientific cooperation, state conflict: the role of scientists in mitigating international discord* (New York City: New York Academy of Sciences, 1999).

²⁴ Skolnikoff, "The political role of scientific cooperation," 461.

influences foreign policy, as he argues that the scientists were able to advance political comity among states not because science is neutral and universal, but because the scientists' objectives were parallel to that of the government. In his analysis of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Skolnikoff demonstrates that this agreement was reached, not because of the efforts of the scientific community, but because of the strong political interests of the governments in reaching agreement. Skolnikoff, therefore, indicates that the state is also a main actor concerning science cooperation, as he examines not only the scientific context but also the political context of these cases.

Flink and Schreiterer aim to contribute to the understanding about the different objectives or the strategies, administrative procedures, and resources deployed of science diplomacy.²⁵ Flink and Schreiterer conduct a comparative study of six countries' science diplomacy. They examine the respective science diplomatic objectives, priorities, programs, and resources of France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.²⁶ They find that the field of science diplomacy is generally increasing with importance in the practice of foreign policy, but that there are varying strategies and organizational structures concerning the motives, objectives, instruments, and intensity of the government science initiatives.²⁷ They also find that the different strategies and objectives in science diplomacy result from differences in the state's knowledge capacity and political cultures.²⁸

Since this chapter analyzes US science diplomacy, this section focuses on Flink and Schreiterer's analysis of the United States. The main point of Flink and Schreiterer's analysis of the science diplomacy being conducted by the United States is that US science diplomacy

²⁵ Flink and Schreiterer, "Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs," 665.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 667.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 675.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 667.

is characterized by a lack of cooperation between government departments that conduct science diplomacy. The authors conclude that US science diplomacy is highly fragmented, and thereby has neither the administrative responsibilities nor the human resources necessary to design or carry out collaborative programs or other research-related activities.²⁹ Their conclusion goes against Huddle and Stein, who both argue for a more positive analysis of US science diplomacy, which perceive the United States as the world's largest and sole remaining national system of innovation amongst the highly developed countries in the early twenty-first century, and one of the pioneering nations in systematically applying science and technology in its foreign policy.³⁰ Flink and Schreiterer do not provide any analysis to why the United States' pursuit of science diplomacy is uncooperative, making it difficult to determine whether US' practice of science diplomacy is constructive or not.

Flink and Schreiterer's work is highly empirical. This, however, may be intentional, as the authors state that science and technology does not fit well into the common theoretical frameworks of International Relations.³¹ Flink and Schreiterer believe that the use of science within the domain of diplomacy cannot be explained by existing theories of International Relations. Flink and Schreiterer, however, do not substantiate their claim about science and International Relations theories, making it more of an opinion than a concrete argument. Flink and Schreiterer's claim can be contrasted with Hans Morgenthau's work on the factors that make for the power of a state, which he establishes in *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.³²

²⁹ Flink and Schreiterer, "Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs," 674.

³⁰ Franklin P. Huddle, "Science, Technology, US Diplomacy: History and 1978 Legislation," *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 17 (1980): 353-363; Stein, "Globalisation, science, technology and policy," 403.

³¹ Flink and Schreiterer, "Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs," 668.

³² Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948).

Morgenthau argues that the industrial capacity of a state, which he argues is an element of a state's power in international affairs, depends upon "the quality and productive capacity of the industrial plant, the know-how of the working man, the skill of the engineer, the inventive genius of the scientist, the managerial organization."³³ Morgenthau's section on industrial capacity demonstrates that his theory of International Relations takes into some consideration the relationship between science and international relations. According to Morgenthau, the relationship between science and international relations is that states perceive science as making up a part of an important factor for the power of a nation. Morgenthau's work demonstrates that Flink and Schreiterer's statement that science and technology do not fit well into the common theoretical frameworks of International Relations needs further reviewing. Flink and Schreiterer's article cannot be used as an appropriate framework to explain the science diplomacy pursued by Stanford University and Nautilus Institute. The main unit of analysis of Flink and Schreiterer's article is the state, while Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute are both non-state actors. The framework offered by Flink and Schreiterer's article is, therefore, not compatible because the features of the state are not the same as those of a non-state actor.

Fährnich seeks to explain why scholars participate in science diplomacy. In order to enhance the political community's understanding of scholars' experiences and perceptions of science diplomacy, Fährnich interviewed thirty academics who were funded to participate in the German government initiative "Promote Innovation and Research in Germany," and conducted a secondary analysis of the interview data.³⁴ The result of Fährnich's analysis is that "scholars had different views on the science diplomatic program."³⁵ He elaborates that

³³ Flink and Schreiterer, "Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs," 87.

³⁴ Fährnich, "Science diplomacy," 689.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 695.

some scholars argued that political support was necessary to pursue their international projects, while others felt restricted within the political framework.³⁶ With regard to what these scholars perceived as their role within science diplomacy, Fährnich concludes that scholars were divided between those who emphasized their independence and those who believed it was the role of scientists to support political interests.³⁷ Fährnich's analysis of his data, therefore, demonstrates that there is no one answer concerning the question of why scholars participate in science diplomacy. Fährnich's article is, moreover, case specific as he only analyzes participants of one German science diplomatic program. As acknowledged by Fährnich, because he analyzes only a single case, the validity of his results is limited and cannot be generalized in regard to other science diplomatic programs.³⁸ Fährnich's article, therefore, does not provide an adequate framework that can explain the science diplomatic activities conducted by Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute, as his results cannot be securely applied to scholars who participated in an American science diplomatic program.

The incompatibility of applying Fährnich's framework to the scientific activities conducted by Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute is further supported by the literature that argues that scholars who participate in American science diplomatic programs do so in a different political framework than those who participate in a German science diplomatic program. According to Fährnich and J.-J. Salomon, Germany and the United States use science diplomacy for different purposes. Germany mainly uses science diplomatic programs to attract highly skilled people to create a foundation for international networks that would strengthen its economic, diplomatic, and scientific ties abroad.³⁹ In

³⁶ Fährnich, "Science diplomacy," 695.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Fährnich, "Science diplomacy," 690; J.-J. Salomon's "Scientists and international relations: a European perspective," *Technology in Society* 23 (2001): 293.

contrast, the United States uses science diplomacy as a means of bringing opposing sides closer together, to achieve the end of improving political relations.⁴⁰ The main purpose of a German science diplomatic program, therefore, differs from that of an American program, indicating that scholars are participating within different objectives. The perspectives and motives that stems from the participants of a German science diplomatic program may consequently not be applicable to those who participate in an American science diplomatic program.

Policy literature on science diplomacy

In this section, I analyse the nature of science diplomacy with reference to the policy literature from professional associations engaged in the practice of science diplomacy, particularly the Royal Society based in London, UK, and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). I analyse the policy literature on science diplomacy, specifically the report, “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” as this report is useful in understanding the characteristics of the scientific activities in the DPRK that were pursued by the academics of Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute.

The report released by the Royal Society and the AAAS, “New frontiers in diplomacy,” establishes that the roles of science diplomacy are informing foreign policy objectives with scientific advice (science in diplomacy); facilitating international science cooperation (diplomacy for science); and using science cooperation to improve international relations between countries (science for diplomacy).⁴¹ Of the three dimensions, the first dimension of science diplomacy, “science in diplomacy,” is of importance and of use to this chapter, as the aim of both the Stanford University academics’ visits to Yongbyon and the

⁴⁰ Fährnich, “Science diplomacy,” 690.

⁴¹ “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” v-vi.

Nautilus Institute's DPRK Energy Experts Working Group was to inform the Bush administration's foreign policy on the North Korean nuclear issue with science-based advice.⁴² This section, therefore, focuses specifically on the first dimension.

The Royal Society is a fellowship of many of the world's most eminent scientists and is the oldest scientific academy in continuous existence.⁴³ The Royal Society has historically perceived science as an essential element of foreign policy and recognized that advances in science have relied upon the international flows of people and ideas. The Royal Society argues that this is demonstrated by how the post of Foreign Secretary of the Royal Society was instituted in 1723, nearly sixty years before the British government appointed its first Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.⁴⁴ The fundamental purpose of the Royal Society is to recognize, promote, and support excellence in science and to encourage the development and use of science for the benefit of humanity.⁴⁵ The Royal Society, therefore, has an interest in practicing science diplomacy, since the dimension of science diplomacy that understands science and technology of being able to help resolve international conflicts, reflects the latter part of the Royal Society's purpose.

In 2009, the UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for "a new role for science in international policymaking and diplomacy."⁴⁶ As a response to that call, the Royal Society, in partnership with the AAAS, hosted a two-day meeting titled "New frontiers in science diplomacy," where participants discussed the role of science in international affairs and how

⁴² 2006 Meeting," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, June 2006, accessed on October 11, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/>; "2008 Meeting," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, March 2008, accessed on October 11, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2008-meeting/>; "New frontiers in science diplomacy," 5; US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea*, 108th Cong., 1st sess., January 21, 2004, 3.

⁴³ "About the Royal Society," *The Royal Society*, accessed on November 2, 2017, <https://royalsociety.org/about-us/>

⁴⁴ "New frontiers in science diplomacy," v.

⁴⁵ "Mission and priorities," *The Royal Society*, accessed on November 2, 2017, <https://royalsociety.org/about-us/mission-priorities/>.

⁴⁶ "New frontiers in science diplomacy," v.

scientists, diplomats, and other policymakers can make this role work in practice.⁴⁷ The content of the report, “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” is based upon the evidence gathered from this meeting. Attendees of the meeting included government ministers, scientists, diplomats, policymakers, business leaders, and journalists, which indicates that the Royal Society aimed to obtain perspectives from all the participants of science diplomacy in order to provide an extensive as possible understanding of the roles of science diplomacy.⁴⁸ Since 2010, the Royal Society has been hosting various conferences that cover different dimensions of science diplomacy, and the interactions between science and foreign policy.⁴⁹

The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) is a non-profit organization that seeks to “advance science, engineering, and innovation through the world for the benefit of all people.”⁵⁰ To fulfil this mission, the AAAS sets the following broad goals of promoting international cooperation among scientists and in science; defending scientific freedom; encouraging scientific responsibility in public policy; and supporting scientific education and scientific outreach for the betterment of all humanity.⁵¹ The AAAS, which is considered as a reputable and politically powerful scientific society, concomitantly founded a Center for Science Diplomacy (CSD) in the fall of 2008 as the use of science in international affairs is part of the goals of the AAAS.⁵² The purpose of the AAAS Center for Science Diplomacy is to advance “the overarching goal of using science to build bridges between countries and to promote scientific cooperation as an essential element of foreign

⁴⁷ “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” v.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ “Royal Society co-hosts science diplomacy roundtable in Moscow,” *The Royal Society*, accessed on November 2, 2017, <https://royalsociety.org/news/2017/05/royal-society-co-hosts-science-diplomacy-roundtable-in-moscow/>.

⁵⁰ “About AAAS,” *American Association for the Advancement of Science*, accessed on November 2, 2017, <https://www.aaas.org/about/mission-and-history>.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Flink and Schreiterer, “Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs,” 666.

policy by raising the profile of science diplomacy.”⁵³ The Center for Science Diplomacy, therefore, has particular interest in identifying opportunities for science diplomacy to serve as a catalyst between societies where official relationships might be limited, and to strengthen civil society interactions between partnerships in science and technology.⁵⁴ Similar to the Royal Society, the AAAS hosts conferences on the different dimensions of science diplomacy. In their third annual conference, “Science Diplomacy 2017,” on 29 March 2017, the participants discussed a broad variety of topics, such as conservation and national security at the US-Mexico border, the technical and diplomatic aspects of space security, and science diplomacy as a foundation for mitigating disease threats across the globe.⁵⁵

According to “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” released by the Royal Society and the AAAS, the scientific community can contribute to the foreign policymaking process by providing the policymakers with scientific-based advice.⁵⁶ The report argues that this is a role that scientists must play because many of the international challenges that policymakers face have scientific dimensions.⁵⁷ It does not further elaborate upon why scientists must adopt this role, but the report’s emphasis that science will be critical to addressing such challenges indicates that scientists are better equipped to finding a resolution to the issue because they have a better knowledge of the issue than policymakers. Informing policymaking with scientific advice is, therefore, a critical role for scientists to play. Due to their expertise about the scientific aspect of the international issue, scientists can find a resolution to the issue better than policymakers.

⁵³ “Center for Science Diplomacy,” *American Association for the Advancement of Science*, accessed on November 2, 2017, <https://www.aaas.org/program/center-science-diplomacy>.

⁵⁴ “About,” *American Association for the Advancement of Science*, accessed on November 2, 2017, <https://www.aaas.org/program/center-science-diplomacy/about>.

⁵⁵ “Science Diplomacy 2017: Conference Report,” *American Association for the Advancement of Science*, March 2017, accessed on November 2, 2017, https://mcprod.aaas.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/reports/SciDip2017%20Conference%20Report_FINAL.pdf.

⁵⁶ “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” 5.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, v.

Scientists can carry out this role by ensuring that policymakers are provided with high-quality scientific advice and that the policymakers are able to comprehend the given information, so that the policymakers will be able to create more efficient solutions to these challenges.⁵⁸ Scientists should also identify where uncertainties exist, or where the evidence base is inadequate.⁵⁹ To demonstrate how scientists can put this role into practice, the report provides various examples of existing mechanisms that inform policymaking with scientific advice, such as the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC).⁶⁰ The report then discusses ways in which the scientific community can communicate their work to the political community in an accessible and intelligible way. To do so, the report again provides examples of scientific bodies that have established and nurtured links between the scientific and policymaking community.⁶¹ The report is, therefore, more empirical than analytical, as it focuses on demonstrating how scientists can put into practice the first dimension of science diplomacy. This section of “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” however, helps explain the aim of the scientific activities of the academics of Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute, as it establishes how providing the political community with science-based information concerning an issue that policymakers face is a role that scientists should play within the diplomatic domain.

The Royal Society and the AAAS report, “Scientific cooperation to support nuclear arms control and disarmament,” is more detailed and focused than “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” as it aims to demonstrate how the second dimension of science diplomacy, “diplomacy for science,” can be used to support the issue of nuclear arms control and

⁵⁸ “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” 5.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid., 6.

multilateral disarmament process.⁶² The second dimension of science diplomacy seeks to facilitate international cooperation, whether in pursuit of strategic priorities for research or collaboration between individual scientists and researchers.⁶³ The report, “Scientific cooperation to support nuclear arms control and disarmament,” therefore, seeks to demonstrate how one dimension of science diplomacy can be applied to a specific international issue. The report does not explain why science cooperation between states can help the progress of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Rather the report focuses on demonstrating how states can put this dimension into practice as it introduces different procedures of scientific cooperation, such as joint research on the topic of managing the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, or establishing disarmament laboratories.⁶⁴ The report does not demonstrate whether the procedures that it discusses will accomplish the objective placed upon them. While the report’s dominant focus is on the second dimension of science diplomacy, the report dedicates a section that discusses how the scientific community has been and can continue to inform the political community with scientific-based advice. The report’s inclusion of this sector reinforces that informing policy objectives with scientific-based advice is a role for scientists. The report recommends that the scientific community should advise the international community about the technical challenges involved about nuclear arms control and disarmament, and to identify the research and international cooperation necessary to address them.⁶⁵

In October 2011, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) released its’ report, “Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security,” which focuses on demonstrating how science diplomacy can be applied to help resolve the various aspects of nuclear security, such as

⁶² “Scientific cooperation to support nuclear arms control and disarmament,” 1.

⁶³ “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” 9.

⁶⁴ “Scientific cooperation to support nuclear arms control and disarmament,” 1.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear arms reduction, and countering nuclear terrorism.⁶⁶ The United States Institute of Peace is a US nonpartisan institute that works to prevent, reduce, and resolve armed conflict around the world by applying practical solutions directly in conflict zones, and provides analysis, education, and resources to those working for peace.⁶⁷ Alongside the 25th anniversary of the Reykjavik Summit in October 1986, the USIP held a symposium on science and diplomacy with the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control on 19 January 2011.⁶⁸ The National Academy of Sciences is a private, non-profit organization which consist of leading American researchers, and provides objective, science-based advice on critical issues affecting the United States.⁶⁹ In 1980, the National Academy of Sciences formed the Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) in order to connect the resources of the Academy to critical problems of international security and arms control. CISAC advises the US government, contributes to the work of non-governmental organizations, and informs the public about the scientific and technical issues related to international security and arms control.⁷⁰

During the symposium in January 2011, titled “From Reykjavik to New START: Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security in the 21st Century,” the participants examined the roles of transparency and confidence building in 21st century nuclear security in support of

⁶⁶ Micah D. Lowenthal, “Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security,” *United States Institute for Peace*, October 2011, accessed on November 2, 2017, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR_288.pdf.

⁶⁷ “Impact Where America Needs It: A USIP Fact Sheet,” *United States Institute of Peace*, 9 May 2017, accessed on 2 November 2017, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/05/impact-where-america-needs-it>

⁶⁸ “Reykjavik to New Start,” accessed on November 2, 2017, <https://www.usip.org/events/reykjavik-new-start>.

The Reykjavik Summit is the summit meeting between US President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Community Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1986 that eventually resulted in the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the US and the USSR.

⁶⁹ “About Us,” *National Academy of Science*, accessed on November 2, 2017, <http://www.nasonline.org/>.

⁷⁰ “Committee on International Security and Arms Control,” *The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine*, accessed on November 2, 2017, http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/cisac/PGA_048467.

international security.⁷¹ Participants were experts from the United States and Russia, including scientists, diplomats, and high-level government officials, implying that the USIP and CISAC aimed to obtain the perspectives of the different actors of US-Russia science diplomacy.⁷² The symposium addressed: examples from past US-USSR/Russia interactions and how the lessons learned can be applied to current and future challenges; monitoring and verification needs in the future; and the scientists' role in enhancing security communication and confidence between and among states.⁷³ From this symposium emerged the USIP report, "Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security," which summarizes the main ideas that were offered during the symposium.⁷⁴

The USIP "Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security," identifies "essential ingredients for successful science diplomacy on nuclear security" and addresses "promising areas for science diplomacy to contribute to nuclear security in the twenty-first century."⁷⁵ The USIP's understanding of science diplomacy draws from the understanding of science diplomacy that is established in "New frontiers in science diplomacy," as the USIP states that science diplomacy can include "science informing diplomacy and diplomacy supporting science."⁷⁶ The USIP's understanding of science diplomacy, therefore, draws from the roles of science diplomacy that are established in "New frontiers in science diplomacy," particularly the first and second role.

The report identifies seven factors that would further the success of science diplomacy: openness to new possibilities, vision and leadership, good science, human connections, communication, time, and self-interest.⁷⁷ It, however, does not demonstrate

⁷¹ "Reykjavik to New Start."

⁷² Lowenthal, "Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security," 1.

⁷³ "Reykjavik to New Start."

⁷⁴ Lowenthal, "Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security," 1.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

whether these seven factors will actually make science diplomacy more successful. The report then identifies topics that participants of the symposium argued would benefit from or demand science diplomacy: nuclear energy and non-proliferation, nuclear arms reductions, countering nuclear terrorism, cooperation on ballistic missile defence, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.⁷⁸ This report does not discuss how scientists can inform political discussions with science. It rather focuses on discussing the facilitation of international science cooperation, or more specifically, how science cooperation between the United States and Russia can be strengthened in order to help resolve the issue of nuclear security.

This literature is helpful in understanding the aforementioned aspects of science diplomacy, but is not sufficient of itself to help explain the activities of Stanford University academics and the Nautilus Institute in the DPRK.

US science diplomacy: manifestation of Track II diplomacy

In this section, I examine the work of Bull, Langhorne, Lisowski, Fisher, and Kelman and Cohen, to establish a theoretical framework that helps explain why the scientific activities conducted by Stanford University academics and the Nautilus Institute can be understood as a partial compensation for the US government's inability to gather information about the DPRK nuclear situation.

Theoretical Framework: Non-state actors play a role in diplomacy

The first assumption of this theoretical framework is that non-state actors are engaging in activities that have been understood as core diplomatic tasks, such as gathering

⁷⁸ Lowenthal, "Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security," 1.

information, as illustrated by Langhorne and Lisowski.⁷⁹ The second assumption is that a feature of Track II diplomacy is the ability of non-state actors to transfer findings that were produced by Track II diplomatic processes back into the official, or Track I, policymaking process, as argued by Fisher, and Kelman and Cohen.”⁸⁰

According to Bull, one of the normal functions of diplomacy is the gathering of intelligence or information about foreign countries.⁸¹ Bull argues that diplomatists have conventionally played an important role in the gathering of intelligence as states permit other states access to information on a selective basis, particularly military information.⁸² Bull elaborates that while states seek to deny other states access to information about their military capacities, at the same time they seek to impress them with selected military information for the sake of deterrence.⁸³ It is, therefore, the diplomatist’s role to gather as much information as the other state is willing to display to the diplomatist.

Lisowski demonstrates that non-state actors are also engaging in the diplomatic task of information gathering.⁸⁴ Lisowski specifically seeks to explain why nongovernmental organizations are able to impact negotiation outcomes concerning climate change and environmental issues. In so doing, his article demonstrates that non-state actors are taking on the task of gathering and providing information to the political community about international issues. Lisowski states that “accredited NGOs are welcome [by the state] to distribute documents, meet face-to-face with negotiators, and attend most formal and

⁷⁹ Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” 331-339; Lisowski, “How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations,” 361-383.

⁷⁹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 171.

⁸⁰ Fisher, “Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions,” 442-474; Kelman and Cohen, “The Problem-Solving Workshop,” 79-90.

⁸¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1977), 171; Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, “Introduction,” in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, ed. Ole Jacob Sending et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 3.

⁸² Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 171.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ Michael Lisowski, “How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 2 (2005): 361-383.

informal negotiation sessions.”⁸⁵ The state relies, and acts on the information provided the NGOs. Lisowski further demonstrates that non-state actors perform this diplomatic task as he quotes government officials from developing countries and developed countries who describe how environmental NGOs have provided them with information, advice, and valuable insights.⁸⁶ He, thereby, demonstrates the ways in which NGOs are gathering information on the behalf of the state and state officials.

According to Langhorne, non-state actors are engaging in activities that have conventionally been understood as core diplomatic tasks due to an increase in situations that are becoming difficult for traditional international and diplomatic processes to resolve efficiently.⁸⁷ Langhorne argues that the rise of such situations is because of better and advanced technology.⁸⁸ Due to the information gained through technology, the public domain does not behave in ways that are parallel with the system of the states, which thereby leads to the emergence of a wide range of human activities that has no connection or ties to government permission or regulation.⁸⁹ According to Langhorne, much of these human activities are able to weaken governmental authority, diminish its role, and loosen the bonds of loyalty between the population and its government.⁹⁰ He then elaborates that the weakening of state structures leads to state collapse and domestic political violence.⁹¹ Langhorne argues that these types of situations have proven to be very difficult for the traditional international and diplomatic processes to efficiently resolve.⁹² The result is that

⁸⁵ Lisowski, “How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations,” 364.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 371.

⁸⁷ Richard Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 2 (2005): 332.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*

non-state actors adopt higher profile roles as they fill in this gap because they promise levels of efficiency and responsiveness that the state cannot.⁹³

Fisher, and Kelman and Cohen demonstrate that a feature of diplomacy conducted by non-state actors is the capability of the participant to transfer the findings, or results, of the Track II diplomatic process back into the official policymaking process. Kelman and Cohen, and Fisher argue that the participants' ability to do so is dependent upon their relationship with the official political community. The authors argue that the ideal participant of the Track II diplomatic process known as the problem-solving workshop, is someone who is influential within the political sphere, and has potential access to political leaders.⁹⁴ The individual, however, should not be someone who is directly responsible for decision making, because if the individual is too close to the leadership, he becomes constrained by official positions and the expectations of policymakers.⁹⁵ Kelman, Cohen, and Fisher argue that individuals with influence within the political community are the ideal participant of the problem-solving workshop because they increase the probability that the insights and ideas generated by the problem-solving workshops are transferred back into the official political process.⁹⁶ Transferring the results of the problem-solving workshop back into the official policymaking process is one of the main objectives of Kelman and Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop.⁹⁷ The participant, and his capability to transfer the findings, is, therefore, an important feature of Track II diplomacy.

⁹³ Richard Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 2 (2005): 332.

⁹⁴ Fisher, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions," 453; Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 84.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Fisher, "Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions," 453; Kelman and Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop," 83.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

Explaining the activities of Stanford University academics and the Nautilus Institute in the DPRK

Using the assumptions outlined in the theoretical section, I examine the empirical record to demonstrate that the scientific activities of the academics of Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute in the DPRK can be understood as an important strand of United States Track II diplomacy that helped compensate for gaps in United States Track I diplomacy to the DPRK. The academics of Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute transferred their findings back into the official policymaking process. In so doing, the information gathered by the academics of Stanford University and the Nautilus Instituted helped fill in the intelligence gap about the DPRK nuclear situation, thus partially compensating for the limitations of US diplomacy between the Bush administration and the DPRK.

In this section, I analyse the historical context, actors, aims, and activities of the Stanford University academics' visits to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, and the Nautilus Institute's DPRK Energy Experts Working Group. In January 2004, August 2007, February 2008, and November 2010, academics from Stanford University, as well as current and former US government officials, visited the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, where they were given access to see the different facilities of North Korea's nuclear program. I specifically focus upon the January 2004 and February 2008 visit, as these two are important visits. The January 2004 visit was the first visit of the Stanford academics to Yongbyon, and the February 2008 visit was coordinated with the implementation of the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. In June 2006, March 2008, and September 2010, the Nautilus Institute initiated its project concerning the DPRK energy sector, the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group. The Nautilus Institute has been analysing the DPRK energy sector, and working with the North Korean government to help improve the DPRK energy situation

since 1995. To better understand how the Nautilus Institute's DPRK Energy Experts Working Group came about, it is important to address the Nautilus Institute's earlier projects concerning the DPRK energy sector.

Stanford University academics' visits to Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center

The Stanford University academics' visits to Yongbyon was led and organized by Professor John W. Lewis, the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Emeritus, at the time of his passing.⁹⁸ Professor Lewis had been involved in Track II diplomacy with the DPRK since his first visit to North Korea in 1986. During this visit, Professor Lewis told the North Korean officials that he was going to invite them to Stanford University.⁹⁹ In the early 1990s, Professor Lewis kept his word and invited the first North Koreans to come unofficially to the United States.¹⁰⁰ During this meeting at Stanford University, American and South Korean government officials were also present.¹⁰¹ Professor Lewis stated in his interview for the Stanford University Oral History Collections that he was involved in much of the work on negotiating with North Korea that occurred from 1993 to 2000.¹⁰² The timing indicates that the Track II diplomatic meeting that Professor Lewis was hosting at Stanford University was happening within the same time period as the official diplomatic talks that the Clinton administration was holding with the DPRK. It is, however, not clear whether the Track II diplomatic meeting was deliberately coordinated to support the negotiation process between the Clinton administration and the DPRK. Since the 1990s, Professor Lewis continuously

⁹⁸ Hecker, 2016; Clifton B. Parker, "John Lewis, Stanford political scientist and groundbreaking Asian politics expert, dies at 86," *Stanford News Service*, September 7, 2017, accessed September 26, 2017, <http://news.stanford.edu/press-releases/2017/09/07/stanford-politichn-lewis-dies-86/>

⁹⁹ Parker, "John Lewis"; John W. Lewis, Stanford Historical Society Oral History Program Interviews (SC0932).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis, *Negotiating with North Korea: 1992-2007*, Stanford: Stanford CISAC, January 2008); John W. Lewis, Stanford Historical Society Oral History Program Interviews (SC0932).

hosted official North Korean delegations at Stanford University, building and maintaining his relationship with DPRK officials, which at times provided the only channel of communication between the US and the DPRK when the two states were not talking to each other.¹⁰³

Professor Lewis is a pioneer in unofficial meetings with North Korea. There is, however, a severe lack of data concerning Professor Lewis' Track II diplomatic activities with North Korea from the 1990's to the 2000's, demonstrated by how the Hoover Institution Library & Archives at Stanford University holds little to no documents that record his Track II diplomatic activities that were hosted at Stanford University.¹⁰⁴ There is, therefore, a lack of information that explains why Professor Lewis initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy with the DPRK at Stanford University. This chapter assumes that this scarcity of information can be attributed to Professor Lewis' "humility" and the understanding that depending upon the situation and people involved, Track II diplomatic activities are private and confidential.¹⁰⁵

In August 2003, Professor Lewis visited the DPRK before the first round of the Six Party Talks (27-29 August 2003).¹⁰⁶ During this visit, the North Korean officials indicated that they would allow Professor Lewis and his delegation to visit the nuclear facilities at the

¹⁰³ Parker, "John Lewis."

¹⁰⁴ Hoover Institution Library & Archives, email to author, September 29, 2017.

¹⁰⁵ Jennifer Abrahamson, "John Lewis (1930-2017): A North Korea expert like no other," *Ploughshares Fund*, September 28, 2017, accessed on November 19, 2017, <https://www.ploughshares.org/issues-analysis/article/john-lewis-1930-2017>; Jeffrey Mapendere, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks," *Culture of Peace Online Journal* 2, no. 1 (2005): 66-81; John W. McDondl, "Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy," in *Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts* ed. Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J Thorson (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 201-220; Joseph Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," in *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships Vol II* ed. V.D. Volkan, J. Montville & D.A. Julius (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991), 162; James Notter and John McDonald, "Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Strategies for Peace," *USIA Electronic Journals* 1, no. 19 (1996); Parker, "John Lewis."

¹⁰⁶ Siegfried S. Hecker, "Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Facilities in North Korea," For presentation at the *Five-Nation Project on Asian Regional Security and Economic Development Working Group II Meeting, Honolulu, Hawaii, February 7, 2006*, <http://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/977455>.

Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. Professor Lewis then contacted his colleague, Dr. Siegfried Hecker, to accompany him to provide scientific expertise. Dr. Hecker considers his visits to Yongbyon as part of his “adventure in science diplomacy,” which is why this chapter analyzes the Stanford University academics’ visits to Yongbyon predominantly from his perspective.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, the majority of information concerning the Stanford University academic’s visit to Yongbyon stems from his personal accounts.

Dr. Hecker’s immediate reaction to Professor Lewis’ invitation was that neither the DPRK nor the US would allow him to go to Yongbyon.¹⁰⁸ Contrary to his belief, he received permission from both governments. There is no direct account from the North Korean government that explains why it allowed Professor Lewis to bring Dr. Hecker into the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. Dr. Hecker, however, conjectures that he was allowed to go inside Yongbyon because the North Korean government believed that through Dr. Hecker, the DPRK could accurately deliver its message to the US and the international community that it had created a nuclear bomb.¹⁰⁹ According to Dr. Hecker, the visit was approved by the US government due to the interest and support of high-level government officials, and the condition that the visit was in the context of an unofficial and non-governmental visit.¹¹⁰

Dr. Hecker’s first tour of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center began on 8 January 2004. Joining him at the invitation of Professor Lewis was Ambassador Charles L. Pritchard, and two Senate Foreign Relations Committee experts on Asian affairs, Mr. W. Keith Luse and Mr. Frank S. Januzzi.¹¹¹ This American delegation was accompanied by

¹⁰⁷ Hecker, “Adventures in scientific nuclear diplomacy,” 31.

¹⁰⁸ Hecker, 2016.

¹⁰⁹ Hecker, 2016; Hecker, “Extraordinary Visits,” 445.

¹¹⁰ Hecker, 2016.

¹¹¹ Hecker, “Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing,” 1.

Ambassador Li Gun, an official from the General Bureau of Atomic Energy, and a security escort.¹¹² The Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center reports to the General Bureau of Atomic Energy.¹¹³ When they arrived at Yongbyon, they were greeted by Professor Dr. Ri Hong Sop, Director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center.¹¹⁴ Dr. Hecker's second visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center was from 12-16 February 2008. Joining him at the invitation of Professor Lewis was, again, Mr. W. Keith Luse, and Joel S. Wit, former official of the US Department of State.¹¹⁵ The American delegation was hosted by nuclear specialists from the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and officials from the General Bureau of Atomic Energy.¹¹⁶ The tour of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center for both visits consisted of the following facilities: the 5 megawatt electric (MWe) reactor; the spent fuel storage pool building next to the 5 MWe reactor; and the Radiochemical Laboratory, also known as the plutonium reprocessing facility.¹¹⁷

Aims of Dr. Hecker's visits to Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center

Dr. Hecker's aim concerning his visit to Yongbyon in January 2004 was to clarify the ambiguities associated with the DPRK nuclear situation, while his aim concerning his visit to Yongbyon in February 2008 was to help verify that the DPRK was actually

¹¹² Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing," 4.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Chaim Braun, Siegfried Hecker, Chris Lawrence, and Panos Papadiamantis, "North Korean Nuclear Facilities After the Agreed Framework," Working paper, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, May 27, 2016, http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/khucisacfinalreport_compressed.pdf, 8; Siegfried S. Hecker, "Report of Visit to the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK). Pyongyang and the Nuclear Center at Yongbyon Feb. 12-16, 2008," *Center for International Security and Cooperation*, March 14, 2008, accessed on October 10, 2017, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/HeckerDPRKreport.pdf>

¹¹⁶ Hecker, "Report of Visit to the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK)," 1.

¹¹⁷ Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing," 4.

Megawatt electric (MWe) is the electric output of a power plant in megawatt. A 5 MWe reactor is a reactor that outputs 5 million watts of electric power, while the 50 MWe reactor outputs 50 million watts of electric power.

implementing its obligations of the Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement.¹¹⁸ These aims of Dr. Hecker stem from his own understanding of the role of scientists within the diplomatic process on nuclear issues. In his article, “Adventures in scientific nuclear diplomacy,” Dr. Hecker states that in January 1986, during the depths of the Cold War, he became convinced that world leaders needed help solving the problems related to nuclear energy, and that scientists could be that help, hence his work in lab-to-lab cooperation with Russian scientists in the 1990s.¹¹⁹ Scientists, and engineers, therefore, have a critical role to play within the realm of nuclear policy because there is an aspect about the nuclear issue which scientists can address, and therefore find a resolution to, better than policymakers. Dr. Hecker sees three ways, or roles, in which scientists can be of assistance to the diplomatic process on nuclear issues. The first is to bring clarity to the nuclear issue, so as to facilitate a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis.¹²⁰ The second role is, if a diplomatic solution is found, scientists must help to implement any part of the solution such as nuclear freeze or eventual denuclearization.¹²¹ The third role is that scientists must help verify the implementation of any such diplomatic solution.¹²²

Based upon his understanding about the roles that scientists must play within the diplomatic process on nuclear issues, Dr. Hecker sought to find out as much as he possibly could about the status of North Korea’s nuclear program from what the DPRK was willing to show him, so that he could present the US policymaking community with an as close to possible accurate view of the condition of the North Korean nuclear program. Dr. Hecker was concerned about the ambiguities associated with nuclear-weapons related matters.¹²³ As

¹¹⁸ Hecker, “Report of Visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK),” 1, 3; Hecker, “Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing,” 3.

¹¹⁹ Hecker, “Adventures in scientific nuclear diplomacy,” 31.

¹²⁰ Hecker, “Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing,” 3.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Hecker, 2016; Hecker, “Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing,” 3.

stated in his hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 21 January 2004, Dr. Hecker elaborated that ambiguities often lead to miscalculations, and in the case of nuclear weapons-related matter, such miscalculations can be disastrous.¹²⁴ Around the time when the academics of Stanford University first visited Yongbyon in January 2004, certain ambiguities associated with North Korea's nuclear program included the question of whether the DPRK had actually taken the 8000 fuel rods from the spent fuel pool, moved them to the reprocessing facility, and extracted the plutonium.¹²⁵ According to Dr. Hecker, there was great argument within the US scientific community about whether the DPRK had or had not, but no one was certain.¹²⁶ Concerning his visit to Yongbyon in February 2008, Dr. Hecker sought to confirm that the DPRK was meeting its obligations of the Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement.¹²⁷

Modality of Dr. Hecker on gathering information about DPRK nuclear program

Before the invitation from Professor Lewis, Dr. Hecker had not studied North Korea's nuclear program.¹²⁸ To prepare for his visit, and to gain some perspective of what he could expect, Dr. Hecker read as much as he could about the DPRK's nuclear program. He stated in his interview that David Albright's *The North Korean Nuclear Puzzle* gave him the strongest picture of what he might be able to see when he arrived at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center.¹²⁹ He also spoke to his colleagues at the Los Alamos National Lab who were familiar with aspects of the DPRK nuclear program due to their experience

¹²⁴ Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing," 3.

¹²⁵ Hecker, 2016.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ "Six Party Talks—Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement," US Department of State Archive, October 3, 2007, accessed on October 10, 2017, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93217.htm>

¹²⁸ Hecker, 2016.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

on freezing the DPRK's nuclear program during the timeframe of the implementation of the October 1994 Agreed Framework.¹³⁰

When Dr. Hecker arrived at Yongbyon, he approached the DPRK's nuclear program in his capacity as a nuclear scientist, rather than a representative of the Bush administration or an inspector. Due to this attitude, he was able to have "good, frank" discussions with the North Korean nuclear specialists about the scientific aspects of the DPRK nuclear program.¹³¹ Dr. Hecker moreover did not limit himself when it came to making inquiries, and he orally expressed his scepticism over the Yongbyon nuclear specialists' claims concerning their nuclear program, such as the claim that they had produced a plutonium metal product. This led the Yongbyon nuclear specialists to give Dr. Hecker permission to make further inspections of the nuclear facilities, which allowed him to gain more concrete information about the conditions of the DPRK's nuclear program.

During the visit in January 2004, to demonstrate that the 5 MWe reactor, or what the DPRK calls the Experimental Nuclear Power Plant, was working as designed, the US delegation was given a tour of the control room, the observation area for the reactor hall, and the top of the reactor.¹³² Their guide was Li Song Hwan, Chief Engineer of the Nuclear Facility.¹³³ The Yongbyon nuclear specialists then suited the US delegation in protective clothing to show them the spent fuel storage pool. The guide for the US delegation's tour of the spent fuel storage pool building was also Li Song Hwan.¹³⁴ During the tour of this facility, the Yongbyon nuclear specialists stated that they had removed all 8000 fuel rods from the spent fuel storage pool, and had shipped them to the Radiochemical Laboratory to be

¹³⁰ Hecker, 2016

¹³¹ Carlin, 2016; Hecker, 2016.

¹³² Hecker, 2016; Hecker, "Extraordinary Visits," 446; Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing," 4.

¹³³ Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing," 4.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

reprocessed so as to extract the plutonium.¹³⁵ Dr. Hecker's initial look into the spent fuel pool showed him that the locking plates and associated structures that the US Spent Fuel Team had put in place during the 1990s were gone.¹³⁶ After the tour of the spent fuel pool, Ri Hong Sap, Director of the Nuclear Facility, told Dr. Hecker that the US delegation was able to confirm that the fuel rods had been removed and sent to be reprocessed due to the tour.¹³⁷ Dr. Hecker, however, disagreed, and expressed his scepticism about the DPRK's claim that the spent fuel was gone. He pointed out that although a third of the canisters were open, a third of the canisters were still closed, and the remaining third seemed to be missing.¹³⁸ In order to convince Dr. Hecker that the spent fuel was gone, Director Ri allowed Dr. Hecker to pick a closed canister at random, and examine the inside of it.¹³⁹ With the aid of a light, Dr. Hecker was able to verify that the canister was empty and that indeed no fuel rods were remaining.

At the Radiochemical Laboratory, the US delegation viewed the operation of the nuclear radiation containment chambers, commonly referred to within the scientific community as hot cells.¹⁴⁰ Their guide of the Radiochemical Laboratory was Li Yong Song, Chief Engineer of the Radiochemical Laboratory.¹⁴¹ The Yongbyon nuclear specialists demonstrated to the US delegation the requisite facilities, equipment, and technical expertise required for reprocessing plutonium.¹⁴² From these demonstrations, Dr. Hecker was able to confirm that the DPRK possessed an industrial-scale reprocessing facility that appeared in good repair.¹⁴³ During the tour of the Radiochemical Laboratory, Dr. Hecker asked if they

¹³⁵ Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing," 6.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³⁷ Hecker, 2016.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ Hecker, 2016; Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing," 6.

¹⁴⁰ Hecker, 2016; Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing," 4, 8.

¹⁴¹ Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing," 4.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

could visit the Dry Storage Building, which serves as the port of entry for the fuel rods into the Radiochemical Laboratory.¹⁴⁴ Director Ri, however, replied that it was not available for a tour because there was no activity and no workers in the building.¹⁴⁵ Although Dr. Hecker was not able to visit the waste facilities nor see the glove boxes used for the final plutonium production, he was able to see and inspect the plutonium product that the Yongbyon nuclear specialists claimed to be from their most recent processing campaign.¹⁴⁶ Near the end of the tour of Yongbyon, Director Ri told Dr. Hecker that they had shown him their deterrent.¹⁴⁷ Dr. Hecker, however, replied that they had not.¹⁴⁸ After some more discussions, Dr. Ri asked Dr. Hecker if he wanted to see the plutonium, to which Dr. Hecker replied positively.¹⁴⁹ The North Korean nuclear specialists brought him a metal box.¹⁵⁰ Inside the metal box was a white wooden box that held two jars that the North Korean nuclear specialists claimed to be carrying plutonium.¹⁵¹ Dr. Ri allowed Dr. Hecker to closely inspect the jars.¹⁵² Dr. Hecker concluded from his assessment of the plutonium product that what the Yongbyon nuclear specialists gave him looked and felt like plutonium.¹⁵³ He, however, was not able to definitively confirm that what he saw was actually plutonium metal due to the lack of proper instrumentation.¹⁵⁴

During the February 2008 visit, the delegation led by Professor Lewis was shown the 5 MWe reactor, the storage site for the fuel rods fabricated for the 5 MWe and 50 MWe

¹⁴⁴ Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing," 6.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 6, 8.

¹⁴⁷ Hecker, 2016.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Hecker, 2016; Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing, 10.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

reactor, and the Radiochemical Laboratory.¹⁵⁵ On 3 October 2007, the Six Party Talks reached an agreement concerning the disablement of the 5 MWe reactor, the Radiochemical Laboratory, and the fuel fabrication facility at Yongbyon, to be carried out by 31 December 2007.¹⁵⁶ Through his independent assessment of the disablement process, Dr. Hecker was able to verify to the US policymaking community that the DPRK had fulfilled ten of twelve disablement actions that had been made by the Yongbyon nuclear specialists concerning the disablement process, and that the disablement actions that had been fulfilled would effectively delay a potential restart of plutonium production.¹⁵⁷

Liaison between Dr. Hecker and the Bush administration

After each of his visits to Yongbyon, Dr. Hecker prepared a report about what he learned during his visits to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, which he then sent to the US government and the North Korean government.¹⁵⁸ On 21 January 2004, Dr. Hecker had a hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, where he shared his report of his visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea.¹⁵⁹ This hearing, therefore, enabled him to successfully transfer his findings into the official policymaking process. The members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to whom he presented before included then-Senators Richard G. Lugar and Joseph R. Biden.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ Braun, Hecker, Lawrence, and Papadiamantis, “North Korean Nuclear Facilities After the Agreed Framework,” 8; Hecker, “Report of Visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK),” 4, 5.

¹⁵⁶ “Six Party Talks—Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement,” US Department of State Archive, October 3, 2007, accessed on October 10, 2017, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93217.htm>

¹⁵⁷ Hecker, “Report of Visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK),” 1, 3.

¹⁵⁸ Hecker, December 9, 2016.

¹⁵⁹ Hecker, “Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing, 1.

¹⁶⁰ “Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” *The Center for Responsive Politics*, accessed on December 13, 2017, <https://www.opensecrets.org/congress/committees/overview?cmte=SFOR&cmtename=Senate+Foreign+Relations+Committee&cong=108&cycle=2004>

At this hearing, Dr. Hecker was able to verify to the US policymaking community that the DPRK's 5 MWe reactor had been restarted and that it appeared to be operating efficiently, providing heat and electricity while also accumulating approximately six kilograms of plutonium per year in its spent fuel rods.¹⁶¹ He was also able to inform the policymaking community that the canisters in the spent fuel pool were empty, and that the approximated 8000 fuel rods had been removed, due to his personal confirmation.¹⁶² Dr. Hecker stated in his hearing that he was not able to definitively substantiate the DPRK claim that it had reprocessed all 8000 fuel rods during one continuous campaign from mid-January 2003 to end of June 2003, nor was he able to validate the claim that the 8000 fuel rods were estimated to contain up to 25 to 30 kilograms of plutonium metal.¹⁶³ He was, however, able to conclude, through the demonstrations of the Radiochemical Laboratory staff concerning its facility, equipment, and technical expertise, that the DPRK appeared to have the capacity to do what they claimed to have done with the 8000 fuel rods.¹⁶⁴ Dr. Hecker also reported to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the product inside the jar was plutonium, along with his assessment that if the DPRK could make plutonium of that shape, then the US must assume it can create a rudimentary bomb.¹⁶⁵ Upon his return to the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Dr. Hecker and his technical colleagues simulated in one of the laboratories, the conditions in the Yongbyon conference room, where he had held the jars.¹⁶⁶ This setting allowed Dr. Hecker to conclude that what he had held was indeed plutonium metal.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶¹ Hecker, "Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing," 10.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Hecker, "Extraordinary Visits," 447.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

Although it was not in the format of an official Senate Committee hearing, Dr. Hecker continued to transfer to the US government his findings and observations that he gathered from his other visits to the DPRK.¹⁶⁸ He stated in his interview that he had worked and talked very closely with officials of the Bush administration.¹⁶⁹ Dr. Hecker, therefore, had access to a channel in which he was able to transfer his findings back into the US policymaking process. In his report concerning his February 2008 visit, Dr. Hecker was able to inform the US policymaking community that the DPRK was meeting its obligations. He, however, also emphasized in his report that the DPRK leadership had made the decision to permanently shut down plutonium production if the United States and the other four participating states of the Six Party Talks meet their respective October 3, 2007 obligations.¹⁷⁰ He did so, as he argues that this was the message that the North Korean government wanted to deliver to the Bush administration.¹⁷¹ Dr. Hecker acknowledges that he was used by the North Korean government as a means of facilitating communication from the DPRK to the Bush administration.¹⁷² Dr. Hecker, therefore, included his discussions with the North Korean government officials within his report to deliver the messages that the North Korean government wanted him to send on its behalf to the US policymaking community.

Dr. Hecker's work concerning the DPRK continued after the last round of the Six Party Talks, and he continues to write about this issue a decade later in 2018. Dr. Hecker made another visit to Yongbyon in November 2010, where he was able to confirm that the DPRK was creating a uranium enrichment facility.¹⁷³ This visit was his last, as the North

¹⁶⁸ Hecker, 2016.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Hecker, "Report of Visit to the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK)," 1, 10.

¹⁷¹ Hecker, "Extraordinary Visits," 449.

¹⁷² Hecker, 2016.

¹⁷³ Siegfried S. Hecker, "A Return Trip to North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex," *Center for International Security and Cooperation*, November 20, 2010, accessed July 25, 2018, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/north_koreas_yongbyon_nuclear_complex_a_report_by_siegfried_s_hecker

Korean government did not offer another initiation. Dr. Hecker, however, continues to publish his analysis concerning the denuclearization of the DPRK. His most recent report, published in 2018, discusses how denuclearization within North Korea should be passed over a ten year period to allow the United states to reduce and manage risks.¹⁷⁴

Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability DPRK Energy Experts Working Group

The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, a public policy think tank based in Berkeley, California, argues that the unavailability of natural resources in the DPRK for energy consumption is a critical dimension to many of the issues involving North Korea, including the creation and resolution of the DPRK's nuclear program.¹⁷⁵ Other issues include military transgressions, economic collapse, and food shortages.¹⁷⁶ Due to this assumption, the Nautilus Institute is, and has been, invested in multiple projects concerning the DPRK's energy sector since its establishment in 1992 to address the issue of the DPRK's energy needs. One of the Institute's major projects was the DPRK renewable energy project, the US-DPRK Village Wind Power Pilot Project.¹⁷⁷

The US-DPRK Village Wind Power Pilot Project installed seven wind turbine towers in Unhari, a rural village on the west coast of North Korea, which provide clean, renewable energy to the village's medical clinic, kindergarten, and households.¹⁷⁸ The idea of the project emerged from a series of trips that Dr. Hayes made to the DPRK, beginning in

¹⁷⁴ Katy Gabel "Stanford researchers release risk-management roadmap to denuclearization in North Korea," *Stanford News*, May 30, 2018, accessed July 25, 2018, <https://news.stanford.edu/2018/05/30/stanford-researchers-release-roadmap-denuclearization/>; Siegfried S. Hecker, Robert L. Carlin, and Elliot A. Serbin, "A Comprehensive History of North Korea's Nuclear Program, *Center for International Security and Cooperation*, May 2018, accessed July 25, 2018, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/cisac-north-korea>.

¹⁷⁵ "DPRK Energy Experts Working Group (2006-2010)," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, accessed on October 11, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/>; David von Hippel and Peter Hayes, *Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK*, 1.

¹⁷⁶ David von Hippel and Peter Hayes, *Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK*, 1.

¹⁷⁷ "DPRK Renewable Energy (1998-2001)," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, accessed on October 11, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-renewable-energy/>.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

1991.¹⁷⁹ In November 1997, Dr. Hayes invited a delegation of North Korean renewable energy experts to come to the United States.¹⁸⁰ The North Korean delegation visited several renewable energy sites in the United States, including the Sacramento Utility Municipal District solar cell central station in California; the Zond Corporation wind farm in Tehachapi, California; and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory in Colorado.¹⁸¹ At the conclusion of the visit, the DPRK renewable energy delegation and the Nautilus Institute agreed to establish the US-DPRK Village Wind Power Pilot Project.

The installation of the renewable energy system began in May 1998, and was completed in October 2000.¹⁸² The first Nautilus mission to the DPRK in May 1998 installed the first of seven wind turbine towers and laid out the plans for building the powerhouse and installing the system.¹⁸³ The Nautilus delegation returned in September 1998 to raise the other towers, install the turbines, and to link the system to twenty households, a kindergarten, and a medical clinic.¹⁸⁴ The third mission took place in September 2000 and October 2000 where the Nautilus delegation installed a water-pumping windmill and transferred an ultraviolet water purification unit.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁹ Timothy Savage, "Introduction to the Special Issue," *Asian Perspective* 26, no. 1 (2002): 1, <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Asian-Perspectives-DPRK-fulltext.pdf>

¹⁸⁰ Savage, "Introduction to the Special Issue," 5.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁸³ "May 22, 1998 update," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, May 22, 1998, accessed on October 13, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-renewable-energy/project-updates/may-22-1998-update/>; Savage, "Introduction to the Special Issue," 7.

¹⁸⁴ "September 25, 1998 update," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, October 5, 1998, accessed on October 13, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-renewable-energy/project-updates/september-25-1998-update/>; Savage, "Introduction to the Special Issue," 7.

¹⁸⁵ "September 19, 2000 update," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, September 19 2000, accessed on October 13, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-renewable-energy/project-updates/september-19-2000-update/>; "October 3, 2000 update," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, October 3, 2000, accessed on October 13, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-renewable-energy/project-updates/october-3-2000-update/>; Savage, "Introduction to the Special Issue," 7.

During its visits to Unhari, the Nautilus Institute delegation also conducted household energy use surveys, and held meetings with their North Korean counterparts.¹⁸⁶ These surveys and meetings provided information on what types of fuels the DPRK needed, what types of technologies might be applied to meet the energy demand, what kinds of energy-sector investments would be most beneficial, and what types of local preferences would affect the acceptance of different energy options.¹⁸⁷ The information gained from conducting the US-DPRK Village Wind Power Pilot Project contributed to the Nautilus Institute's database on the DPRK's demand for and supply of the various forms of energy used in the DPRK.

The Nautilus Institute's database is another project of the Institute, which according to the Nautilus Institute is one of the only detailed energy supply and demand databases in existence for the DPRK.¹⁸⁸ The Nautilus Institute developed the database by assembling as much information on the DPRK that could be obtained from as many data sources as possible, which include: the Nautilus Institute's energy projects in the DPRK; several consulting missions to the DPRK on energy sector and environmental issues on behalf of international agencies, such as the United National Development Programme (UNDP); and reports made by the media, DPRK trading partners, South Korean government agencies, and visitors to and observers of the DPRK.¹⁸⁹ The collected information was then analysed by the Nautilus Institute to see which pieces of information matched and was compatible with other data, thereby creating a logical narrative about the conditions of the DPRK energy sector.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ "DPRK Renewable Energy (1998-2001)."

¹⁸⁷ David von Hippel, James H. Williams, and Nautilus Team, "Case Study of a Rural Energy Survey in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Methods, Results, and Implications," *Asian Perspective* 26, no.1 (2002): 79

¹⁸⁸ "2006 Meeting," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, June 2006, accessed on October 11, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/>.

¹⁸⁹ "2006 Meeting"; von Hippel and Hayes, *Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK*, 2.

¹⁹⁰ von Hippel and Peter Hayes, *Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK*, 100.

The database, however, initially only included information for the years 1990, 1996, and 2000, and was not updated after 2002. The demand for data on the DPRK energy sector by participants of the Six Party Talks, and states in bilateral negotiations with the DPRK, however, greatly increased. As stated in Section 3 of the Joint Statement of the 19 September 2005, the participating state of the Six Party Talks agreed to cooperate in economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK.¹⁹¹ In order to be able to adequately address the duration and scale of the DPRK's need for energy and economic assistance, and therefore, properly carry out Section 3 of the Joint Statement of the 19 September 2005, these states needed information about the DPRK's energy and economic situation. From this demand of information emerged the Nautilus Institute's DPRK Energy Experts Working Group project.¹⁹²

To assist in meeting the demands for current information on the DPRK energy sector, and for analysis on the different potential DPRK energy futures, the United States Department of Energy provided the Nautilus Institute a special grant to update its DPRK energy sector database and analysis.¹⁹³ The US Department of Energy, specifically its Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI) specializes in specializes in monitoring nuclear proliferation, and thereby provides unique expertise to the intelligence community.¹⁹⁴ With this grant, the Nautilus Institute held three DPRK Energy Experts' Working Group meetings, in June 2006, March 2008, and September 2010. The DPRK Energy Expert Working Group was also funded by the Iara Lee and George Gund III Foundation, John D

¹⁹¹ "Six-Party Talks, Beijing, China," *US Department of State*, September 19, 2005, accessed on October 11, 2017, <https://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm>

¹⁹² "2006 Meeting."

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Austin Bodetti, "How the US Department of Energy Shapes North Korea Policy," *The Diplomat*, December 18, 2017, accessed on August 26, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/how-the-us-department-of-energy-shapes-north-korea-policy/>.

and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, and the Ploughshares Fund.¹⁹⁵

Aim of Nautilus Institute DPRK Energy Experts Working Group project

The main aim of the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group was to update the Nautilus Institute's DPRK energy database and related analysis, so that the Institute could inform the parties of the Six Party Talks about the current status of the DPRK energy sector and possible approaches to the DPRK energy sector redevelopment.¹⁹⁶ The first DPRK Energy Experts Working Group was held from 26-27 June 2006 at Stanford University.¹⁹⁷ It was co-hosted by the Preventive Defense Project at Stanford University and the Center for the Pacific Rim at University of San Francisco. The second DPRK Energy Experts' Working Group was held from 8-9 March 2008 in Beijing, China. The objectives of the meetings were to: compile a quantitative and physical description of the energy situation in the DPRK; compile sectoral specific data pertaining to North Korea's energy economy, both supply and demand, including those of the military; examine the total data set for consistency, errors, and oversights; include biomass energy as well as fossil energy supply to the data set; examine the energy demand and supply in the DPRK within multiple dimensions, including energy economy, technology, and environment; examine motives and rates of change that determine future possible energy paths; and compartmentalize policy options into categories that relate to situations that arise from possible scenarios of DPRK nuclear dismantlement.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ "DPRK Energy Experts Working Group (2006-2010)."

¹⁹⁶ "2006 Meeting"; "DPRK Energy Experts Working Group (2006-2010)."

¹⁹⁷ von Hippel and Hayes, *Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK*, iv.

¹⁹⁸ Peter Hayes, "Welcome Participants! To the DPRK Energy Expert Study Group Meeting," Welcome Remarks and Purpose of Meeting, DPRK Energy Experts Working Group, East Palo Alto, CA, 26-27 June 2006, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/papers-and-presentations/>

Modality of Nautilus Institute on gathering information about DPRK energy sector

The Nautilus Institute updated its database by bringing together those with expertise on the DPRK energy supply and resources, and the DPRK energy demand and economy. Experts in attendance at the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group meetings included scholars and researchers from the: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory; US Department of State; US Department of Energy; Institute of World Development, Development Research Center of the State Council, PR China; Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; European Commission; Samsung Economic Research Institute; and Korea Institute of Construction Technology.¹⁹⁹ At the meetings, the experts made presentations where they provided pertinent, recent data and special insights on topics such as the DPRK's agricultural sector and implications for energy use, forest and other biomass production in the DPRK, the DPRK's mineral resources and inter-Korean cooperation, the DPRK energy and energy-related trade with China, and the DPRK's power sector.²⁰⁰ Through the compilation of the data gathered from the presentations, the Nautilus Institute aimed to make its database as reflective as possible of the actual conditions of the DPRK energy sector.

The final product of the meetings was a synthesis report concerning the DPRK energy sector that was made available to the participating states of the Six Party Talks, participants of the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group, and the public.²⁰¹ The report is titled "Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances, Engagement

¹⁹⁹ "Participants," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, accessed on 1 December 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/participants/>; "Participant List," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, accessed on 1 December 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2008-meeting/attendee-list/>

²⁰⁰ "Papers and Presentations," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, accessed on 1 December 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/papers-and-presentations/>; "Papers and Presentations," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, accessed on 1 December 2017, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2008-meeting/papers-and-presentations/>

²⁰¹ Hayes, "Welcome Participants!"

Options, and Future Paths for Energy and Economic Redevelopment,” and incorporated input from the first and second DPRK Energy Experts Working Group meetings.²⁰² The report lists the sources of the fuels used in the DPRK economy, shows the processes that produce or refine primary fuels for consumption, such as electricity generation facilities, and then lists the final demands for fuels, typically by sector.²⁰³ The sector categories for the DPRK supply-demand balance are industry, transport, residential, agricultural, fisheries, military, public and commercial sectors, non-specified and non-energy.²⁰⁴ The forms of energy that the database measures include electricity and coal output, oil imports, and the use of wood and biomass.²⁰⁵ The content of the report indicates that the Nautilus Institute aimed to provide the policymaking community with a comprehensive understanding of the DPRK energy sector. The latest update of this report includes estimated DPRK energy supply-demand balances for the years 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009.²⁰⁶

Liaison between Nautilus Institute and the Bush administration

The special grant given to the Nautilus Institute by the US Department of Energy indicates that the Nautilus Institute had a connection with the US Department of Energy, and thereby the US government.²⁰⁷ The relationship indicates that the information gathered by the Nautilus Institute was able to be transferred back into the official policymaking process since the Institute had access to the US political leadership. Moreover, the Nautilus Institute states on its website that it has provided policy analyses and briefings at their request to US government officials on the DPRK’s energy needs, its likely negotiating postures and

²⁰² von Hippel and Hayes, *Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK*, 1.

²⁰³ Ibid., 25.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 30.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 14-15.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 1.

²⁰⁷ “DPRK Energy Experts Working Group (2006-2010)”; von Hippel and Hayes, *Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK*, 27.

demands, and possible negotiable options.²⁰⁸ This implies that the Nautilus Institute was able to create a channel of communication between itself and US government officials of the Bush administration. The website, however, does not specify which agency or department of the United States government the Nautilus Institute provided information to.

The Nautilus Institute's work concerning the energy sector of North Korea began in 1998, and Dr. Peter Hayes' most recent reports about DPRK energy needs was released in 2014.²⁰⁹ These reports were published by the Center for Energy, Governance, and Security at Hanyang University in Seoul, South Korea, indicating that the Nautilus Institute maintained its relationships with the South Korean government and continued to provide policy analysis and briefings to South Korean government officials. After the last round of the Six Party Talks in 2008, Dr. Hayes, along with Dr. David F. von Hippel, continued to apply their comprehensive energy security assessment framework to North Korea's energy sector, and provided further analysis of the energy policies that would be useful to the issue of the DPRK energy insecurity. Furthermore, from 2008 to 2011, the Nautilus Institute launched another project, "DPRK Building Energy Efficiency Training."²¹⁰ The Institute, partnered with EEMP in China and the Global Cities Institute in Australia, performed an energy efficiency upgrade in a certain building in Pyongyang, North Korea, with the aim of building trust and reinforcing communication between North Korea and the international community.

²⁰⁸ "DPRK Energy Experts Working Group (2006-2010)."

²⁰⁹ David. Von Hippel and Peter Hayes, "Energy Needs in the DPRK", *NAPSNet Policy Forum*, August 12, 2014, accessed July 25, 2018, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/energy-needs-in-the-dprk/>.

²¹⁰ "DPRK Building Energy Efficiency Training (2008-2011)," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Stability*, accessed on July 25, 2018, <https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-buildings/>.

Conclusion

Science diplomacy has influenced the United States' relations with North Korea, as science is a commonality between North Korea and the United States, in which bridges can be built. The dialogues and actions of the science engagements created by the academics of Stanford University and the Nautilus Instituted allowed for the forging and maintaining of communication and cooperation that then produced information about the DPRK's science sector, including its nuclear sector. Moreover, science diplomacy between such actors and the North Korean government provided an opportunity for interactions between the United States and the DPRK when formal communication avenues became increasingly limited.

Due to the unsuccessful efforts by the Bush administration to obtain information about the DPRK's nuclear program, the Stanford University and the Nautilus Institutes' science diplomatic activities can be understood as contributing to fulfilling one of the normal functions of official Track I diplomacy. As demonstrated in this chapter, the Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute aimed to gather information respectively about the status of the DPRK nuclear facilities, and the DPRK energy sector. Both institutions, moreover, were able to transfer their findings back into the official policymaking process. By gathering information and transferring their findings back into the official policymaking process, the Stanford University academics and the Nautilus Institute were able to compensate for the Bush administration Track I diplomatic limitations, and its inability to adequately gathering information about the DPRK nuclear program. Although the visits by the Stanford University academics to Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and the activities of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability's DPRK Energy Experts Working Group can be perceived as science diplomacy, these activities can also be understood as an identifiable manifestation of United States Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK.

Introduction

From 26-28 February 2008, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra visited Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, to play a public concert and interact with North Korean musicians. The stated aim of the visit, according to Zarin Mehta, president and executive director of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, was to help the furthering of the normalizing of relations between the US and the DPRK by presenting a more positive image of the United States to the North Korean government and North Korean public.¹ This dissertation argues that non-state actors initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy because they believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate for the shortcomings of US Track I diplomacy with the North Korean government that took place during the Bush administration (2001-2009). Within the context of my central thesis, Chapter 7 shows that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a partial compensation for the US delegation's inability to fulfil the normal diplomatic function of minimizing diplomatic friction between the United States and the DPRK. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the US delegation to the Six Party Talks led by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher R. Hill (2005-2009) faced difficulties fulfilling the normal functions of diplomacy. The analytical framework of this dissertation argues that Track II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors compensate for the constraints that state actors face in official diplomacy. The orchestra aimed to present a positive image of the United States to the North Korean government and the North Korean

¹ Daniel J. Wakin, "New York Philharmonic Might Play in North Korea," *The New York Times*, October 5, 2007, accessed August 28, 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/arts/05orch.html?ex=1349323200&en=8ac70f4e20371cfb&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink>.

public. In so doing, the activities of the New York Philharmonic can be understood as a partial compensation for the US delegation's inability to ease the diplomatic friction between the US and the DPRK.

In the first section, I introduce the supplementary data that pertains specifically to this chapter. In the second section, I establish the limitations of Track I or official United States diplomacy. I demonstrate that the US delegation to the Six Party Talks led by Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador Hill faced difficulties minimizing the effects of international friction between the US and the DPRK, because the US delegation was unable to adequately show the North Korean delegation that the policy objective which the US delegation was seeking at the Six Party Talks was consistent with the interests of the DPRK. In the third section, I establish the motivation, aim, and outcome of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra concerning its visit to Pyongyang. In the fourth section, I analyse the literature concerning music and US diplomacy to demonstrate that this bulk of scholarship does not provide a sufficient framework that explains the New York Philharmonic's visit to Pyongyang.² In the last section, I argue that the literature on post-Cold War literature on diplomacy explains the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to the DPRK because it offers insight into why the visit can be understood as a partial compensation for the US delegation to the Six Party Talk's inability to achieve a diplomatic objective.

² Emily Ansari, "Shaping the Policies of Cold War Musical Diplomacy: An Epistemic Community of American Composers," *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 41-52; Jennifer Campbell, "Creating Something Out of Nothing: The Office of Inter-American Affairs Music Committee (1940-1941) and the Inception of a Policy for Musical Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 29-39; Danielle Fosler-Lussier, "Music Pushed, Music Pulled: Cultural Diplomacy, Globalization, and Imperialism," *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 53-64; Jessica Gienow-Hecht, "The World is Ready to Listen: Symphony Orchestras and the Global Performance of America," *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 17-28.

Data

This chapter makes use of primary data from newspaper articles and the documentary about the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang, "Americans in Pyongyang."³ Secondary data is derived from Robert Carlin's reconstruction of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang in Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin's *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*.⁴ Carlin's reconstruction is important since it is based upon interviews with Mehta. Mehta was a key organizer of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang, whom I was unable to interview in person due to issues pertaining to schedule and availability.⁵

The chapter nonetheless makes use of interviews with other key organizers of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit, who include Evans Revere, president of The Korea Society; Professor Frederick F. Carriere, executive vice president of The Korea Society; and Eric Latzky, head of communications of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra. The Korea Society helped organize the New York Philharmonic's visit to the DPRK. These individuals held these institutional positions at the time of when the New York Philharmonic Orchestra visited North Korea (2008). At the time when the interviews took place (2016),

³ Barbara Demick, "New York Philharmonic to play in North Korea," New York Times, February 24, 2008, accessed on April 11, 2017, <http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-phil24feb24-story.html#page=1>; EuroArtsChannel, "Americans in Pyongyang (Documentary about the New York Philharmonic's trip to North Korea)," Youtube Video, 52:56, Posted (Sept 2014), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7s7sbS5hiMo>; Anthony Kuhn, "New York Philharmonic Performs in North Korea," NPR, February 26, 2008, accessed April 13, 2017, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=19357328>; "New York Philharmonic to play in N. Korea- paper," Reuters, December 10, 2007, accessed April 13, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-30909620071210>; Thomas Omestad, "The New York Philharmonic Tries to Strike the Right Notes in North Korea," US News, February 26, 2008, accessed April 13, 2017, <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/02/26/the-new-york-philharmonic-tries-to-strike-the-right-notes-in-north-korea>; Wakin, "New York Philharmonic Might Play in North Korea"; Daniel J. Wakin, "North Koreans Welcome Symphonic Diplomacy," The New York Times, February 27, 2008, accessed April 11, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/27/world/asia/27symphony.html?_r=0; Daniel J. Wakin, "Philharmonics Agrees to Play in North Korea," The New York Times, December 10, 2007, accessed on April 13, 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/arts/music/10phil.html>;

⁴ Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (New York: Basic Books, 2014): 419-424.

⁵ Robert Carlin, interview with author, November 10, 2016.

these individuals no longer held the previous positions. The majority of data concerning the logistics of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit is derived from these interviews.

As underlined in Chapter 1, interviews raise some methodological and theoretical concerns, due to problems such as distinguishing truth from authenticity, potential bias, and the interviewee's memory.⁶ For a variety of reasons, the informant may omit important details, or they may view the situation through "distorted lenses" and provide an account that is misleading and unable to be checked or verified.⁷ Due to the lack of accessible information concerning the details and logistics of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to the DPRK, interviews with the organizers of the visit are necessary. To limit the margin of error concerning interviews as much as possible, the interviewees were asked similar questions concerning the logistics of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit, with the intent that this would allow the accounts to become verifiable. The interviewees provided similar answers, indicating that the account they provided concerning the logistics of the visit was not distorted. The form of interview was semi-structured interview as it allowed for specific topics to be addressed and gave space for the interviewees to address unconsidered question or topics.

This chapter analyses the literature on musical diplomacy, but shows that this scholarship does not provide a sufficiently helpful analytical framework that explains the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to the DPRK. It analyzes the special forum on US musical diplomacy, published by the journal *Diplomatic History*.⁸ The articles within this

⁶ George Gaskell, "Individual and Group Interviewing," in *Qualitative Researching: With Text, Image and Sound. A practical handbook*, ed. Martin W. Bauer and G. Gaskell (London: SAGE Publications, 2000), 38-56; Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Karl Nunkoosing, "Problems with Interviews," *Qualitative Health Research* 15, no. 5 (2005): 698-706.

⁷ Gaskell, "Individual and Group Interviewing," 44.

⁸ Ansari, "Shaping the Policies of Cold War Musical Diplomacy," 41-52; Campbell, "Creating Something Out of Nothing," 29-39; Fosler-Lussier, "Music Pushed, Music Pulled," 53-64; Gienow-Hecht, "The World is Ready to Listen," 17-28.

forum demonstrate that music and American ensembles were used by the US government as a tool of diplomacy, particularly during the Cold War. These articles do not engage with US foreign policies and national security concerns, and, therefore, do not properly demonstrate why the US government sends musical groups abroad to implement US foreign policies. There is little to no scholarly literature that analyzes the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to the DPRK within the prism of International Relations theories or diplomatic theories. The literature that discusses the visit is mainly descriptive.⁹ This research is, thereby, original in that it provides a scholarly analysis of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang.

US delegation unable to minimize effects of friction within US-DPRK relations

In this section, I argue that the US delegation to the Six Party Talks led by Ambassador Christopher Hill (2005-2009) was unable to fulfil the normal diplomatic function of minimizing friction between the US and the DPRK. According to Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, "friction is the chafing or rubbing together of things on proximity."¹⁰ Given the juxtaposition of these different political communities, some degree of friction will arise even between states that perceive a wide area of common interests, and whose relations are close and amiable.¹¹ Friction in international relations, therefore, routinely occurs between almost all states due to the fact that states have different political communities, each with its own values, preoccupations, prejudices, and

⁹ Erin Kruth, *US Alternative Diplomacy towards North Korea: Food Aid, Musical Diplomacy, and Track II Exchanges*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University SAIS, 2008, accessed June 22, 2017, <http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Kruth.pdf>; Karin J. Lee, "The New York Philharmonic in North Korea. A New Page in US-DPRK Relations?" *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 6, no. 3 (2008): 1-6.

¹⁰ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1977), 171.

¹¹ Ibid.

sensibilities. The effects of Bull's understanding of friction is the rise of tension and discord that may be unrelated to the actual interests of the states involved.¹² The effects of friction have the capability to hinder the negotiation process because it can hinder the states' ability to determine the area of overlapping interests. As argued by the literature on classical diplomacy, negotiation of an agreement is possible when the interests of the conflicted states overlap at some point and if the conflicted states are able to perceive that they do overlap.¹³ Minimizing the effects of friction between the conflicted states is, therefore, an important function of diplomacy, since it helps prevent states from losing their focus on the areas of overlapping interest.

Bull argues that a diplomatist can help minimize diplomatic friction by observing what he calls the conventions of language.¹⁴ Observing such conventions of language helps the diplomatist minimize friction because it ensures effective communication between the diplomatist and the other party about their respective states' interests and objectives. Bull explains that these conventions of language are: avoiding arguments that are intended to give vent to feelings or to satisfy the diplomatist's own or the diplomatist's country's pride or vanity; seeking always to reason or persuade rather than to bully or threaten; trying to show that the objective for which the diplomatist is seeking is consistent with the other party's interests; speaking of "rights" rather than of "demands," and to show that these rights stem from rule or principles which both states hold in common, and which the other state has already conceded; and trying to find the objective for which the diplomatist is seeking in a framework of shared interests and agreed principle that is common ground between the states concerned.¹⁵ These conventions of language allow the diplomatist to demonstrate to the other

¹² Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 171.

¹³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 170; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 531; Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 25.

¹⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 172.

¹⁵ Ibid.

party that the objective in which the diplomatist is seeking should not be conceived as the enforcement of a claim to universal authority, the promotion of the true faith against heretics, or as the pursuit of self-regarding interests that take no account of the interests of others.¹⁶ These conventions of language are, therefore, conducive to the negotiation process since it allows the diplomatist to bring attention to the common ground between the conflicted states' differing interests, and the realization that negotiation is thereby possible.

The US delegation led by Ambassador Christopher Hill (2005-2009) faced difficulties observing the conventions of language which would help minimize the effects of friction between the US and the DPRK. The US delegation was inept in showing the North Korean delegation that the policy objective for which the US delegation was seeking at the Six Party Talks was in the interests of the North Korean government, because the US delegation was unable to adequately persuade the North Korean delegation that the objective the US was seeking at the Six Party Talks was the actual policy objective of the Bush administration towards the DPRK. The US delegation aimed to show the North Korean delegation that the Bush administration's policy towards the DPRK was not regime change. Rather, the Bush administration was sincere in implementing the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round on the Six-Party Talks of September 19, 2005, which included the clause of how the US would move towards full diplomatic relations with the DPRK in return for the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program.¹⁷ The US delegation was, however, unable

¹⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 171.

¹⁷ "Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005," *US Department of State Archive*, September 19, 2005, accessed April 20, 2017, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm>; "North Korea-Denuclearization Action Plan," *US Department of State Archive*, February 13, 2007, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm>.

to do so due to the internal division within the Bush administration over how United States foreign policy towards the DPRK would be implemented.¹⁸

The internal division within the Bush administration impeded the negotiation process of the Six Party Talks, as it led to a lack of a coherent and consistent foreign policy towards the DPRK. Within the Bush administration were government officials who favoured diplomatic negotiations with the DPRK, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell and his Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs James Kelly.¹⁹ This group preferred a multilateral, diplomatic approach towards the North Korean nuclear issue, that would accent traditional negotiation and multilateral coordination.²⁰ Others in the administration, such as State Department Under Secretary for International Security Affairs John Bolton and Defence Department Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, favoured a more assertive and unilateral approach to North Korea.²¹ This group of foreign policy advisors were more concerned about the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and defence of the United States.²² They, therefore, pushed for the development of a home based, national missile defence system to defend against what they perceived as rouge nations equipped with weapons of mass destruction.²³

The division created a debate over how to achieve the goal of dismantling North Korea's nuclear program, which persisted throughout President Bush's terms as president. President Bush allowed the debate to continue, as he did not play his role as ultimate arbiter but rather continued to rely on the ideas and information of his advisers, giving his foreign

¹⁸ Christopher R. Hill, *Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 210; C. Kenneth Quinones, "Dualism in the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy," *Asian Perspective* 27, no. 1 (April 2003): 1-28.

¹⁹ Quinones, "Dualism in the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy," 2.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 3, 8, 12.

²² *Ibid.*, 6.

²³ *Ibid.*

policy towards the DPRK a duality.²⁴ This consequently hindered the US delegation's ability to persuade the North Korean delegation that that policy objectives that the US delegation were seeking at the Six Party Talks were the actual policy objectives of the Bush administration towards the DPRK.

Immediately after the announcement of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, which objective was the denuclearization of North Korea, the US Treasury Department placed economic sanctions on North Korean trading entities as well as on Banco Delta Asia of Macau, a bank in which several North Korean companies had accounts with.²⁵ Ambassador Hill states in his memoir, *Outpost: A Diplomat at Work*, that the purpose of this action was not to give him leverage during the negotiations, but to derail the negotiation process.²⁶ The imposition of economic sanctions ultimately became a serious setback to the negotiation process as it contributed to the significant deterioration of the negotiation atmosphere. The freeze on the North Korean-related accounts provoked strong condemnation from the North Korean government, as the DPRK interpreted the sanctions as a method of the US government to facilitate regime change in North Korea.²⁷ Kim Gye-Gwan, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK and head of the North Korean delegation to the Six Party Talks, called the imposing of financial sanctions on North Korea "a new US conspiracy to topple the North Korean regime."²⁸ The North Korea government reverted to its suspicion that the Bush administration was not serious about resolving the

²⁴ Quinones, "Dualism in the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy," 1.

²⁵ Hill, *Outpost*, 240-243; David Lague and Donald Greenlees, "Squeeze on Banco Delta Asia hit North Korea where it hurt - Asia - Pacific - International Herald Tribune," *The New York Times*, January 18, 2007, accessed June 3, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/world/asia/18iht-north.4255039.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.

²⁶ Hill, *Outpost*, 240-243.

²⁷ "Dialogue and Sanctions Can Never Go together: Rodong Sinmun." *KCNA*, November 2, 2005. Accessed June 3, 2014. <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200511/news11/03.htm>; Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 418.

²⁸ "Dialogue and Sanctions Can Never Go together: Rodong Sinmun"; Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question*, 418.

nuclear issue through negotiations, and instead sought the collapse of the North Korean regime. This belief continued to be prevalent within important sectors of the North Korean government, such as the military, during and after the fifth round of the Six Party Talks (9 November 2005 – 13 February 2007), which indicates that the US delegation had difficulty minimizing the effects of friction throughout this time frame.²⁹

The US delegation to the Six Party Talks aimed to show the North Korean delegation that the Bush administration did not seek regime change, and that the US would comply with its obligations as stated by the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round on the Six-Party Talks of September 19, 2005. The US delegation was, however, incapable of doing so due to the Bush administration's lack of a coherent and consistent foreign policy towards the DPRK. The United States delegation was, therefore, unable to show the North Korean delegation that the objective for which it was seeking at the Six Party Talks was consistent with the interests of the North Korean government. Since it could not do so, the US delegation was unable to observe the appropriate conventions of language, and thereby faced difficulties minimizing diplomatic friction between the US and the DPRK.

Motivation, aim, and outcome of the New York Philharmonic's visit to Pyongyang

In this section, I establish the motivation of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra that guided the management of the orchestra to further explore the DPRK's invitation to play in Pyongyang. I also address the aim and outcome of the visit. The New York Philharmonic Orchestra in its history has participated actively in American musical diplomacy, as its music directors, such as Leonard Bernstein (1958-1969), believed in the idea that music could

²⁹ "DPRK army officer blames US for tense situation on Korean Peninsula," *Xinhuanet*, December 23, 2007, accessed June 7, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/23/content_7299974.htm.

improve relations between the peoples of adversarial states.³⁰ Musical diplomacy has, therefore, traditionally been a part of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's philosophy. Having been interested in pursuing this philosophy, Zarin Mehta, president and executive director of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, took the DPRK's invitation into serious consideration.³¹

Between 1955 and 1961, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra was sponsored by the President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Special International Program for Cultural Presentations to make five tours abroad.³² The most well-known venture is the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's tour of the Soviet Union during 1959 led by its music director, Leonard Bernstein. As part of President Eisenhower's Special International Program for Cultural Presentations, the New York Philharmonic's visit was meant to contribute to the improvement of mutual understanding between the people of the US and the Soviet Union.³³ Bernstein called the tour "a mission of friendship," and believed that the contacts that the orchestra made with the citizens of the Soviet Union through its music would present an image that would go deeper than the impressions that the Russian people routinely received from the Soviet press that demonized the US.³⁴ According to Bernstein, the purpose of the New York Philharmonic's tour of the Soviet Union was to improve mutual understanding and appreciation between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union by presenting a more positive image of the United States.

³⁰ "Bernstein at the National Press Club", October 13, 1959, Bernstein collection 77/11, Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/rr/record/pressclub/pdf/LeonardBernstein.pdf>;

³¹ Zarin Mehta, e-mail message to author, June 10, 2017.

³² "Bernstein at the National Press Club."

³³ "Bernstein at the National Press Club"; Jessica Black, "Goodwill Tour or Cold War Competition? The Portrayal of Cultural Exchange in the American Press," *Context* 38, (2013): 1-10.

³⁴ "Bernstein at the National Press Club."

The orchestra spent three weeks touring Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, and presented twenty concerts to local audiences.³⁵ The tour was well received by the peoples of the Soviet Union, as according to Bernstein, “everywhere we went, audiences broke all the rules. They shouted and screamed, and wouldn’t let us go.”³⁶ Based upon Bernstein’s account of the tour, the Russian audience was, therefore, quite receptive to the New York Philharmonic Orchestra and himself. There is, however, a lack of scholarly literature that explains whether the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s tour of the Soviet Union led to better relations between the US and the USSR. The New York Philharmonic Orchestra again undertook a tour in the Soviet Union in 1976 led by Thomas Schippers and Erich Leinsdorf, and in 1987 led by Zubin Mehta.³⁷

With the New York Philharmonic’s history of being an American cultural diplomat in mind, Mehta chose to not dismiss the DPRK’s invitation when it arrived in August 2007, and instead, to further explore the authenticity and sincerity of the invitation.³⁸ Mehta stated in a telephone interview with Daniel J. Wakin, reporter for *The New York Times*, that it would be “a wonderful thing” if the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang helped in the furthering of the normalizing of US-DPRK relations.³⁹ The stated aim of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang was to make a contribution to improving relations between the US and the DPRK by presenting a more positive image of the United States to not only the North Korean government, but also the North Korean public.

The New York Philharmonic Orchestra was not going to the DPRK to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, as resolving an international conflict is outside the jurisdiction

³⁵ Black, “Goodwill Tour or Cold War Competition?” 1.

³⁶ “Bernstein at the National Press Club”; Black, “Goodwill Tour or Cold War Competition?”, 1, 2.

³⁷ John Rockwell, “Philharmonic Negotiating Concert Tour of Soviet,” *New York Times*, July 30, 1987, accessed June 27, 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/30/arts/philharmonic-negotiating-concert-tour-of-soviet.html?pagewanted=print>.

³⁸ Latzky, 2016.

³⁹ Wakin, “New York Philharmonic Might Play in North Korea.”

of a musical exchange between states. The orchestra, however, believed it was going to the DPRK with the support of the Bush administration. Latzky underlined in his interview that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra did not undertake this journey as an independent entity, and went only “at the behest, or the cooperation, the encouragement of the US government.”⁴⁰ According to Latzky, the orchestra did not feel it was its place to act as an independent cultural diplomat. He, therefore, made sure that the orchestra had received the US government’s approval before accepting the DPRK’s invitation. Mehta also stated that the orchestra would not consider going to North Korea without US government support.⁴¹ These statements demonstrate that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra believed it was going to Pyongyang at the encouragement, and thereby with the support, of the United States government.

The Bush administration, however, treated the visit as a private cultural event, rather than a government-supported cultural visit. During a White House press briefing, when White House Press Secretary Dana Perino (2007-2009) was asked about the White House’s position on the visit to North Korea by the New York Philharmonic, Perino stated that the White House considered “this concert to be a concert,” and “not a diplomatic coup.”⁴² She continued to describe the visit as a “private invitation that was issued” to the orchestra by the North Korean government.⁴³ Perino’s description of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to DPRK indicates that the Bush administration sought to distance itself from this endeavour. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice provided a similar answer to that of Perino when asked by the press, what potential the concert may possibly have for opening up further

⁴⁰ Latzky, 2016.

⁴¹ Wakin, “New York Philharmonic Might Play in North Korea.”

⁴² “Press Briefing by Dana Perino,” *The American Presidency Project*, February 26, 2008, accessed April 21, 2017, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=76694>.

⁴³ Ibid.

relations between the US and the DPRK. While Rice mentioned that she believed that it was a good thing that the New York Philharmonic was going to Pyongyang, she also stated that “we shouldn’t get carried away with what listening to Dvorak is going to do in North Korea.”⁴⁴ Rice’s answer indicates that the Bush administration did not believe that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang would have any significant impact upon the leadership of the DPRK and its policies concerning the denuclearization of its nuclear program. The Bush administration, therefore, had little intention to link the New York Philharmonic’s visit to the DPRK with the North Korean nuclear issue. Based upon the Bush administration government official’s description of this endeavour, the orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang cannot be understood as a state-sponsored US symphony orchestra tour.

In order to present a more positive image of the United States to the North Korean government and North Korean public, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang entailed a public concert that was televised live within North Korea, master classes between musicians of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra and young North Korean music students of the Pyongyang National Conservatory, and a chamber music event by an ensemble that was made up of musicians of the New York Philharmonic and musicians of the State Symphony Orchestra of the DPRK, which is the national orchestra of North Korea. The New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit consisted of activities that would allow for human relationships to be made between Americans and North Koreans based upon the repertoire of music. This section assumes that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra believed that these interactions would allow the orchestra to provide the North Korean

⁴⁴ “Briefing on Recent Africa Trip and Upcoming Asia Trip, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Washington, DC, February 22, 2008,” *US Department of State Archive*, released on February 22, 2008, accessed April 21, 2017, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/101246.htm>.

government and North Korean public an alternative, non-adversarial paradigm for perceiving the United States.

The management of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra sought to hold a concert that could be experienced by as many North Koreans as possible. To them, this meant a live, simultaneous broadcast of the concert within North Korea.⁴⁵ That the concert be broadcasted live was not a request of Mehta, but one of his conditions for going to Pyongyang that he had laid before the North Korean officials in the first meetings.⁴⁶ A televised concert was an important element to the New York Philharmonic's visit because it would permit a wide as possible North Korean audience to see the different side of the United States that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra was offering.⁴⁷ In addition, by making it accessible to the North Korean public, the orchestra would be able to counter the claim from the the US press that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra was catering to the North Korean regime and giving the Kim regime the appearance of legitimacy.⁴⁸

The management of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra arranged for musicians of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra to engage with young North Korean music students of the Pyongyang National Conservatory through a series of master classes.⁴⁹ This was an important component of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit because it allowed for re-humanized relationships to be developed between Americans and North Koreans. During the master classes, the North Korean music students played for the musicians of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, and in response the musicians gave direction and

⁴⁵ Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 422; Carriere, 2016; Latzky, 2016.

⁴⁶ EuroArtsChannel, "Americans in Pyongyang," 31:32.

⁴⁷ Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 422; EuroArtsChannel, "Americans in Pyongyang (Documentary about the New York Philharmonic's trip to North Korea)," 31:33; Latzky, 2016.

⁴⁸ Demick, "New York Philharmonic to play in North Korea"; Karin J. Lee, "The New York Philharmonic in North Korea. A New Page in US-DPRK Relations?" *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 6, no. 3 (2008): 1-6.

⁴⁹ EuroArtsChannel, "Americans in Pyongyang (Documentary about the New York Philharmonic's trip to North Korea)," 17:57; Latzky, 2016.

recommendation.⁵⁰ The music students then re-played the music as recommended by the musicians of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra.⁵¹ In essence, the master classes were simply a music lesson. The musicians of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra were able to create a standard teacher-student relationship with the young North Korean musicians.

Another event that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra organized during its stay in Pyongyang was a chamber music event.⁵² Larin Mehdel, the music director of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, decided that the chamber music would be a performance of Mendelssohn's Octet in E-flat major, Op. 20, performed by four American musicians and four North Korean musicians.⁵³ The chamber music event was an important component of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit since, according to the musicians of the orchestra, there is no greater act of cooperation than chamber music.⁵⁴ Similar to the master classes, the chamber music event allowed relations to be built between the US and the DPRK.

Glenn Dicterow, Concertmaster of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, and Cynthia Phelps, principal viola, both participated in the chamber music event. After the performance, Dicterow stated that the North Korean musicians, with whom they had never played with before, were in tune with the American musicians, as they were able to quickly recognize the American musicians' interpretation of the music.⁵⁵ Phelps made similar comments, as she noted that the North Koreans were receptive to the kind of musical phrasing and rhythmic intensity that the American musicians were trying to build together.⁵⁶ Their

⁵⁰ EuroArtsChannel, "Americans in Pyongyang (Documentary about the New York Philharmonic's trip to North Korea)," 18:43

⁵¹ Ibid., 23:06-23:18.

⁵² Latzky, 2016.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ EuroArtsChannel, "Americans in Pyongyang (Documentary about the New York Philharmonic's trip to North Korea)," 26:35; Latzky, 2016.

⁵⁵ EuroArtsChannel, "Americans in Pyongyang (Documentary about the New York Philharmonic's trip to North Korea)," 28:13.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 28:26.

experience demonstrates that the American and North Koreans musicians were able to create a musical dialogue and arrive at human relationships.

The New York Philharmonic Orchestra was able to present a more positive image of the United States to not only the North Korean government, but also the North Korean public. Mehta was able to ensure that the concert would be broadcast live within the DPRK, which thereby allowed a wide as possible audience to see the image of the United States that the orchestra was offering. This section is, however, unable to determine whether the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit actually changed the DPRK's adversarial image of Americans, as there is currently no way to accurately measure the North Koreans' perception of Americans after the concert.

When Mehta told Song Sok Hwan, Vice-Minister of Culture of the DPRK, that the concert was to be broadcast live, Song did not give Mehta an immediate response as he did to Mehta's other demands, such playing the US national anthem and having both the US flag and the DPRK flag on the stage.⁵⁷ According to Carlin, there was no precedent of a live broadcast within the DPRK.⁵⁸ It was not until two weeks before the day of the actual concert that the DPRK agreed. In early February, when the New York Philharmonic Orchestra began its tour in China, the North Koreans asked Mehta if the concert had to be broadcast live. Mehta responded that if the concert was unable to be broadcast live, then the New York Philharmonic Orchestra would not go to North Korea.⁵⁹ The DPRK relented, and agreed to have live broadcast inside North Korea. The New York Philharmonic was, therefore, able to

⁵⁷ Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 421; Carriere, 2016; Latzky, 2016.

⁵⁸ Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 422; Carriere, 2016; Latzky, 2016; Evans Revere, Zarin Mehta, Daniel J. Wakin, and Chuck R. Lustig, "The New York Philharmonic February performance in North Korea." Panel discussion, The Korea Society, Washington D.C., April 1, 2008, <http://www.koreasociety.org/dmdocuments/2008-4-2-nyphil.mp3>.

⁵⁹ Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 422; Latzky, 2016

achieve what it believed would allow the orchestra to present a more positive image of Americans to not only the North Korean government, but also the North Korean public.

Some of the musicians of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra argue that the North Korean audience's image of the US had changed, and that respectful, human-to-human relationships had been built, due to the orchestra's visit.⁶⁰ Jon Deak, Associate Principal Bass, recounts that when the orchestra played "Arirang," a folk song that is well-known and cherished in both North Korea and South Korea, there was "that warmth, and the falling away of the veil between the two peoples. There it was, it was dropping. It was visibly, palpably dropping."⁶¹ Deak underlines in his interview his firm belief that he saw the softening within the North Korean audience. Rebecca Young, Associate Principal Viola, also argued that the orchestra's performance led to a building of re-humanized relations between themselves and the North Korean audience. She recalls how members of the orchestra waved at the audience to say,

"We're leaving. Bye, nice to have played for you. And they started, somebody waved back and then somebody else on the stage, a few more people started waving. And the whole audience was waving to us, and we were waving to them. And it was human-to-human, and not rehearsed. That was the moment of connection, where we all felt like they got us, and we got them and something can happen. It was very moving."⁶²

Young's belief that a re-humanized relationship between the orchestra and the audience had been built is based upon the interaction between the North Korean audience and the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, as the orchestra was leaving the stage.

⁶⁰ EuroArtsChannel, "Americans in Pyongyang (Documentary about the New York Philharmonic's trip to North Korea)," 46:00, 47:40

⁶¹ Ibid., 45:52.

⁶² Ibid., 47:20-47:50.

Suki Kim's interpretation of the North Korean audiences' reception to the concert, which she establishes in her article, "A Really Big Show: The New York Philharmonic's fantasia in North Korea," is contrary to that of the musicians.⁶³ Kim accompanied the New York Philharmonic Orchestra to Pyongyang as a journalist. In her article, she writes that "the Koreans around me appeared amused, if not somewhat puzzled," when the orchestra began to play "Arirang," and that she "did not witness any tears" during the performance.⁶⁴ Kim, therefore, expresses her scepticism about whether the concert had opened the hearts of the North Korean people. She makes the conclusion that the concert was, "in the end, just a concert."⁶⁵

This dissertation is unable to confirm whose interpretation of the North Korean audience's reception is the most accurate, as there is currently no means to accurately measure whether the New York Philharmonic's visit changed North Korea's image of the United States. Through the various activities of its visit, the orchestra, however, did present to the North Korean government and North Korean public an alternative, non-adversarial paradigm for perceiving the United States.

Disconnect between study of US musical diplomacy and diplomatic theory

In this section, I analyse the literature concerning music and US diplomacy. I demonstrate that this bulk of scholarship does not provide an adequate analytical framework that would explain the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang. The relationship between music and international relations has been subject to little scholarly research. International relation theorists focus upon economic or military factors, while

⁶³ Suki Kim, "A Really Big Show: The New York Philharmonic's fantasia in North Korea," *Harper's Magazine* (December 2008): 70, <http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/harpers.pdf>

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

musicologists focus on analysing musical scores.⁶⁶ I choose the following articles as representative of the authorities work on musical diplomacy because the articles within the forum seek to examine the motivations and content of US-sponsored orchestra tours within the paradigm of cultural diplomacy. Moreover, one of the articles of this forum attempts to explain the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to the DPRK. These articles make up a special forum on US musical diplomacy, published by the journal *Diplomatic History*.⁶⁷

The articles within this forum establish that music and American music ensembles were used by the US government as a tool of US diplomacy, particularly during the Cold War period. Moreover, the forum demonstrates that musical diplomacy had different meanings and purposes depending upon its various participants, who included US government officials, musicians, and organizers. The articles, however, do not contextualize their respective arguments within the discipline of International Relations or diplomacy. Nor do the articles engage with the scholarly literature on US foreign relations during the Cold War. They, therefore, do not demonstrate the ways in which the American musical diplomatic programs were related to American national security concerns of World War II and the Cold War period, or explain why the US government used music ensembles to implement its foreign policies. For these reasons, the articles within this forum do not provide a framework that would sufficiently explain the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to the DPRK.

⁶⁶ Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1993); Marie Zawisza, "How music is the real language of political diplomacy," *The Guardian*, October 31, 2015, accessed May 8, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/music/2015/oct/31/music-language-human-rights-political-diplomacy>.

⁶⁷ Ansari, "Shaping the Policies of Cold War Musical Diplomacy," 41-52; Campbell, "Creating Something Out of Nothing," 29-39; Fosler-Lussier, "Music Pushed, Music Pulled," 53-64; Gienow-Hecht, "The World is Ready to Listen," 17-28.

Gienow-Hecht aims to explain why state governments, including that of the United States, send symphony orchestras abroad. She challenges the narrative that governments send symphony orchestras abroad to improve relations, as she argues that this interpretation is problematic due to the lack of evidence that demonstrates that touring orchestras do indeed improve relations between adversarial states.⁶⁸ Her scholarship, therefore, aims to provide an alternative explanation, as she argues that governments send symphony orchestras abroad to demonstrate the state's legitimacy as a prominent international actor, and to display the state's power.⁶⁹ Gienow-Hecht explains her argument within a theoretical framework that derives from theatre and drama studies concerning the stage, particularly its concept that the stage serves "to establish a relation and a hierarchy, defined by the audience, performance, and the mediation and control of a leader."⁷⁰ Gienow-Hecht thereby supports her explanation using the scholarship of theatre and drama studies' understanding of the stage. Gienow-Hecht's theoretical framework is, however, problematic for two reasons. She does not explain why the concepts of the theatrical stage drawn from drama and theatre studies are critically important for understanding musical diplomacy, other than her observation that both diplomatic historians and scholars of theatre and drama studies refer to the term "stage," within their respective fields.⁷¹

According to Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, the historical facts must lend themselves to the interpretation that the theory has put upon them, and the conclusions which the theory arrives must be consistent with the facts.⁷² Gienow-Hecht, however, does not demonstrate how her theoretical framework is

⁶⁸ Gienow-Hecht, "The World is Ready to Listen," 18.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 19.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 3.

consistent with the historical facts of state-sponsored symphony orchestras. For example, Gienow-Hecht argues that since World War II, the thinking of policymakers throughout the world, particularly in the United States, originated less in the ideals of public diplomacy, but in the basic assumption surrounding a performance of an orchestra on stage.⁷³ Gienow-Hecht, however, fails to substantiate her claims. Her scholarship makes no referral to policymakers, which shows that these policymakers understood the assumptions surrounding a performance of an orchestra on stage, and that their decision to send orchestras to other countries was based upon these assumptions.

Gienow-Hecht misunderstands and misinterprets the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to North Korea. Her article incorrectly portrays the visit as one that was sponsored by the US government. Gienow-Hecht states that the "US State Department financed Lorin Maazel and the New York Philharmonic's tour to Pyongyang...in an effort to move forward the stalemated talks on trade and atomic weapons."⁷⁴ Although the US State Department helped with the logistics of the visit, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to North Korea was financed by private sources.⁷⁵ There was no financial support from the US government.⁷⁶ Gienow-Hecht's article does not provide any citation concerning her statement about US government funding, so the source of this information is unknown. Furthermore, the Bush administration significantly depreciated the visit.⁷⁷ The New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang was treated by the White House as a "private invitation," rather than a musical tour sponsored by the US government.⁷⁸ The New York

⁷³ Gienow-Hecht, "The World is Ready to Listen," 27.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 18.

⁷⁵ Barbara Demick, "It's not like they just tuned up and played," *Los Angeles Times*, February 27, 2008, accessed April 21, 2017, <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/27/world/fg-logistics27>

⁷⁶ Latzky, 2016.

⁷⁷ "Briefing on Recent Africa Trip and Upcoming Asia Trip, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Washington, DC, February 22, 2008."

⁷⁸ "Press Briefing by Dana Perino."

Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang was, therefore, not under the auspices of the US government. The Bush administration did not support the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to the DPRK in the same manner that the Eisenhower administration supported the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to the Soviet Union in 1959.

Campbell emphasizes that the American musical diplomacy began before the Cold War.⁷⁹ Campbell's scholarship is more about historical revisionism, as she challenges the conventional narrative that argues that US musical diplomacy was a product of the Cold War. Campbell reconstructs the efforts of the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) Music Committee, which was established in 1940, in order to demonstrate that the model of US musical diplomacy began much earlier than the Cold War. Campbell establishes the objectives and artistic priorities of the committee members of the OIAA, and the processes by which the music projects were selected.⁸⁰ Campbell's scholarship is notable for examining the efforts of the OIAA in greater detail and with more insight than other works.⁸¹ It, however, does not provide an adequate framework that explains the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang because her scholarship is more focused on bringing recognition to the efforts of the OIAA Music Committee and its role in the history of US musical diplomacy, rather than explaining why the US government sent orchestras abroad.

Ansari analyzes the American National Theatre and Academy's (ANTA) Music Advisory Panel to argue that a nonstate actor was able to influence the agenda of the state actor.⁸² The ANTA's Music Advisory Panel entailed a group of American composers who selected the musicians and repertoire that would be sent abroad for the President's Special

⁷⁹ Campbell, "Creating Something Out of Nothing," 29.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 30.

⁸¹ Jonathan Rosenberg, "America on the World Stage: Music and Twentieth-Century US Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (Jan 2012): 66.

⁸² Ansari, "Shaping the Policies of Cold War Musical Diplomacy," 41.

International Program for Cultural Presentations.⁸³ Although the ANTA was an agency of the state, it was comprised of non-state actors, as the group was made up of private citizens. The aim of Ansari's article is to demonstrate that this group pursued its own personal agenda, which was to further the committee member's own style of music that happened to be classical music, and thereby influenced state policy. It, however, does not mention the role of the state and the foreign policies of the Eisenhower administration. There is, therefore, a gap within her scholarship as she does not address the political context in which the members of the ANTA operated within. Addressing the political context would better explain what motivated the composers to act as they did. The lack of information concerning the foreign political agenda of the state makes it difficult to determine whether the ANTA Music Advisory Panel had actual influence over the Eisenhower administration. Ansari's scholarship does not provide an adequate framework that would explain the New York Philharmonic's decision to go to Pyongyang since her analysis excludes the state. Although the visit was not a state-sponsored cultural event, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang involved state and non-state actors. It is, therefore, crucial that the theoretical framework that explains the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang takes into account the role of the state and the non-state actor within the domain of diplomacy.

Fosler-Lussier challenges the conventional narrative that explains American cultural relations with other states as imperialistic and the implication that these state-cultivated relations had harmful intentions and results.⁸⁴ Although her article acknowledges that the objective of the US State Department's Cultural Presentation Programs was to spread American influence abroad, she argues that the objective of American cultural diplomacy

⁸³ Ansari, "Shaping the Policies of Cold War Musical Diplomacy," 42.

⁸⁴ Fosler-Lussier, "Music Pushed, Music Pulled," 63.

changed to engagement and creating meaningful personal contact with the people of the other state.⁸⁵ Fosler-Lussier, therefore, argues that US musical diplomacy during the Cold War developed from a unilateral cultural invasion to a form of engagement. Her article is, however, atheoretical. Fosler-Lussier briefly mentions Joseph Nye's concept of soft power, as she suggests that US musical presentations during the Cold War derived from the "attractive qualities of American cultural products."⁸⁶ Her article does not elaborate as to why Nye's work helps support her position. Fosler-Lussier's article establishes that the US State Department changed the objective of its Cultural Presentation Programs, but it does not sufficiently explain why this change occurred. It, moreover, is not suitable for explaining the New York Philharmonic's visit to Pyongyang as the unit of analysis differs. Fosler-Lussier focuses on US-sponsored orchestra tours. Although the US State Department helped with the logistics of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to North Korea, the orchestra's visit to North Korea was not a US-state sponsored endeavour. Her argument, therefore, cannot be applied to the activities of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra.

New York Philharmonic's visit conceptualized within Track II diplomacy

In this section, I establish the theoretical framework that helps explain why the New York Philharmonic's visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a compensation of the US delegation's inability to minimize diplomatic friction between the United States and the DPRK. The theoretical framework is derived from the concepts of the analytical framework that were established in Chapter 2. The two concepts are that non-state actors also engage in diplomacy, and that Track II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors compensate for constraints that state actors face in official diplomacy. This theoretical

⁸⁵ Fosler-Lussier, "Music Pushed, Music Pulled," 55.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 64.

framework helps explain the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang because it explains why a non-state actor engages in practices that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks.

Theoretical framework: Non-state actors play a role in diplomacy

The theoretical framework that informs my argument, that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a partial compensation for the US delegation's inability to minimize the effects of diplomatic friction between the US and the DPRK, derives from the analytical framework that was established in Chapter 2. The two concepts are that non-state actors also engage in diplomacy, and that Track II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors compensate for constraints that state actors face in official diplomacy.

As argued by Langhorne and Kelley non-state actors are engaging in practices that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks.⁸⁷ The conceptualization of non-state actors that informs this perspective can be understood through the paradigm of the International Relations theory of neoliberal institutionalism, which regards non-state actors as also being important actors in the international system.⁸⁸ According to Langhorne and Kelly, one factor that induced the rise of the non-state actor's influence over diplomacy is the widespread adoption of information communication technologies (ICT).⁸⁹ The information power gained through ICTs elevated the influence of the public domain to behave in ways that are not necessarily parallel with the system of the states. This

⁸⁷ John Robert Kelley, "The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 21, no. 2 (2010): 286; Richard Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 2 (2005): 331.

⁸⁸ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁸⁹ Kelley, "The New Diplomacy," 289; Langhorne, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors," 332.

“communications revolution” led to the emergence of a wide range of human activities that has no connection or ties to government permission or regulation.⁹⁰ According to Langhorne, much of these human activities are able to weaken governmental authority, diminish its role, and loosen the bonds of loyalty between the population and its government.⁹¹ The weakening of state structures leads to state collapse and domestic political violence.⁹² Langhorne argues that these types of situations have proven to be very difficult for the traditional international and diplomatic processes to resolve.⁹³ The result is that non-state actors adopt higher profile roles as they fill in this gap because they promise levels of efficiency and responsiveness that the state cannot.⁹⁴

Based upon Langhorne and Kelley’s scholarship, when there are conflicts that seem to lie beyond the control of the state and state-sanctioned actors, non-state actors emerge to play significant roles.⁹⁵ Non-state actors are, therefore, compensating for government inaction. Langhorne and Kelley are, however, not solely arguing that states are sharing the role of diplomacy with non-state actors, or that the state is coordinating with non-state actors to better manage international affairs. They are also arguing that in the near future, non-state actors will be producing the more innovative and novel forms of representation.⁹⁶ Langhorne and Kelley, therefore, envision a world society where the non-state actors replace the state for the role of managing international transactions. This component of Langhorne and Kelley’s respective scholarship is, however, unconvincing, as Langhorne and Kelley do not adequately demonstrate their argument that diplomacy will be practiced in future not by the diplomat and foreign ministries, but by non-state actors.

⁹⁰ Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” 332.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Kelly, “The New Diplomacy,” 289; Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” 332.

⁹⁶ Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” 338.

While non-state actors are engaging in practices that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks, it does not mean that the role of the state and state-sanctioned representatives in diplomacy is insignificant or irrelevant, particularly since it is only the state that carries law-making and law-enforcement powers, as argued by Juergen Kleiner in his article, “The Inertia of Diplomacy.”⁹⁷ The state is, therefore, still an important actor on the international stage. The relationship between the state and the non-state actor in the domain of diplomacy is not an inverse relationship in that if one gains power, the other actor loses it. Rather, the state and non-state actors coexist in what Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann’s *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics* call a “mutually constitutive relationship.”⁹⁸ The tasks that the non-state actors perform add to and change ways of doing things for the state actors, and the non-state actors model their operations on the institution of diplomacy. This relationship can be seen in a specific form of diplomacy known as Track II diplomacy.

As established in Chapter 2, Track II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors assist state-sanctioned actors by compensating for the limitations that the officials of Track I diplomacy face.⁹⁹ The non-state actor is unable to replace the state actor’s role as a conductor of diplomacy. Track II diplomacy is, therefore, not a substitute for Track I diplomacy, but rather an interdependent process of Track I diplomacy. According

⁹⁷ Juergen Kleiner, “The Inertia of Diplomacy,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 19, no. 2 (2008): 321-349. Michael Lisowski, “How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no. 2 (2005): 361-383; Geoffrey Allen Pigman, “Making Room at the Negotiating Table: The Growth of Diplomacy between Nation-State Governments and Non-State Economic Entities,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 16, no.2 (2005): 385-401; Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, “Introduction,” in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, ed. Old Jacob Sending et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 5.

⁹⁸ Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, “Introduction,” 11.

⁹⁹ Ronald J. Fisher, “Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of Prenegotiation,” *International Negotiation* 11 (2006): 65-89; Ronald J. Fisher, “Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful Negotiation,” *International Journal* 44, no. 2 (1989), 442-474; Joseph Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy,” in *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships Vol II* ed. V.D. Volkan, J. Montville & D.A. Julius (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991), 162, 163.

to Montville, Track II diplomacy is a process involving unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups with the aim of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict.¹⁰⁰ Montville assumes that state actors face limitations when conducting diplomacy, such as the need to be seen as strong, wary, and indomitable in the face of the enemy by their constituents, and that the resources and procedures of Track I diplomacy may not be enough to resolve the conflict.¹⁰¹ Track II diplomacy is thereby designed to assist the officials of Track I diplomacy and to compensate for the constraints imposed upon the state actors conducting Track I diplomacy.¹⁰²

New York Philharmonic compensates for a limitation of US diplomacy

The New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit can be understood as a contribution to fulfilling the normal diplomatic function of minimizing the effects of friction between the US and the DPRK. The New York Philharmonic's aim to present a more positive image of the United States to the North Korean government and the North Korean public was influenced by Ambassador Hill's agenda concerning the visit. Hill sought to use the orchestra's visit as a means of shifting the North Korean government's adversarial perspective of the Bush administration.¹⁰³ By going to Pyongyang to help achieve an objective that the US delegation to the Six Party Talks had difficulties achieving, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit can be understood as a partial compensation for the US delegation's inability to ease friction between the US and the DPRK. The theoretical framework offers specific insights into this understanding of the New York Philharmonic

¹⁰⁰ Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch," 162.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 163.

¹⁰² Ibid., 162-163.

¹⁰³ Demick, "New York Philharmonic to play in North Korea."

Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang, because it explains why a non-state actor engages in practices that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks.

On 19 January 2007, Ambassador Hill met with Kim Gye-Gwan, vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK and head of the North Korean delegation to the Six Party Talks. During this meeting, Hill and Kim went through the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement, and discussed the implementation of the statement.¹⁰⁴ There is speculation within the policy and scholarly community that the idea of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra visiting Pyongyang was alluded during this meeting.¹⁰⁵ There is no exact explanation to how the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's invitation to play in the DPRK came about as neither the North Korean government nor the US State Department has provided an account of its respective contribution. One thing that is clear concerning this visit is that it was not initiated by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra.¹⁰⁶

This chapter argues that it is more probable that the idea of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra playing in Pyongyang arose during Hill and Kim's meeting in January 2007 as a premeditated opportunity to improve US-DPRK relations because of Ambassador Hill's personal involvement to make this endeavour a reality.¹⁰⁷ Hill's efforts indicate that he may have been involved in developing the idea of this endeavour, or at the least, was aware that the North Korean government was planning this endeavour. The DPRK had proposed the idea of a cultural exchange between the US and the DPRK within the context of the denuclearization of North Korea, before the summer of 2007. This further

¹⁰⁴ "US Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher R. Hill on North Korea, January 17, 2007," *The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy*, accessed April 18, 2017, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/docs/0701/doc02.htm>

¹⁰⁵ Frederick Carriere, interview with the author, October 14, 2016.

¹⁰⁶ Carriere, 2016; Latzky, 2016.

¹⁰⁷ Carriere, 2016; Oberdorfer and Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 421-422.

supports the argument that the orchestra's invitation was a premeditated diplomatic opportunity.

During the National Committee on American Foreign Policy's (NCAFP) Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security from 30 June to 1 July 2005, a participating North Korean government official asked the American speaker "whether the United States could engage in 'ping-pong' diplomacy with North Korea as it had done in the past with China."¹⁰⁸ According to the 2005 NCAFP report, the American speaker replied that "it could happen once a new atmosphere develops."¹⁰⁹ This discussion implies that the North Korean government was interested in some sort of cultural exchange with the United States in the summer of 2005, and, therefore, may have been waiting for a better moment to launch such a venture. The DPRK determined that the summer of 2007 was such a moment to send the invitation. The Six Party Talks was making visible progress concerning the denuclearization of North Korea, which was creating a more positive atmosphere among the participating states of the Six Party Talks.¹¹⁰ The Banco Delta Asia funds that the US had frozen had been transferred to North Korea in June 2007, and IAEA inspectors had been allowed into North Korea to monitor, inspect, and verify the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facility.¹¹¹ The IAEA confirmed the shutdown of Yongbyon in July 2007.¹¹²

In the autumn of 2007, Ambassador Hill visited David Geffen Hall, the location of the orchestra's rehearsals, to speak to the musicians about why it would be a good idea for

¹⁰⁸ "Multilateral Dialogue to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue," *Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*, August 9, 2005, accessed May 18, 2015, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/multilateral-dialogue-to-resolve-the-north-korean-nuclear-issue/>.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Oberdorfer and Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 420.

¹¹¹ Daniel Wertz and Chelsea Gannon, "A History of US-DPRK Relations," *NCNK*, November 2015, accessed on June 26, 2017, http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/history-US-dprk-relations#footnote26_eriumyu; Mary Beth Nikitin, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues," (CRS Report No. RL34256) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 1-32, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34256.pdf>.

¹¹² Ibid.

the New York Philharmonic Orchestra to accept the invitation.¹¹³ The musicians' decision to go to the DPRK was influenced by this meeting with Ambassador Hill. The New York Philharmonic Orchestra is a democratic body, in that the musicians have the right to give their opinion, and can refuse to perform in locations that have not already been pre-approved.¹¹⁴ Since Pyongyang was not one of the orchestra's regular locations of its Asia Tour, the musicians could decide to decline the DPRK's invitation. When the musicians of the orchestra were informed of the DPRK's invitation, there were people who were vigorously opposed to going.¹¹⁵ Eric Latzky and Zarin Mehta held a meeting with the full orchestra to discuss the invitation, and arranged to have Ambassador Hill and, at that time, his assistant, Foreign Service Officer Yuri Kim to attend so that they could talk to the orchestra musicians.¹¹⁶ At this meeting, Hill told the musicians what the "positive aspects of doing something like this would be," and explained why he thought this invitation was something right to pursue.¹¹⁷ The New York Philharmonic Orchestra's meeting with Hill changed many of the musicians' minds concerning this endeavour. After the meeting, musicians gave their approval for the management of the New York Philharmonic to further explore the idea of performing in the DPRK.¹¹⁸ Due to this sequence of events, I argue that the orchestra's objective concerning its visit to the DPRK was derived from Ambassador Hill's objectives concerning the orchestra's visit. The orchestra was, therefore, not pursuing

¹¹³ EuroArtsChannel, "Americans in Pyongyang (Documentary about the New York Philharmonic's trip to North Korea," 3:13; Revere, Mehta, Wakin, and Lustig, "The New York Philharmonic February performance in North Korea"; Latzky, 2016.

¹¹⁴ Carriere, 2016; Latzky, 2016.

¹¹⁵ EuroArtsChannel, "Americans in Pyongyang (Documentary about the New York Philharmonic's trip to North Korea," 2:32-2:58; Latzky, 2016.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 2:50

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 3:13.

¹¹⁸ Glenn Kessler, "Mid-Level Official Steered US Shift On North Korea," *Washington Post*, May 26, 2008, accessed June 27, 2017, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/25/AR2008052502805_pf.html; Latzky, 2016.

its own political or cultural agenda, but rather supporting an agenda that the orchestra believed was that of the United States government.

Ambassador Hill supported the orchestra's visit to Pyongyang due to his belief that the visit would demonstrate to the DPRK that the policy objectives of the Bush administration on the North Korean nuclear issue was not the collapse of the North Korean regime.¹¹⁹ Ambassador Hill stated to the Los Angeles Time editorial board that the presence of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra in Pyongyang would argue against the North Korean government's allegation that the Bush administration's policy towards the DPRK was regime change.¹²⁰ Hill strongly supported the visit, because he believed that the orchestra's presence would allow for a shift within the North Korean government's understanding of the Bush administration's policy on North Korea. Ambassador Hill, therefore, believed that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra could achieve what the US delegation had difficulties achieving at the Six Party Talks, which was showing the DPRK that the Bush administration did not seek regime change within North Korea. Ambassador Hill did not explain why he believed that the orchestra's presence would counter the North Korean government's allegation about the Bush administration's policy towards North Korea, but his statement indicates that Hill assumed that a touring symphony orchestra could improve relations between adversarial states. By sending the New York Philharmonic Orchestra to Pyongyang, Ambassador Hill wanted the North Korean government to recognize that the Bush administration did not seek regime change within the DPRK. Ambassador Hill was, therefore, sending the orchestra to Pyongyang to achieve a diplomatic task that the US delegation had difficulties fulfilling, which is why the New York

¹¹⁹ Demick, "New York Philharmonic to play in North Korea"; Revere, Mehta, Wakin, and Lustig, "The New York Philharmonic February performance in North Korea"; "New York Philharmonic to play in N. Korea-paper."

¹²⁰ Demick, "New York Philharmonic to play in North Korea."

Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a partial compensation for the limitation of American diplomacy between the US and the DPRK.

Conclusion

The aim of Chapter 7 was to show that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a contribution to fulfilling the normal diplomatic function of minimizing diplomatic friction between the United States and the DPRK. In the first section, I introduced the supplementary data that pertains specifically to this chapter. In the second section, I demonstrated that the US delegation to the Six Party Talks led by Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador Hill faced difficulties minimizing the effects of international friction between the US and the DPRK, because the US delegation was unable to adequately show the North Korean delegation that the policy objective for which the US delegation was seeking at the Six Party Talks was consistent with the interests of the DPRK. In the third section, I established the motivation, aim, and outcome of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra concerning its visit to Pyongyang. In the fourth section, I analysed the literature concerning music and US diplomacy to demonstrate that this bulk of scholarship does not provide a sufficient framework that explains the New York Philharmonic's visit to Pyongyang. In the last section, I demonstrated why the literature on post-Cold War literature on diplomacy explains the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to the DPRK.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

Introduction

The concluding chapter contains my research question and hypothesis, analytical framework, and the conclusions of each chapter. I then provide suggestions for further research. I lastly discuss my research findings and implications.

Research question and thesis

The prevailing view of the George W. Bush administrations concerning US foreign policy towards the DPRK was that the United States should not engage in Track I diplomacy with North Korea, as illustrated by the National Security Council, the president's office, and the vice-president's office. Although the US engaged with the DPRK through the multilateral diplomacy of the Six Party Talks between 2002 and 2008, the Bush administration continued to express a reluctance and disinterest to engage in Track I diplomacy with North Korea. Nonetheless, unofficial, or Track II diplomacy initiated by representatives of United States non-governmental organizations took place through the period of the Bush administration. Track II diplomacy, therefore, managed diplomatic channels between the US and the DPRK when official channels were closed. As demonstrated in the first chapter, there, however, is a lack of scholarly research on Track II diplomacy between the US and the DPRK. The question that arises from this research gap is why did influential United States non-governmental organizations (NGOs) initiate and pursue Track II diplomacy with the government of the DPRK during the United States administrations of George W. Bush that began on January 20, 2001 and ended on January 20, 2009? My research thesis is that non-governmental organizations initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy because these organizations believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate for the shortcomings of

US Track I diplomacy that took place between the Bush administration and the North Korean government.

Analytical Framework

To explain why non-governmental organizations initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy with the DPRK during the Bush administration, I developed an analytical framework that draws on concepts of diplomacy. The first assumption of my analytical framework is that diplomacy is conducted by the state and state-sanctioned actors, through the process of negotiations. The second assumption is that non-state actors are also engaging in core diplomatic functions. The emergence of non-state actors that are conducting diplomatic tasks, however, does not imply that the role of the state within the domain of diplomacy has become obsolete. The third assumption is, therefore, that the relationship between the state and non-state actors in diplomacy can be demonstrated in a specific form of diplomacy, known as Track II diplomacy. Track II diplomacy is a practice of diplomacy that is designed to assist state actors by compensating for the constraints imposed upon them.

Chapter conclusions

In this section, I present the conclusions of each chapter. In Chapter 1, I first demonstrated that there is a lack of research on Track II diplomacy between the US and the DPRK. Through the analysis of literature pertaining to US foreign policy, US foreign policy towards East Asia, and US foreign policy towards North Korea, I demonstrated five research gaps. I next introduced the research question and hypothesis of my dissertation. I then discussed my methodology, and lastly introduced the chapter structure of my dissertation.

In Chapter 2, I established the analytical framework to explain why influential US non-governmental organizations initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy with the DPRK

during the Bush administration. In the first section, I introduced my analytical framework. In the second section, I analysed the classical literature on diplomacy to argue that diplomacy is conducted by the state and that negotiation is a core component of diplomacy. I then addressed the limitations of the classical literature on diplomacy. I argued that non-state actors are also engaging in diplomacy, as argued by the post-Cold War literature on diplomacy. In the last section, I analysed the literature on Track II diplomacy to demonstrate that Track II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors help compensate for the limitations that state actors face during Track I diplomacy.

In Chapter 3, I argued that the constraint of US Track I diplomacy, which US Track II diplomacy helps compensate for, is due to the moralistic underpinning of US diplomacy. The moralistic underpinning can be understood through the ideology of American moral exceptionalism, which is based upon the normative claim that the US is morally superior to other states because the US' conduct of foreign affairs is guided by ethical principles. In the first section, I explored the two dominant understandings in which Americans conceive exceptionalism to better demonstrate that the American exceptionalism that influences US foreign policy is based upon the US' sense of moral superiority, and consequently stems from normative claims rather than empirical case studies. In the second section of this chapter, through the analysis of the scholarship on the history of US foreign policy, I showed that the US government makes use of the conceptual insights of the ideology of American exceptionalism, which have been identified in the first section, within its policy stance of diplomatic isolation towards states it considers as adversarial. The ideology of American moral exceptionalism, therefore, constrains the US government's negotiating options with non-democratic states, because it is used as a rationale by American policymakers and politicians who seek to avoid diplomatic engagement with non-democratic states.

In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that the actual practice of US diplomacy towards the DPRK during the Bush administration was constrained. The US delegation to the Six Party Talks was unable to fulfil the normal functions of diplomacy due to the underlying philosophy of the ideology of American moral exceptionalism, which impeded active diplomatic engagement with the North Korean government. In the first section of this chapter, I established the main objectives, aims, and implementations of the Bush administration's foreign policy towards the DPRK. In the second section, I argued that negotiation was not a core component of US diplomacy during the Six Party Talks, as the US delegation was unable to gather information about the adversary's position, or facilitate communication between the US and the DPRK. I, therefore, established the limitations of US diplomacy towards the DPRK that non-state actors sought to compensate for through Track II diplomatic processes. In the third section, I argued that US diplomacy during the Bush administration was constrained by the conceptual insights of the ideology of American exceptionalism, the lack of a concise and coherent policy on the DPRK, and the Bush administration's overreliance on the Chinese government.

In Chapter 5, I argued that the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), a non-profit policy organization, pursued and initiated a series of Track II meetings from 2003 to 2005 to compensate for the US delegation to the Six Party Talks' inability to clearly communicate US policy objectives to the DPRK. In the first section, I introduced the supplementary data that pertains specifically to this chapter. I then analysed Herbert C. Kelan and Stephen P. Cohen's model of the problem-solving workshop, as I used their model to help explain the NCAFP's Track II diplomatic approach. In the third section, I demonstrated the significance of the NCAFP as a nongovernmental organization that practices Track II diplomacy. In the fourth section, I established the assumptions that inform the NCAFP's Track II approach, the purpose of the NCAFP's Track II meetings concerning

the North Korean nuclear crisis, the objectives, the methodology, and the participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings. I lastly established that while the NCAFP was able to partially achieve its objectives, it had difficulties in meeting all of them.

In Chapter 6, I argued that the Stanford University and the Nautilus Institutes' science diplomatic activities can be understood as contributing to fulfilling one of the normal functions of official Track I diplomacy, due to the unsuccessful efforts by the Bush administration to obtain information about the DPRK's nuclear program. By gathering information and transferring their findings back into the official policymaking process, the Stanford University academics and the Nautilus Institute were able to compensate for the Bush administration Track I diplomatic limitations, and its inability to adequately gathering information about the DPRK nuclear program. Although the visits by the Stanford University academics to Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and the activities of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability's DPRK Energy Experts Working Group can be perceived as science diplomacy, these activities can also be understood as an identifiable manifestation of United States Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK. In the first section, I introduced the primary data, which includes data from interviews and policy reports, that pertains specifically to this chapter. In the second section, I critiqued the scholarly and policy literature on science diplomacy. I then drew on diplomatic theories introduced in previous chapters to establish a theoretical framework for discussion in the following section of the significant science diplomacy conducted by Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute in the DPRK. In the final section, I linked the theoretical framework with the empirical material to conclude the chapter.

In Chapter 7, I argued that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a contribution to fulfilling the normal diplomatic function of minimizing diplomatic friction between the United States and the DPRK. In the first

section, I introduced the supplementary data that pertains specifically to this chapter. In the second section, I demonstrated that the US delegation to the Six Party Talks led by Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador Hill faced difficulties minimizing the effects of international friction between the US and the DPRK. The US delegation was unable to adequately show the North Korean delegation that the policy objective for which the US delegation was seeking at the Six Party Talks was consistent with the interests of the DPRK. In the third section, I established the motivation, aim, and outcome of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra concerning its visit to Pyongyang. I then analysed the literature concerning music and US diplomacy to demonstrate that this bulk of scholarship does not provide an appropriate framework that explains the New York Philharmonic's visit to Pyongyang. In the last section, I demonstrated why the literature on post-Cold War literature on diplomacy explains the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to the DPRK than the literature on music and US diplomacy that was analysed in the earlier section.

Further research

While my dissertation focuses on the George W. Bush administrations, United States' Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK began before, and continued after the Bush administrations. The Track II diplomacy that took place during the Clinton administration (1993) and the Obama administration (2009) remains under-researched and deserving of attention. Further research should be taken in this direction, investigating why non-state actors, such as the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACS) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), pursued and initiated Track II diplomacy towards North Korea.

While there is still more research to be done on the topic of Track II diplomacy between the US and the DPRK, this dissertation aims to contribute to the study of US foreign

policy on the DPRK by providing another interpretation of US diplomacy towards the DPRK; the Bush administration limited its practice of official diplomacy concerning the North Korean nuclear issue, hence the opening for Track II diplomacy. Influential non-state governmental organizations initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy with the North Korea government because they believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate for these limitations. It is, therefore, my hope that this dissertation serves as another chapter to the academic, governmental, and public understanding of American negotiations with North Korea.

Research findings and implications

My dissertation examines three cases of United State Track II diplomacy to North Korea: Track II diplomatic conferences of the National Committee of American Foreign Policy; the New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea; and US science diplomatic activities to North Korea, which include the Stanford delegation's visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and the Nautilus Institute's DPRK Energy Experts' Working Group. The analysis demonstrates that each case of United States Track II diplomacy partially compensated for the US delegation to the Six Party Talks' inability to fulfil a normal function of diplomacy.

The Track II diplomatic conferences of the National Committee of American Foreign Policy partially compensated for the United States delegation's inability to clearly communicate United States policy objectives to the DPRK. The New York Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a contribution to fulfilling the normal diplomatic function of minimizing diplomatic friction between the United States and the DPRK. The delegation of academics from Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability's DPRK Energy Experts Working Group helped fulfil the

diplomatic function of obtaining information about another state, as both organisations gained much information about the DPRK's nuclear program.

My research findings indicate that the Bush administration limited its practice of official diplomacy concerning the North Korean nuclear issue, hence the vacancy for Track II diplomacy. It is, thereby, contentious to claim that diplomacy is no longer a viable solution based upon the Bush administration's practice of diplomacy with the North Korean government. My research findings, moreover, imply that Track II diplomacy can play an important complementary role to the different stages of the negotiation process. This finding can prove to be significant to the Trump administration, who, at this time of writing, is currently in a negotiation deadlock with the North Korean government. The Trump administration could use the processes of Track II diplomacy to help compensate for the constraints imposed upon United States government officials to be, or at least to be seen, strong, wary, and indomitable, or it can use them to re-open communication channels, as proven by the NCAFP Track II diplomatic conferences.

Conclusion

This research came about due to my concern that within the realm of academia and United States government, scholars and policymakers are arguing that diplomacy is no longer a viable option towards dismantling North Korea's nuclear program. An aim of my research was to, therefore, demonstrate that it is too early to declare diplomacy as a failed solution, due to the lack of research on Track II diplomacy between the United States and North Korea. Further research concerning the field of Track II diplomacy is necessary, such as the question of impact that Track II diplomacy has or does not have upon Track I diplomacy, or the question of the ideal participant of Track II diplomacy. Moreover, additional research concerning United States Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK is necessary, as Track II

diplomacy began before and continued after the Bush administration. It is, however, hoped that this dissertation will contribute to a better understanding of Track II diplomacy, and the contribution of Track II diplomacy to official, Track I diplomacy.

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